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A B S T R A C T  
By the beginning of the seventeenth century the 
Kozaks were established as an anomalous military class of 
freemen in the southeastern confines of the Polish- 
Lithuanian Commonwealth. These Kozaks were predominantly 
of the Rusin ethnic strain; Rusin being contemporary name 
for Ukrainians. To the Commonwealth these Kozaks were as 
useful as they were dangerous, and its government tried 
vigorously to subordinate them. Pressured by the ruling 
class to that end, the government finally resorted to
f
severe measures. Following the Kczak pogroms in 1637 and 
in 1638, it reduced the Kozaks to the status of serfs. The 
decade after 1638 was characterized by mounting crisis and 
great dissatisfaction, when the Kozaks experienced intoler­
able conditions of life. At the same time the Rusin 
people as a whole suffered religious persecution, economic 
exploitation and varying degrees of social and political 
oppression.
Emerging as the leader of the Kozaks in 1648, Bohdan 
Khmelnytskyi provided a spark to this explosive combination
ii
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of issues which set off the greatest of all the Kozak rebel- . 
lions in the Commonwealth. Initially Khmelnytskyi had no 
irredentist plans. He would have been satisfied with conces­
sions to the Kozaks and to the Orthodox Church, and with the 
establishment of an autonomous Kozak territory. But the 
Kozak victories moved the Rusin society into action. Thus, 
the Kozak rebellion soon became transformed into the national 
struggle of liberation against the Commonwealth. These deve­
lopments, combined with fresh military successes and the 
influence of the Rusin intellectual circles at Kiev., changed 
Khmelnytskyi1s aims and plans. He now visualized himself as 
the leader of the Rusin people and set before himself two main 
goals: to liberate all the Rusin people within the Common­
wealth; and to erect a Rusin state on the ruins of the medieval 
Kievan Rus.
Khmelnytskyi next convinced himself that the ruling 
clsiss would not agree to any reforms. He could not hope to 
change the existing dual structure of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth into a trialist state in which the Rusin segment 
would be guaranteed both equality and autonomy. He was there­
fore left with only one course of action: to establish an 
independent state by severing all ties with the Commonwealth.
t
iii
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Since Khmelnytskyi decided that he could not defeat it with 
his own resources, he resorted to the usual expedient of 
political manipulations. He played off the neighbouring 
powers against one another and formed alliances with those 
which he considered the least dangerous. In August 1649 
Khmelnytskyi was abandoned by his Tatar allies, just when a 
victory was within his grasp. He then had to negotiate with 
King Jan Kazimierz and to conclude the Treaty of Zboriv.
This treaty made great concessions to the Kozaks, but failed 
to satisfy the expectations of the Rusin people as a whole.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
P R E F A C E  
In the third and in the fourth decades of the seven­
teenth century, the majority of the nobles of the Polish- 
Lithuanian Commonwealth boasted that the international posi­
tion of their state was extremely favourable. They pointed 
out, on the one hand, that the neighbouring states were 
either plagued by disastrous wars, or were weakened as the 
result of participation in these wars, or in general, were 
passing through crises in one form or another. The Holy 
Roman Empire was ruined by the Thirty Years War, which also 
greatly undermined the military strength of Sweden. Muscovy's 
scars were still visible from the anarchy of the Time of 
Troubles; moreover, it received fresh wounds during the 
163 2-1634 war with the Commonwealth. Similarly, the Otto-
a .
man Empire was weakened by the recurrent dynastic uphevals, 
and its military strength was sapped bv the conflicts with 
Persia and Venice. The Commonwealth, on the other hand, 
enjoyed the times of "golden peace", stability and prosperity.
That great religious war which engulfed Western 
Europe and the internal struggles within such countries as 
England, France and Spain, only reaffirmed the faith of these
v
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nobles in the excellence of the political and the social 
institutions of the Commonwealth. It took the start of the
terrible "Deluge" of wars in 1648 not only to expose to them
the superficial strength of the Commonwealth, but also to 
convince them that its domestic affairs w&re not in good 
order. Some of these nobles began to realize that their 
chivalry, fighting spirit, prowess and even patriotism was 
corrupted by their wealth and egotism. The unexpected catas- 
trophies and calamities revealed to them the facts that 
their precious "golden liberties" rested on the deprivation 
of the rights of other classes of population? and that their 
flourishing parliamentarianism made the executive impotent 
and passed the real power to the hands of the magnates.
Moreover, they also saw that they were poor examples of that
"bastion of Christianity" against the enemies of the Church; 
that they were brought up in. the spirit of religious exclu­
siveness and intolerance; and that the harmony among the 
VEirious ethnic groups of the Commonwealth did not exist. 
Finally, as the Kozak "Hydra" reared its heads again in 
1648, it became obvious to most of the gentry that repres­
sion and serfdom did not solve the overall Kozak problem 
in 1638.
vi
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In 1648 Bohdan Khmelnytskyi provided a spark to the
explosive combination of issues, which first set off a Kozak
rebellion and then spread rapidly into a great fire of
national liberation of the Rusin people. The aim of this
monograph is to give an all-sided description and analysis
of events during this struggle within the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth, in the period 1648-1649.
The broad subject area of this monograph occupies a
prominent —  frequently controversial —  position in Polish,
Russian and Ukrainian historiography. But in the English-
speaking world, this subject matter did not receive the
«
deserving attention of scholars. This monograph therefore 
also attempts to contribute to this relatively unexplored 
topic in the English language historiography.
vii
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E X P L A N A T O R Y  N O T E  
In this monograph the spelling of Muscovite (Russian), 
Rusin (Ukrainian) and Belorusin (Byelorussian or White 
Russian) names follows the now common English transliteration 
of the Cyrillic alphabet, which is more or less adapted to 
correct pronunciation. I have used the system of transli­
teration as prescribed by the United States Library of Cong­
ress, omitting only such minor details as apostophes, dia­
critical marks and ligatures. Thus, for example, I use
Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, Aleksei Mikhailovich Lvov and Syluian
(
Muzhylovskyi; instead of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi, Aleksei 
Mikhailovich L 'vov and Syluian Muzhylovs'kyi. In the Polish 
proper names, since the Poles use a Latin alphabet, I have 
retained the original Polish spelling (or as it appeared in 
edited documentary collections), but without the diacritical 
marks. This rule also applies to other languages which use 
a Latin alphabet.
Usage has made a completely consistent spelling of 
proper names impossible. In an attempt to solve this diffi­
cult problem, I have adopted the following system:
I. Generally I have endeavoured to retain the
xi
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contemporary Ukraine, i.e., Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic. Additional explanation of these terms follow on 
pp. 1-2 of the text and in Appendix III.
III. I have based the spelling of most place names 
located within the 1648 boundaries of the Commonwealth 
largely on its four main ethnic divisions: Polish, Lithua- 
nism, Rusin and Belorus.in (see map following p. 1). Thus, 
for example, I have used the following: Krakow, Vilnius, 
Chernivhiv and Smalensk. This rule also applies to names o 
persons. But, in cases where I have found some difficulty 
in determining the ethnic origin of persons, I have spelled
I
their names in Polish. In other cases where persons were 
of an ethnic origin other than Polish, but they were best 
known by the Polonized versions of their names, I have also 
spelled their names in Polish. Thus, for example, I have 
spelled Jeremi Wisniowiecki, rather than Iieremia Vyshneve- 
tskyi (Ukrainian).
IV. There is one principal departure from the method 
described in section III above. It concerns place names 
which have acquired forms now firmly established in English 
Such names as Warsaw, Moscow, Kiev and Dnieper are less con 
fusing than Warszawa, Moskva, Kyiv and Dnipro. Thus, some
xiii
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nomenclature of the seventeenth century. 'For this reason I 
have used the older terminology in this monograph; for 
example, Muscovy instead of Russia; and Crown instead of 
Poland. The expression "Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth" 
comes nearer to the official term Rzeczpospolita than any 
other term given to the specific land area. When it is 
necessary to distinguish the two component parts of the 
Commonwealth, the terms "Crown" and "Grand Duchy" are used 
for Polish and Lithuanian territories respectively.
II. The meaning and use of the following terms in this 
monograph: Rusin and Ukraine, deserve a special clarification 
and attention. The term Rusin has been deliberately chosen 
and employed throughout this monograph to denote both the 
particular ethnic group within the Commonwealth and the par­
ticular qualities, and even certain specific territory inha­
bited by these people. In the second half of the nineteenth 
century the descendants of these people adopted another name 
for themselves —  Ukrainians. The term Ukraine, as used in 
this monograph, does not denote the name of the territory 
inhabited by all the Rusins, but only a specific area inha­
bited by some of them. The Ukraine of the middle of the 
seventeenth century also should not be confused with
xii
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well-known place names retain the form now generally 
accepted in English usage.
V. The spelling of proper names other than within the 
1648 boundaries of the Commonwealth varies with location.
Tims, I have used the Russian spelling for Muscovy, the 
German spelling for Prussia, etc. I have generally followed 
the system adopted by the editors of the Encyclopaedia of 
Islam regarding the spelling of Tatar and Turkish names.
VI. Because of the length of some titles, to save time 
and space, I have adopted the following system for footnotes:
(a). After citing the first two or three words of a
C
title, I have added etc for the rest of that title. Each 
of such shortened titles is entered in full in the biblio­
graphy.
(b). I have dispensed with citing the names of compilers, 
editors, publishers and translators, since they are entered 
in the bibliography. The names of publishers, however, are 
not listed in bibliography if books are over a hundred years 
old.
(c). I have adopted the following order when citing 
correspondence (as well as generally other documents): 
ncimes of both the addresser and the addressee; place from
xiv
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where the letter was sent (but omitting such words as "near", 
"in the camp near", etc); and the date of the letter. For 
the sake of uniformity, all dates are adjusted to the 
Gregorian, or the New Style, calendar, which in the seven­
teenth century was ten days in advance of the Julian or the 
Old Style, calendar.
(d). Stipulations in sections (a) and (b) above do not 
apply to a title which is not listed in the bibliography.
Each such title will be listed in full in the initial foot­
note.
(e). Since the bibliography contains most titles in
the Slavic languages, I have also translated each title from
Slavic into English. Titles, as well as words and phrases
»
in French and Latin, are not translated into English. I 
have purposely avoided long quotations in these languages.
I also saw no reason to retain the Latin of the so-called 
"macaronism", i.e., sentences with the mixture of Latin and 
Polish. In the footnotes, I have translated only the titles 
which are not listed in the bibliography.
Finally, Appendix II offers a selective index of the 
names of persons of importance, or of those frequently 
referred to in this monograph during the years 1648-1649.
xv
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In the same index I have listed the names of all the contem­
porary authors whose works appear in the bibliography of 
this monograph. The glossary (Appendix III) is for the 
purpose of further amplifying certain names and terms used 
in this monograph. The two maps are for the purpose of 
clarifying the historical geography of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth in the middle of the seventeenth century.
xv i
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CHAPTER I
THE SOCIAL, LEGAL AND RELIGIOUS CONDITIONS OF THE KOZAKS IN 
THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH TO THE THIRD DECADE OF 
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
I
In 1569 the Act of the Union of Lublin fused the 
Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania into one 
confederate state called the Commonwealth. As a result of 
this new political arrangement, the remnant of the medieval 
principalities of the Kievan Rus hitherto under the direct 
control of Lithuania, was incorporated into the Polish part 
of the confederation. The territories along both banks of 
the middle Dnieper River, comprising the southeastern
1
borderlands of the Commonwealth, were called Ukraine. The 
southernmost extremities of Ukraine's settled life extended 
to the beginning of the steppes, while still further 
south stretched vast tracts of "wilderness" which were 
almost void of population. The suzerainty of the
•^ -The name Ukraine (Ukraina) literally means "border­
land" . As used in this monograph, the name Ukraine is 
applied to the area comprising the Palatinates of Kiev and 
Bratslav (from 1569) and Chernihiv (from 1635).
1
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2Polish Crown over these areas was only nominal. Zaporozhe 
—  the land beyond the cataracts of the Dnieper —  and the 
Wild Plains were in reality a no man's land. The steppes 
ended at the shores of the Black Sea; here began the Tatar 
world.
Various ethnic groups and people of heterogenous
origin inhabited the newly-acquired territories of the
Crown. The main elements among them were the following;
Rusins, Belorusins (sic), Poles, Lithuanians, Muscovites
2
and Tatar-Turk admixtures. The Rusins, who formed the 
bulk of the population in these areas, also constituted the 
dominant ethnic strain in other soutfiern palatinates of the 
Commonwealth. They were the descendants of the various 
peoples who at one time had occupied the territories of the
2
In this monograph the name Rusin(s), used as an adjec­
tive and as a noun, is applied to that ethnic group which 
lived in the south-eastern palatinates of the Commonwealth. 
The vast majority of these people inhabited the Crown's 
Province of Little Poland (from the Palatinate of Rus in 
the west to the Palatinate of Kiev in the east). Variations 
of this name found in various monographs and works include 
the following: Russian(s), Little Russian(s), Ruthenian(s)
and Ukrainian(s). The name Belorusin(s) is applied to that 
ethnic group which during the same time inhabited most of 
Grand Duchy of Lithuania (excluding the northern palati­
nates) . The most common variations of this name are the 
following: Byelorussian(s) and White Russian(s). As used
in this monograph, the noun form Rus refers to the terri­
tory inhabited by Rusins; and Belorus to the territory inha­
bited by Belorus ins.
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Kievan Rus. They possessed a distinctive language and
culture, and most of them were Orthodox Christians. The
3
social and military element, known as the Kozaks, was also 
closely related to and identified with the Rusins.
The origin and development of the Kozaks within the 
Polish-Lithuanian state was an organic outcome of the pecu­
liar conditions of life along the borders of the steppes in 
close proximity to the Tatars. The frontier regions were 
virtually unprotected against the lightning strikes of the 
Tatar hordes from the northern shores of the Black Sea or 
those from Crimea. The aim of these Tatar raids was not 
only to spread destruction by means of fire and sword among 
the Christian "infidels", but also to gather plunder and to 
sieze human merchandise for the slave markets of Kaffa. 
Under these circumstances the settlers of the borderlands 
were unable to pursue their normal cultural and economic 
activities. On the whole, their lives and occupations were 
radically conditioned by the existence of the Tatar menace. 
Left primarily on their own resources, these people learned
3
Kozak and Cossack are synonymous terms. The former 
term is used throughout this monograph. The West European 
form, Cossack, according to Barthold, is the result of 
Little Russian (i.e., Ukrainian) and Polish*pronunciation 
of the Turkish word Kazak, which means robber, disturber of 
peace and adventurer. See W. Barthold, "Kazak", Encyclo­
paedia of Islam, II (1927), 836.
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4how to live with a sword by imitating their enemies. From
the Tatars they adopted their way of life, methods of waging
4
war, distinctive dress and even their name —  Kozaks.
In this way began the evolution of a distinctive 
group of people within the Commonwealth. Already at the 
close of the fifteenth century the Kozaks formed certain 
types of "hordes", which differed little from the hordes of 
their deadly Tatar enemies. Throughout the sixteenth cen­
tury this process of evolution continued, and it was chara­
cterized by the coalescence of multifarious social and 
ethnic elements. By the beginning of the seventeenth cen­
tury, due to the rapid increase in the numbers of the 
Kozaks, their social and ethnic backgrounds still resem­
bled a mosaic. Notwithstanding this development, the 
Kozaks as a whole were at this time established as a defi­
nite class of unique military freemen, and the Rusin
5
element became the dominant ethnic strain among them.
^See Aleksander Jablonowski, Pisma Aleksandra Jablono- 
wskiego [The Works of Aleksander Jablonowski] , 7 vols 
(Warsaw; E. Wende, 1910), II, 12-13.
5
See Wladyslaw Tomkiewicz, "O skladzie spolecznym l 
etnicznym Kozaczyzny Ukrainnej na przelomie XVI i XVII 
wieku" [On the Social and the Ethnic Composition of the 
Kozaks of Ukraine at the Turn of the XVI and on the Begin­
ning of the XVII Centuries], Przeglad Historyczny [Histo­
rical Review], XXXVI (no. 1, 1948), 249-60.
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5The shifting boundaries and the political instabi­
lity of the borderlands freed the Kozaks from the respon­
sibilities and restraints borne by the burgesses and the 
serfs. The majority of these Kozaks had no permanent 
homes or avocations. Some of them found seasonal work in 
the towns of Ukraine. Others used the steppe "wilderness" 
for various occupations: fishing, hunting, trapping, bee­
keeping and the like. Still others were engaged in steppe 
trade, or became, after a Tatar fashion, wild steppe herds­
men. With the approach of winter, these men gathered the 
fruits of their labour, returned to the inhabited areas of 
Ukraine and settled in various towns, particularly in 
those towns close to the steppes.
But the "Kozaks' life" was not limited only to 
such peaceful pursuits. Adventurous men formed bands and 
took part in various exploits: attacks on Tatar herdsmen 
and seizure of their flocks of sheep and herds of cattle or 
horses. They robbed Armenian and Turkish caravans and 
carried out military expeditions against the Tatars by land. 
They also plundered Muslim towns, freed Christians from 
the slavery of the "infidels", and destroyed Turkish 
galleys during their sea-raids on the Crimean coasts and 
on the shores of Asia Minor.
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These Kozak military freemen formed an anomalous 
fourth class within the social structure of the Polish- 
Lithuanian state. The nobles, burgesses and serfs cons­
tituted the only three legally-recognized social classes 
of the Commonwealth. For the time being,, the Common­
wealth's government simply tolerated the existence and 
growth of this Kozak anomaly, and left its status undefined 
and uncertain. The primary concern of the government was 
to curb the activities of the Kozaks. Since the govern­
mental policies made for this purpose were often charac­
terized by curious indecisiveness, lack of initiative and 
imagination, the control of the Kozaks proved to be a 
matter of extreme difficulty. Furthermore, by neglecting 
the affairs and the needs of the far-removed frontier 
regions, the government not only made possible for the 
anomalous Kozak military class to exist and to develop, but 
also by its inertia helped to create grave problems for 
the Commonwealth.
By handling the affairs and needs of the far- 
removed borderlands with certain disinterest, the govern­
ment failed to provide for them sound systems of defense 
and administration. The destruction of the Tatar nest in 
Crimea was never seriously considered in Warsaw; while the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7other alternative, the building of a chain of fortresses 
and the stationing of a strong regular array along the 
frontier, was thought to be too costly. The government 
was content more or less to abandon the claims to the 
lower Dnieper region and to leave it to the contest of 
arms between the Kozaks and the Tatars. It was also satis­
fied with the existing arrangement, whereby the defense and 
the administration of the border areas was left almost 
totally in the hands of royal officials known as sheriffs. 
Since the government supplied insufficient funds and 
troops to them, these officials were charged with a hercu- 
lean task. In order to forestall cr to retalliate the
A
frequent Tatar incursions, the sheriffs had no choice but 
to thrust the burdens of defense upon the local population 
and to call the Kozaks to the colours. Certain warlike 
sheriffs also enlisted the Kozaks into their own contin­
gents and for the sake of their own ends, carried out 
military "expeditions" into the Muslim world.
Since these officials were in a position to obey 
orders from Warsaw phlegmatically, or to ignore them 
completely, their administration was characterized by fre­
quent disorder. Under these circumstances, the frontier 
areas were open to the Tatar raids and were kept continually
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aflame by guerilla warfare; their administration was 
chaotic; and the authority of the government in them, was 
also non-existent. By leaving the borderlands without 
sound systems of defense and administration, the govern­
ment not only provided for the Kozaks a firm basis for the 
existence, but also created for them ideal conditions for 
their development and growth. The colonization policy of 
the government was still another factor which contributed 
to this evolutionary process of the Kozaks. Furthermore, 
it was also largely responsible for making the Kozaks 
become a problem for the Commonwealth.
Prior to 1569, as long as Ukraine belonged to the 
Grand Duchy of Lithuania, no outsiders had the right to 
acquire landed estates there. This obstacle was abolished 
when the south-eastern territories were incorporated with 
the Crown. Thus, soon after the Union of Lublin took 
place, Ukraine, "the promised land" which "flowed with 
[ rivers of] milk and honey", became the spoil of great 
Polish and Rusin lords. With little guidance and restriction
As described by the sixteenth-century French traveller, 
Blaise de Vigenere, in La description du Royaume de Pologne 
(Paris, 1573). Cited by Leszek Podhorodecki, Sicz Zaporoska 
[ Zaporozhian Sich] (Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1960), 
p. 5.
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from the government, these magnates soon carved out the 
south-eastern palatinates into immense 1atifundiae. In 
securing land monopoly, the new owners also gained control 
of the highest administrative offices. Furthermore, they 
introduced serfdom in a land without a landlord, and their 
swarms of rapacious officials began a system of economic 
exploitation. Since the Kozaks presented a problem not 
only to the expansionist policies of these "kinglets", but 
also to the system of manorialism in general, these poten­
tates attempted to reduce the Kozaks into serfs. In this 
way, apart from the Tatars, the Kozaks encountered a new 
brand of enemies in the borderlands, who threatened to 
destroy their status of military freemen. The Kozaks had 
little choice but to oppose the new order.
Even though the officials accused the Kozaks of 
"unsubmissiveness and rebellion", or called them "disobe­
dient", this did not mean lawlessness in all cases. Some 
of the Kozaks preferred the shelter of the borderland for­
tresses. They attempted to gain the rights of the landed 
gentry and to free themselves from the jurisdiction of 
sheriffs and their deputies. Living side by side with 
Polish or Rusin petty gentry, these Kozaks fared as well as
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
these neighbours of theirs who possessed coat-of-arms.
These petty squires frequently tilled the soil with their 
own hands and suffered, just like the Kozaks, under the 
heavy hands of the officials. If an oligarch showed desire 
for their land, he was in a position to acquire it either 
by "law" or by "lawlessness". Because of all of these 
circumstances, the Kozaks cared little for the honours of 
ennoblement.
On the other hand, the Kozak malcontents who pre­
ferred to face the extremes of climate and Tatar danger, 
rather than to bear the ever-increasing impositions thrust 
upon them by the authorities, fled to Zaporozhe. There 
they established themselves as a military-monastic community. 
Operating from their fortified island camp -- Sich —  
beyond the rapids of the Dnieper, they feared neither the 
threats of the Crimean Khan and the Turkish sultan, nor 
obeyed the fiats of the Polish king. The Sich, formed as 
a reaction to the borderland officials and the Tatar 
danger, became the centre for all dissatisfied elements.
This illegal "commonwealth" produced warriors who not 
only dared to take up arms against their suzerain, but who 
also carried out fantastic land and sea exploits in the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
11
Muslim world.
Both the governments of the Commonwealth and of the 
Ottoman Empire sought to reduce the power and the 
attraction of the Sich. The former could not ignore the 
activities of an illegal "state", which hatched rebels, 
received foreign envoys, formed alliances and carried out 
fire and sword into the neighbouring countries. To the 
latter, the Sich was a nest of pirates, who plundered and 
destroyed its Anatolian and Crimean possessions. But 
neither’ of the two powers was able to destroy the Sich 
completely. The Zaporosliian "knights" had no problem in
f
finding recruits to fill their ranks. To them came adven­
turous men, outcasts of society and those who thirsted 
glory and feats of arms. There were also mass flights of 
fugitive serfs who searched for the Kozak fairyland.
Following each campaign of the Zaporozhians, the 
High Porte issued threats of war to the Commonwealth.
7
See [Mustafa] Naima, "Zatargi z Ottomanami z powodu 
Kozakow i Dziennik Wyprawy Chocimskiey z Rocznikow Naima 
Efendi" [Conflicts with the Ottomans on Account of the 
Kozaks and the Journal of the Khotyn Campaign from the 
Annals of Naima Effendi] , in J. J. S. Sekowski, ed. and 
tr., Collectanea z Dziejopisow Tureckich Rzeczy do Historyi 
Polskiey Sluzacych [Collectanea of Events from Turkish 
Historiographers Pertaining to Polish History], 2 vols 
(Warsaw, 1824), I, 126-27, 177-82.
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Ultimatums sent from Constantinopole to Warsaw left two 
choices: the Kozaks as a military organization, must be 
destroyed, or the Kozak piratical habits must be effec­
tively curbed. The predicament of the Commonwealth became 
a "very hard knar, a knot strangely twisted", for which it 
required "not the sword of Alexander the Great . . . but
g
the wisdorft of Solomon". The main reason for this diffi­
culty was in the fact that the Commonwealth had no desire 
to become involved in an armed confrontation with the 
Muslim world; yet, it was in no position to carry out the 
demands sent from Constantinopole. On the one hand, to 
destroy the Kozaks —  even if that was possible —  for the 
sake of pleasing the infidels, also meant to destroy the 
only real defense against the Tatars. On the other, all 
efforts to subordinate the Kozaks failed to produce results.
The steps taken thereafter by the government of 
the Commonwealth amounted only to a series of inconsistent 
policies, which had the effect of actually intensifying
g
Evaluation of the Kozak problem by Krzysztof Palczow- 
ski in his pamphlet 0 Kozakach, jezeli ich zniesc, czyli 
nie —  Discurs [On the Kozaks: Should they or should they 
not be done away with? A Discourse] (Krakow, 1618). Cited 
by Jablonowski, op. cit., II, 200.
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the difficulties of the state. On the one hand, the Tatar 
raids of the borderlands were considered by the government 
as an unavoidable evil for which there existed no solution. 
The government1s envoys were instructed to make formal 
protests before the sultan, even though i't was common 
knowledge that these fell on deaf ears. The Khan of Crimea 
was bought off by the payment of "presents", a thinly- 
disguised humiliating tribute. Solemn pledges of friend­
ship were renewed with the sultan and his vassal, and 
assurances were given to them that all Kozak offenders 
would be suitably punished. Such policies proved to be 
futile. Since the Zaporozhians were out of the reach of 
the government, their piratical sea-raids continued. The 
"presents" also failed to stop the incessant Tatar depre­
dations .
On the other hand, equally futile were the steps 
taken by the government to bring the Kozaks under discip­
line. Given a definite status and organization, the 
Kozaks could have brought incalculable advantages to the 
Commonwealth. As excellent soldiers and sailors, the 
Kozaks could have extended the boundaries of the Polish- 
Lithuanian state to the shores of the Black Sea and 
protected them against the Tatars and th j Turks:
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The Counsels of Poland were in’ a great errour, 
when they resolved to change the life, and alter 
the humour of the warlike people, which being 
protected by their Priviledges, and encouraged in 
their Wars, would at all times, as occasion served, 
have been ready to have ejected great numbers of 
good souldiers into the Ottoman Territories, and 
might have conserved to balance the Ppwer of the 
Tatars, which now daily infest and ruine the Borders 
of Poland. These people were like ill humors, which 
being vomited out into the Dominions of the Turk, 
eased and made healthy the Body politick of Poland; 
but being conserved within the stomach, caused 
Syncopes, Convulsions, and such Commotions, as have of 
late years shaken the whole Body of the Polish Kingdom.
The government of the Commonwealth, however, failed 
to recognize such a positive significance of the Kozaks to 
the state. Under the pressure of the magnates the govern­
ment pursued a blind course of action, by seeking to 
repress and to reduce the Kozaks to the status of serfs. 
Since it was still unable to cope with Kozak power, it 
resorted to various short-term measures. These measures, 
often contradictory, were in most cases never executed.
They also served as a source which nurtured the warlike 
characteristics of the Kozaks. The overall result of these 
actions of the government was that it only succeeded in 
alienating the Kozaks and caused them to rebel.
^P. Rycaut, The History etc (London, 1680) , [1] , p. 68. 
(Italics in the original).
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II
One of the ways by which the government attempted 
to bring the Kozaks under its control was the establish­
ment of the registered Kozaks. Although this was a step 
in the right direction, it was too inadequate to solve 
the overall Kozak problem or even to subordinate all Kozaks 
under the authority of the government.
The Kozak register accentuated the divisions of the 
Kozaks into camps of opposing interests, and caused anta­
gonisms and conflicts between them. However, the advent 
of the register brought about the clearer emergence of 
three general groups: the loyal registered Kozaks; the 
Zaporozhian outlaws; and the mass of common Kozaks, who 
gravitated between the two extremes. Even though this rift 
among the Kozaks was advantageous to the government, its 
frequent contradictory policies minimized the successful 
use of the stratagem of divide et impera.
The registered Kozaks were in a far more advan­
tageous position than the Zaporozhians or the common Kozaks. 
From a small percentage of Kozaks the register created 
officially-recognized Kozak regulars -- His Royal Majesty's 
Zaporozhian Army. This Kozak Army was divided into
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regiments and attached to designated towns of Ukraine. The
main tasks of the registered Kozaks were to keep order in 
Ukraine, to prevent the sea-raids of their Zaporozhian 
brethern and to protect the frontier against the Tatar in­
roads .
Because the registered Kozaks performed military 
service for the state, the government granted them certain 
privileges. These were the basis for the evolution, espe­
cially among the officer-class, of a Kozak "aristocracy", 
or a comparatively wealthy military elite. Their views on 
property were the same as those of the privileged classes
t
of the Commonwealth. Since the vacancies in the Kozak 
register were rigidly controlled and restricted to persons 
whose loyalty was beyond question, the registered Kozaks 
were thereby inclined to favour the established order and 
to live on good terms with the authorities.
The basis for the legal status of the registered 
Kozaks within the Commonwealth rested on their "rights and 
privileges" which were recognized by the government. No 
such basis existed for the clear definition of the legal 
status of the vast majority of the non-registered, or 
common Kozaks. Yet, these common Kozaks not only regarded 
themselves as f'reemen, but in many cases also claimed the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
17
privileged status of the registered Kozaks as their own.
The main reason for this development was the failure of 
the government to define clearly their status.
The common Kozaks who lived in the border areas of
Ukraine, were bound by the impositions of serfdom if they
settled on private estates of the nobles. But no such
burdens existed for them if they chose to live on crown
lands. Thus, as the government sought to subject all the 
common Kozaks to all the laws,regulations and customs that 
were imposed on the serfs at the same time, it also acknow­
ledged that these Kozaks were freemen. These contradictory 
governmental policies caused the common Kozaks to vacil- 
liate between law and lawlessness.
Even the legal status of those Kozaks who were 
enticed into the Sich was not clearly defined. On the one 
hemd, the government regarded those Kozaks who lived out­
side the pale of the law more or less as fugitive serfs, 
who must be suppressed and whose servile status must be 
re-established. On the other hand, the government freque­
ntly looked upon these Kozaks as a collection of dregs from 
various countries, and who were not even the subjects of
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the King of Poland.^
The registered Kozaks were unable to carry out 
their duties, not only because they lacked sufficient 
strength, but also because the government failed to give 
them its full support. Only a small force of the regis­
tered Kozaks was kept by the government; therefore, in 
addition, it was forced to enlist common Kozaks whenever a 
war broke out. On occasions, even some of the Zaporozhians 
were "rehabilitated" and induced to serve alongside the 
registered Kozaks. In this way thousands of Kozaks and 
Zaporozhians could find their way into the elite of the 
Kozak Army. Once a campaign ended, however, the same 
thousands were expected to return to "peaceful" occupations.
Such governmental practices resulted in the loss of 
prestige associated with the register and in the under­
mining of the authority of the registered Kozaks. The 
common Kozaks were provided with an opportunity to clamour 
for the "rights and privileges" enjoyed by the registered 
Kozaks. By enlisting the Zaporozhians the government also 
gave a kind of silent approval of the illegal activities
■^See M. Hrushevskyi, Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy, 10 vols 
(New York, 1956)^11,325; and Tomkiewicz, op. cit. , pp.
255-57.
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and independent actions carried out by those remaining at 
Zaporozhe. In this way, the frequent governmental rever­
sals of policy degraded the registered Kozaks, provided 
the basis for the claims of the common Kozaks and enhanced 
the power of the lawless elements represented by the Sich.
Various other contradictory policies of the govern­
ment, as well as the malversations ot its officials, under­
mined the loyalty of the registered Kozaks, erased sharp 
distinctions among all Kozaks and made possible greater 
co-operation among them. The chronic lack of funds in the 
exchequer meant that the registered Koz aks were frequently
C
not paid for their services. For this reason many of them 
fell under the spell of the Sich, and together with the 
Zaporozhians, endeavoured to find plunder in the Ottoman 
Empire. In the same way, the too frequent reductions of 
the quota of the registered Kozaks and the rapacity of the 
officials, drove others to support the causes of their mal­
content brethern during rebellions. In 1638, when the 
government abolished most of the rights and privileges of 
the Kozak Army, it succeeded in completely alienating the 
registered Kozaks, and thereby set the stage for the hos­
tilities of a decade later.
Both the government and the vast majority of the
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nobles underestimated the role and the value of the Kozaks 
as a whole to the Commonwealth. The Kozaks were tolerated 
by the ruling class because it was neither able to find a 
suitable place for them within the organism of the state, 
to bring them under discipline, to crush their power com­
pletely, nor to reduce them to the status of serfs.
Because of these circumstances, the Kozaks were able to 
continue their existence and growth as an anomalous fourth 
stratum within the three legally-recognized social strata 
of the Commonwealth.
The Kozaks constituted a definite class of freemen. 
Since the Kozaks had no political rights and could hold no 
public office, they did not enjoy the rights and privileges 
of the nobles. However, by the fact that they possessed 
personal rights, could own land and were free from many of 
the restrictions and obligations borne by the burgesses and 
the serfs of the Commonwealth, the Kozaks thereby somewhat 
resembled the privileged status of the nobles. The Kozaks 
also considered themselves to be "men of knightly rank", 
even though this distinction legally belonged only to the 
nobles. The Kozak claims to knighthood were never offi­
cially confirmed by the government. Nevertheless, on 
occasions when the Kozak services were needed for war, writs
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issued by the royal chancery to the Kozaks frequently 
stressed their knightly characteristics. Furthermore, the 
same writs addressed the Kozaks by titles only proper to 
the nobility The Kozaks therefore resembled in many
ways the status of nobles, the highest estate of the 
Commonwealth.
One of the most obvious solutions for the overall 
Kozak problem was the extension of all the rights of the 
nobles to the Kozaks. The nobles, however, were decidedly 
opposed to any plan by which they would have to share their 
"golden liberties" with the Kozaks. This very issue was 
raised at the Convocation Diet of 1632. The delegates of 
the Kozak Army argued, that as men of knightly rank the 
Kozaks formed part of the Commonwealth's body politic, and 
as such they should have the right to participate in the 
election of a new king. Since this was a demand for politi­
cal rights, the representatives of the Commonwealth's 
ruling class found no reason to initiate any dangerous pre­
cedents. The Senate issued a statement to the effect that 
the Kozaks were simply commoners and had no right to make
■^See K. Szajnocha, Dwa lata dziejow naszych 1646.
1648., 2 vols (Warsaw, 1900), I, 1, 62-64; and Tomkiewicz, 
op. cit., p. 253.
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such demands. The Chamber of Deputies acknowledged that
the Kozaks were part of the Commonwealth's body —  but only
as hair and nails which had to be cut off if they grew too 
12long. Thus ended this far-reaching Kozak proposal which 
aimed to transform the Kozaks into a stratum equal to that 
of the nobility.
By rejecting the plan which would extend political 
rights to the Kozaks, the government failed once again to 
take advantage of a possible solution to the pressing 
Kozak problem and also created more difficulties for it­
self. One serious consequence of the governmental failure 
to settle the Kozak affairs was the entanglement of the 
already thorny Kozak problem with the grievances and the 
aspirations of the Rusin people. As a result of this 
development, the government was unable to deal with the 
Kozak problem solely on the basis of satisfying the 
interests of the Kozaks alone.
The Kozaks were not an isolated class of people, 
but an integral part of the Rusin society. The Kozaks
12See Zbigniew Wojcik, Dzikie Pola w ogniu. 0 Kozaczy- 
znie w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej [Wild Plains in Flames.
On the Kozaks of the Old Commonwealth] , 2nd ed (Warsaw; 
Wiedza Powszechna, 1961), pp. 114-15; and Hrushevskyi, 
op. cit., VIII, 1, 150-51.
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thereby not only expressed the desires of the "dissatis­
fied" Rusin elements within their ranks. They also shared 
the aspirations of all the Rusin people. Among all these 
aspirations, those affecting the Rusin Orthodox faith were 
extremely significant. Orthodoxy provided a common cause 
for all the Rusin people and thereby was able to foster 
Rusin nationalism. In this way the Kozaks were drawn into 
the crucial religious struggle between the Orthodox and the 
Uniates within the Commonwealth.
Ill
The religious conflict between the Orthodox and 
the Uniate Churches began following the Union of Brest. In 
1596 a church council was summoned to Brest-Litovsk to pro­
claim the union of the Commonwealth's Orthodox Church with 
Rome. The church union was supported by a majority of the 
Orthodox hierarchy, including the Metropolitan of Kiev.
Two bishops, together with a large number of delegates from 
the monasteries and the parish clergy, as well as with 
representatives of the laity, desired to remain members of 
the Orthodox Church. The two sides among the Orthodox 
failed to reach an agreement on the question of union, and 
concluded their deliberations by excommunicating and
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anathematizing each other.
Only the decisions of the Roman party at the 
Council of Brest were recognized by the government. There­
fore, it sanctioned the existence of the new Uniate Church, 
making it the sole representative Of all the Orthodox 
Rusin and Belorusin people, and treated the Orthodox Church 
as legally non-existent. The result of this governmental 
policy was' the persecution of the Orthodox: churches , 
monasteries and church lands were siezed and given to the 
Uriiates; church services were suppressed; and many of those 
who remained Orthodox lost their civil and political 
rights
Twenty-five years after the Union of Brest the
Uniate Church possessed twice the number of churches the
Orthodox Church had; yet, according to a report of a papal
14nuncio, the Unrate Church remained "almost without fold". 
Thus, an absurd situation evolved and prevailed: the
13See the speech of the Orthodox deputy from Volynia, 
Lcivrentyi Drevynskyi, at the Diet of 1620, in Hrushevskyi, 
op. cit., VII, 445-47.
■^Instruction to Msgr. Lancellotti (1622). Cited by 
Jozef Tretiak, Historja wojny chocimskiej (1621) [History 
of the Khotyn War (1621)] , new rev. ed. (Krakow: Krakowska
Spolka Wydawnicza, 1921), p. 85. *
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Uniates had a hierarchy, many empty churches and a small 
flock of faithful; while the Orthodox "Schismatics" had 
one bishop, very few churches and a countless number of the 
faithful.
It was through the actions of these faithful that 
the Orthodox Church managed to respond to the challenges 
of its Uniate rival. Although the Eastern Church was 
abandoned by most of the Rusin aristocracy, it found other 
able leaders in its monasteries and in the ranks of its 
vigorous laity, chiefly composed of lesser Rusin nobles 
and of Rusin burgesses. They prevented the Orthodox Church 
from falling into a deeper state of degeneration and its 
ecclesiastical affairs from becoming more disorganized.
They took up the challenge of its regeneration. The Rusin 
serfs only played a passive role by being tenaciously 
attached to their traditional faith. The incalculable 
contributions of still one more segment of the Rusin 
society, the Kozaks, made possible for the Orthodox Church 
to redouble its missionary activities and to organize its 
own defense in depth against all "Latinist encroachments".
The Kozaks were not always the staunch supporters 
of Orthodoxy or the irreconcilable enemies of Uniatism.
Even as late as the close of the sixteenth century their
.4  r  t r; ' - 
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religiousness could only be measured by the antithesis
15
with the world of Islam. Many Kozaks paid little 
attention to the solemn pronouncements at the Council of 
Brest. They were unconcerned about the religious polemics 
between the Orthodox and the Uniates and even about the 
plight of the Orthodox Church. For this reason they were 
considered to be men "without religion" and religious 
"rebels" even by the most enlightened representatives of 
the Eastern Church.^ Nevertheless, by the second decade 
of the seventeenth century the Kozaks as a whole assumed 
an active role in the affairs of the Orthodox Church. One
I
factor responsible for this change of direction was the 
revival of the influence of Kiev, which attracted Kozak 
support. Another major reason why the Kozaks began to 
support the Orthodox Church was because in their ranks were 
found many Rusins who experienced persecution for their 
faith.
15See Jablonowski, op. cit., II, 23.
•'■^ These were the opinions of the Orthodox magnate, Adam 
Kysil, and the Orthodox Metropolitan Bishop of Kiev, Petro 
Mohyla. According to the views of the Ukrainian historian 
P.A. Kulish, the role of the Kozaks in religious matters was 
negligible. He remarked that their part in religious affairs 
differed little from that of the bandits of all times and of 
all nations. See Jablonowski, op. cit., II, 37, 101.
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From 1610, when the Kozaks made the first major 
public manifestation of their support for the Orthodox 
Church, they continued to play a vital role in the church 
affairs. The Kozaks helped to restore the Orthodox hier­
archy and thereby secured the continuity of the life of 
the church. They acted as arbitrators between the quarrel­
ling Orthodox factions; they cooperated with the Orthodox 
clergy, nobles and burgesses and championed before the 
government for the rights of the Eastern Church; and they 
were prepared to draw their swords in defense of their 
faith. Because of their protection Kiev became the center
from which radiated Rusin cultural, religious and national 
17life. The Kozaks were therefore no longer mere adven­
turers, but doughty exponents and preservers of the 
traditions of the Kievan Rus:
[The Kozaks] are the sons of the glorious Rusin people, 
from the seed of Japheth, who waged war against the 
Greek Tsardom [i.e., Byzantium] both on the Black Sea 
and on the land. This host is [ a descendant] of that 
generation which during |the reign of] Oleh, the 
Rusin monarch, . . . attacked Constantinopole. They 
[are the descendants of those, who] during [the 
reign of] Volodymyr, the sainted Rusin monarch, waged
17
x,See W. Lipmski, Stanislaw Michal Krzyczewski etc 
(Krakow, 1912), pp. 46-54.
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war against Greece, Macedonia and Illyria. Their 
ancestors, together with Volodymyr, were baptized, 
accepting the Christian faith from the Church of 
Constantinopole, and even to this day are born, 
live and die in this faith.
Because the Kozaks were so involved in the affairs 
of the Orthodox Church, they were partly responsible for 
its gains in 1632 from the newly-elected King Wladyslaw 
IV. One of the most significant concessions to the Ortho­
dox was the legalization of their hierarchy and the desig­
nation for it a number of episcopal sees. In the years that 
followed the Orthodox Metropolitan of Kiev, Petro Mohyla, 
a prelate of high birth, superior character and great
I
learning, inaugurated a period of rapid growth for the 
Orthodox Church. Even under these circumstances its free 
development was hampered by various restrictions.
Some of the Orthodox faithful considered that they 
suffered greater oppression than the Orthodox Christians 
under Islam, because their churches have been taken over 
by the Uniates; they did not have the freedom of worship; 
and because they were denied sacraments and even public 
burials. Other intolerable conditions included the leasing 
of the Orthodox churches to the Jews, who collected fees
•^Memorandum of the Orthodox hierarchy to the Common­
wealth's goverrnent in 1620. Cited by Hrushevskyi, op. cit. ,
VII, 3 91.
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P
for batisms, marriages, and even for opening of the churches
19
on Sundays and holy days. Under these circumstances, all
efforts to create a meaningful union of churches within
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth failed to produce 
20results. "The union", wrote the Lithuanian Chancellor to 
the Uniate Archbishop of Polatsk, "has not produced joy, 
but only discord, quarrels and disturbances. It would
•^Travelling through Ukraine in the 1650's the Arch­
deacon Paul of Aleppo, no doubt reflected the typical 
Orthodox attitude, when he wrote in his diary: [The
accursed Poles] have shewn themselves more debased and 
wicked than the corrupt worshippers of idols, by their 
cjruel conduct to Christians, thinking to abolish the very 
name of Orthodox. God perpetuate the Empire of the Turks 
for ever and ever! for they take their impost, and enter 
into no account of religion, be their subject Christians or 
Nazarines, Jews or Samarians: Whereas these accursed Poles
were not content with taxes and tithes from the brethern of 
Christ, though willing to serve them; but, . . . they sub­
jected them to the authority of the enemies of Christ, the 
tyrannical. Jews, who did not even permit them to build 
churches, nor leave them any Priests that knew the mysteries 
of their faith; but, on the contrary, violated their wives 
and daughters, if they at all appeared abroad in the public 
exercise of their religion". Paul of Aleppo, The Travels 
etc., 2 vols (London, 1831), 1, 2, 165.
70 .King Wladyslaw IV endeavoured to create, m  place of 
the Union of Brest, a lasting union of churches. One of his 
far-reaching plans was to affect a religious compromise 
between the Orthodox and the Uniates and to create for them 
a separate patriarchate within the Commonwealth. On the 
background and issues see Mikolaj Andrusiak, "Sprawa patry- 
jarchatu kijowskiego za Wladyslawa IV " [The Question of the 
Kievan Patriarchate During the Reign of Wladyslaw IV], in 
Prace historyczne etc (Lviv, 1934), 269-85.
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21 •have been better if it never existed".
The results of the overall religious struggle between 
the Orthodox and the Uniates and the persecution of the 
Orthodox faithful were extremely significant. Those who 
attached the Orthodox Church were actually contributing to 
the solidification of all segments of the Rusin society.
The cultural, social and ethnic cleavages, which existed 
between Polish or Polonized ruling class and the majority 
of the Rusin people, were further deepened by religious 
differences. The religious cleavage caused a pronounced 
Polish-Rusin antithesis. The attempts to force Uniatism 
on the Orthodox Rusin population awakened its national 
consciousness and hastened the formation of the Rusin 
nationality.
Since the religious and the national aspirations of 
the Rusins were fused with the Kozak problem, the Kozaks 
became the representatives of the Rusin society as a whole. 
In the Kozak ranks one definitely found Rusin nobles, bur­
gesses and serfs; and on the whole the Kozaks received 
support of the Orthodox clergy. Furthermore, through the
21L. Sapieha's letter to I. Kuntsevych, Warsaw, April 
13, 1622. Cited by Valerian Krasinski, Sketch of the Reli­
gious History of the Slavonic Nations, 2nd ed (Edinburgh, 
1851), p. 205.
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Kozaks —  these heirs of the Kievan Rus, the armed represen­
tatives of the Rusin people and the faithful members of the 
Orthodox Church —  the most enlightened Rusin circles 
attempted to re-establish the severed political and national 
traditions of the old Kievan state. Thus'cemented, the 
"alliance" of the Kozaks with the Orthodox Church posed new 
problems for the Commonwealth.
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CHAPTER II
THE NEW STATUS OF THE KOZAKS, AND THE OPPRESSED CONDITION 
OF THE KOZAKS AND OF THE RUSIN PEOPLE IN THE COMMONWEALTH,
1638-1648
I
The repercussion of the Kozak "alliance" with the 
Orthodox Church was felt by the Commonwealth both in its 
foreign relations and in its domestic affairs. Religious 
conflicts within the Commonwealth provided the Ottoman 
Empire and Muscovy, as well as other powers, with oppor-
I
tunities to agitate the Kozaks and the Orthodox in order to
carry out their own designs.'*' For this purpose the High
Porte used various high-ranking Orthodox clergymen, or
simply ordered its pawn, the Patriarch of Constantinopole,
to follow its bidding. Even though the Patriarch of
Constantinopole, who exercised jurisdiction over the
Commonwealth's Orthodox faithful, was physically the subject
of the Turkish sultan, he was spiritually the subject of
%
■^This aspect is well treated in Franciszek Suwara, 
Przyczyny i skutki kleski cecorskiej 1620 r [Causes and 
Effects of the Defeat at Tsetsora in 1620] (Krakow:
Gebethner and Wolff, 1930).
32
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2the Muscovite tsar. Since the Patriarch of Moscow was 
also becoming the instrument of the tsar, and since the 
Muscovite Patriarchate served as a magnet for the whole 
Orthodox world, the influence of Muscovy was much more 
dangerous for the Commonwealth.
The Commonwealth's government used various means to 
counteract the influences of these hostile powers. It 
placed high hopes in the Union of Brest. The religious 
Union of Brest would both supplement the political Union 
of Lublin, and would create more stable foundations for 
the coexistence of all four main ethnic groups within the
I
Commonwealth —  Poles, Lithuanians, Busins and Belorusins. 
These expectations of the government failed to materialize.
The religious union damaged the political union.
It also created a deeper rift between the Roman Catholic 
Poles and Lithuanians, and the Orthodox Rusins and Belo­
rusins. Furthermore, during the religious conflicts 
between the Orthodox and the Uniates, the Kozaks became a 
formidable weapon of the Eastern Church. Under the 
direction of the Orthodox clergy the Kozaks began to
2
See Wladyslaw Konopczynski., Dzieje Polski nowozytnej 
[History of Modern Poland] , 2 vols. , 2nd ed (London: B.
Swiderski, 1958), I, 190.
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gravitate closer to Muscovy. Both, the clergy and the 
Kozaks began to send their representatives to Moscow and 
appealed to the Orthodox tsar to extend his protection over 
them and over the persecuted Orthodox within the Common­
wealth . ^
These contacts facilitated for Muscovy the attain­
ment of its religious and political aims at the expense of 
the Commonwealth. On the one hand, Moscow, the "Third 
Rome", could carry out its messianic role of dispensing 
Orthodoxy throughout the Commonwealth. On the other hand, 
Muscovy was provided with an opportunity to fulfill the 
"testament" of Tsar Ivan I "Kalita" -- to consolidate all 
lands of the Kievan Rus which were part of the Common­
wealth .
The involvement of the Kozaks into the religious 
conflicts on the side of the Orthodox Church also caused 
serious domestic problems for the Commonwealth. By the 
1630's the Kozak rebellions became more frequent than in 
former years. One of the main reasons for this
3
See K. G. Guslistyi, "Istoricheskxe sviazx Ukraxny s 
Rossiei do osvoboditelnoi voiny 1648-1654 gg" [ Historical 
Ties of Ukraine with Russia Prior to the 1648-1654 War of 
Liberation], in A. I. Baranovich et al. eds., Vossoe- 
dinenie etc (Moscow, 1954), pp. 36-41.
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development was in the fact that the Kozaks made good use
of their "alliance" with the Orthodox Church. In order to
secure more support from the Orthodox people during their
rebellions, the Kozaks began to use religious slogans.
Typical of such slogans were those used by the Kozaks their
rebellions of 1637 and 1638. In their proclamations, the
Kozak rebels claimed of taking up arms, not only in the
defense of their "golden liberties", but also in the
4
defense of their "Christian faith".
Such Kozak slogans as "against these adversaries of
5
our Greek [ Orthodox] faith" stirred the Rusin society as 
a whole into action. These calls were answered by Ortho­
dox priests, monks and even nuns, who then fomented revolt 
among the Rusins. Both the burgesses and the nobles of 
"Greek [Orthodox] faith" provided war materials to the 
Kozaks and participated in the rebellions. The Rusin serfs 
needed little encouragement to rise against "their own
^Manifesto of Pavliuk But to the Kozaks, Moshny, 
December 15, 1637, in Szymon Okolski, Dyaryusz transackcyi 
wojennej mledzy wojskiem koronnem i zaporoskiem w r. 1637 
[i w r .  1638] [A Diary of the Hostilities Between Crown and 
Zaporozhian Armies in 1637 and 1638], ed. K. J. Turowski 
(Krakow, 1858), pp. 46-47.
5
Manifestoes of Karpo Pavlovych Skydan to the Kozaks, 
Chyhyryn, October 24, 1637; and Moshny, November 29, 1637, 
in ibid., pp. 26-27.
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I t
lords . Furthermore, the Kozak rebels renewed their
contacts with Muscovy: they petitioned the tsar to become
their sovereign and to permit the Don Kozaks to aid them.^
Since the Kozaks succeeded, time after time, in
7
inciting "nearly all of Ukraine to rebellion", the Common­
wealth's government sanctioned severe measures against them. 
Thus, in 1630 Crown Grand Hetman Stanislaw Koniecpolski 
called on the loyal gentry of Ukraine "to extinguish [this 
fire of revolt] with the blood of these serfs'1.^ In 1637 
Koniecpolski permitted the officials to vent their fury on 
the wives and children of the "scoundrels" who eluded 
capture, and even to raze their homes. He reasoned that 
it was "more preferable for nettle to grow on such sites,
than to have the traitors of His Royal Majesty and of the
9Commonwealth multiply there". To King Wladyslaw IV the 
Kozak "lawlessness" merited "only that it be extirpated
6Ibid., pp. 14-15, 90.
7Instruction of King Zygmunt III for the Diet of 1631, 
Warsaw, January 19, 1631, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., 3 
vols (Moscow, 1954), I, 96.
g
Manifesto of S. Koniecpolski to the nobles of Volynia, 
Bar, April 7, 1630, in ibid., I, 80.
^Manifesto of S. Koniecpolski to the officials of 
Ukraine, Bar, September 3, 1637, in Okolski, op. cit., 
p. 14.
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10
with the sword and every severity".
The Crown Army and the private armies of the
"kinglets" followed these guides and managed to suppress
all rebellions. On the wake of the quellings came the
bloody "pacification" of Ukraine and the confiscation of
lands belonging to the rebels. The final act was performed
by the Diet which passed ordinances to keep the rebels
under control. The same steps were taken after the Kozak
progroms of 1637 and 1638. At this time, however, the
severe ordinance, unlike all others, which for the most
part were not executed,^ had the distinction of being the
first one to be brought to a successful conclusion.
The Ordinance of the Registered, Zaporozhian Army,
12
in the service of the Commonwealth, was the foundation
^Manifesto of King Wladyslaw IV to the officials of 
Ukraine, Warsaw, December 1, 1637, in ibid., p. 63
■*"^ Such constitutions or ordinances were passed by the 
Diets in the years 1590, 1593, 1596, 1601, 1607, 1609, 1611, 
1613, 1618, 1619, 1620, 1623, 1624, 1626 (two), 1627, 1628 
and 1635. For the summaries of these ordinances see A. K. 
Zeglicki et al. comps., Inwentarz nowy praw, statutow, 
konstytucyi koronnych, y W. X. Litew: Znayduiacych sie w
Szesciu Tomach Voluminis Legum [A New Catalogue of Laws, 
Statutes and Constitutions of the Crown and of the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania, Contained in Six Volumes of the 
Volumina Legum] (Warsaw, 1754), pp. 257-60.
1 p
For the text of this Ordinance of 1638 see Vossoedi- 
nenie Ukrainy etc.. I, 255-57.
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upon which rested the whole weight of the "final solution"
to the Commonwealth1s Kozak problem. Passed by the Diet of
1638, this new Kozak Ordinance was practically a word-for-
word repetition of Koniecpolski1s earlier memorandum to the 
13government. It reduced the quota of the registered 
Kozaks to 6,000, formed into six regiments. The former 
Kozak "Elder" of the Army was replaced by an appointed 
commissioner of gentle birth, an individual of considerable 
military experience. His chief task was to keep strict 
discipline among the registered Kozaks and to administer 
justice to them. A special guard detachment was established 
for his safety which consisted of non-Kozaks. Polish or 
Rusin nobles who were experienced in military matters and 
who proved themselves to be men of "virtue and trust", could 
be: appointed as senior-ranking officers in the Kozak Army.
The junior-ranking posts were available to the 
14Kozaks, but only to those who had no blemish on their
13See Wladyslaw Tomkiewicz, "Ograniczenie swobod 
kozackich w roku 1638" [Restriction of Kozak Liberties in 
1638], Kwartalnik Historyczny [Historical Quarterly], XLIV 
(no. 1, 1930), 142-44, 146.
14
The only departure from the Ordinance, was the estab­
lishment at a later date of the posts of six regimental 
adjutants, one for each regiment. These po^ts were avai­
lable to the Kozaks. See Okolski, op. cit., p. 194.
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records of service to the Commonwealth. All six registered 
Kozak regiments were assigned alternating tours of duty at 
Zaporozhe. Their chief task was to guard the frontier 
against Tatar incursions. They were also to prevent all 
"lawless men" who would attempt to carry but sea-raids into 
the Ottoman dominions. No Kozaks were to venture into 
Zaporozhe without the commissioner1 s "passports". Those 
failing to comply with this regulation would be apprehended 
and then executed by the "governor" of Kodak fortress.
Koniecpolski1s recommendations dealing with non­
military matters were also accepted. The registered Kozaks 
were to suffer no ill-treatment from the civil authorities. 
The Kozaks were forbidden to meddle in civil matters even 
in those involving their own interests. If disputes arose 
between them, and the burgesses on crown lands , these 
disputes were to be settled by both the military and the 
civil authorities. In order to prevent such disputes from 
arising, a royal commission would define clearly the 
boundaries of Kozak landholdings.
The commission of the Diet which draughted this 
Kozak Ordinance added to Koniecpolski's recommendations 
three major proposals of its own. The burgesses were for­
bidden to allow their sons to enter Kozak ranks and to give
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their daughters in marriage to Kozaks. The Kozaks were not 
permitted to settle in the more remote areas of Ukraine, 
but only in the districts of Cherkasy, Chyhyryn and Korsun 
of the Palatinate of Kiev. The third proposal called for 
the restoration of all land, "illegally" possessed by the 
Kozaks, to the rightful owners. The commission hoped that 
these restrictions would eventually isolate the registered 
Kozaks from their environment, create a separate caste out 
of them, and thereby minimize chances of future rebellions.
This Kozak Ordinance a]so introduced two major 
changes. By abolishing the self-government of the Kozak
I
Army, this Ordinance completely altered the Army's chara­
cter. In 1G25 and in 1636 the government attempted to curb 
the self-dependence of the Kozak Army, but there was no 
governmental attempt to interfere in the Army's internal 
organization. The only exception was the intrusion of the 
Crown Grand Hetman, who nominated or approved the appoint­
ment of the commander of the Kozak Army. All other senior 
and junior officers were Kozaks who were elected by the 
Kozak rank-and-file.
The Kozak Army heretofore was a closed organization
15See Tomkiewxcz, op. cit., p. 146.
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which carried out its own affairs: it had its own chancery,
court, ordinance officers and adjutants. The government 
provided the Kozaks with pay and uniforms; in return, they 
performed military service for the Commonwealth. Now, the 
Ordinance of 1638 brought important innovations, for it 
took away from the registered Kozaks the "rights and privi­
leges" heretofore de facto possessed by them. An appointed 
commissioner, a non-Kozak, replaced the elected "Elder" of 
the Kozak Army; and all of its senior-ranking posts were 
also filled by non-Kozak appointees. Although the Kozaks 
were permitted to hold junior-ranking posts in the Army, 
these posts were non-elective and therefore were also 
controlled by the Kozaks' superiors. Finally, the judica­
ture and the chancery of the Kozak Army was also 
abolished.^
By abolishing the autonomy and the "democracy" of 
the Kozak Army, this Ordinance took away from the regis­
tered Kozaks their most precious privileges. They still 
possessed certain personal rights, but in reality, these 
rights elevated them only a step higher than their enserfed 
brethern. The former Kozak "aristocracy", men who
I
l^See ibid., pp. 148-49.
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petitioned for the rights of the nobles in 1632, were now 
reduced to common soldiers. They had neither the personal 
liberties, prestige nor the authority of the past years.
They were separated from their environment, restricted to 
live only in certain areas, kept under strict discipline and 
cut off from the Kozaks at Zaporozhe. Under this arrange­
ment the government expected to prevent future rebellions, 
because neither the serfs would be able to rise without the
leadership of the registered Kozaks, nor the registered
17
Kozaks without the support of the serfs.
The second important change introduced by the
I
Ordinance of 1638 was the abolition of the personal rights 
of all non-registered Kozaks. All Kozaks not in the service 
of the Commonwealth were thereby reduced to the status of 
serfs. The opening statement of this Ordinance emphasized 
this change:
We deprive them for all times of all of their former 
jurisdictions, seniorities, prerogatives, incomings 
and other dignities acquired by their faithful service 
from our forefathers, but now forfeited through this 
rebellion, wishing to have those, whom the fortunes 
of war left among the living, as commoners reduced 
to serfs. ^
-*-^ See ibid. , pp. 150-51.
^-^Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., I, 255.
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If this new arrangement of the Ordinance of 1638 
was to bear fruit, it had to be effectively implemented. 
Little effort was spared by government to find men suitable 
for such a task. The appointed officers of the Kozak Army 
were men who were guided by the spirit of vengeance, repres­
sion and excesses. Their frequent acts of malpractice and 
malfeasence caused their grip on the registered Kozaks to 
become weaker.
At the same time the Kozak serfs were exploited by 
the magnates or by their officials. Both Kozak elements 
were degraded, and living under intolerable conditions, 
were hardly pacified. Up to 1638 the government was able 
to use, with some success, its policy of divide et impera. 
The rift between the registered and common Kozaks was one 
of the reasons why the Kozaks were largely unsuccessful 
during their rebellions. The effect of the Ordinance of 
1638 was that it erased most of the distinctions which 
formerly existed among the Kozaks, and fused them into one 
group, making possible united action by them in the 
future.
Furthermore, the innovations introduced by this 
Ordinance were enforcible only if the Commonwealth
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
44
maintained peace with its neighbours. Peace enabled it to
dispense with Kozak services and to quarter Crown troops
in Ukraine to keep order among the Kozaks. An outbreak of
war would shatter these arrangements. Since the Crown Army
consisted of only some 4,000 men, many Kozak serfs would
have to be recalled to the colours. They would be given an
opportunity to clamour for their "rights and privileges"
and for the repeal of the intolerable Ordinance.
Since the regulars would also have to be withdrawn
from the Kozak territories, there was always the possibility
that the remaining Kozak serfs would hatch a rebellion. It
was therefore in the interest of the ruling class, which
busied itself with the economic exploitation of Ukraine, to
ensure that its times of "golden peace" prevailed.
Most of the nobles believed that the Ordinance of
1638 effectively cauterized the wounds of the decapitated
Kozak "Hydra". According to their popular saying, the
Kozaks were finally driven to their burrows and there they 
19
would remain. The anomalous fourth class ceased to 
exist. The majority of Kozaks tilled the soil of their 
masters' estates as serfs. The fortress Kodak was
■*-^ See K. Szajnocha, Dwa lata dziejow naszych. 1646. 
1648., 2 vols (Warsaw, 1900), I, 1, 122,
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20rebuilt by the first cataract of the Dnieper and checked
21
both "Kozak lawlessness and Tatar incursions". It made
possible rapid colonization of the borderlands, enabled the
ruling class to pursue its economic interests and guaranteed
22for it the times of "golden peace". Ukraine, formerly
characterized by chaos and violence, now became "as peace-
23ful as any town within the Crown". As far as the nobles 
were concerned, the thorny Kozak problem was finally solved. 
This proved to be only wishful thinking.
II
The metamorphosis of Kozak "aristocracy" to common
20Kodak was built m  1635. In the same year the Kozaks 
under the leadership of Ivan Sulyma attacked it and razed 
it to the ground.
21 .Cited by Aleksander Czolowski, "Kudak,, Przyczynki do 
zalozenia i upadku twierdzy" [Causes for the Establishment 
and for the Fall of the Fortress Kodak], Kwartalnik 
Historyczny, XL (no. 2, 1926), 175.
22See ibid., pp. 174-75. See also Tomkiewicz, op. cit., 
pp. 174-75; and Maryan Dubiecki, Kudak, twierdza kresowa i 
jej okolice [The Borderland Fortress Kodak and its Environs], 
rev. and enl. ed (Warsaw: Gebethner and Wolff, 1900), pp. 
81-91.
23Z. S. Koniecpolski, "Rodowod Domu Koniecpolskich, 
herbu Pobog, to jest Krzyz na podkowie, pisany w roku 1651" 
[Genealogy of the Koniecpolski Family of the Armorial 
Bearings Pobog, or Cross over a Horseshoe, Written in 1651], 
in Pamietniki o Koniecpolskich etc (Lviv, 1842), p. 179.
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soldiers and of Kozak "knights" to common tillers of soil,
paralleled other significant developments in Ukraine.
Following the successful progroms of the Kozaks in 1637-
1638 and the passage of the severe Ordinance, the magnates
secured land monopoly, great wealth, unprecedented
24influence and ominous power. "To become absolute sove­
reigns", claimed one contemporary, "they only want the
. . 25
privilege of coining".
The "states" of these "kinglets" transformed the 
Commonwealth into a federation or conglomeration of many
pA
See I. P. Krypiakevych, Bohdanf Khmelnytskyi (Kiev, 
1954), pp. 14-22; and Stanislaw Sreniowski, "Panstwo polskie 
w polowie XVII w. Zagadnienia ekonomicznej i politycznej 
wladzy oligarchow" [ Polish State in the Middle of the XVII 
Century. On the Problems of the Economic and of the 
Political Power of the Oligarchy], in K. Leprzy et. al. eds., 
Polska w okresie drugiej wojny polnocnej 1655-1660 ,[Poland 
at the Time of the Second Northern War, 1655-1660], 2 vols 
(Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1957), I, 13-39.
See also the interpretation of Adam Kersten, "Problem 
wladzy w Rzeczypospolitej czasu Wazow" [The Question of 
Authority in The Commonwealth During the Times of the 
Wazas] , in O naprawe Rzeczypospolitej etc. (Warsaw, 1965), 
pp. 23-26.
9  R .Sieur de Beauplan, "A Description of Ukraine, Contain­
ing several Provinces of the Kingdom of Poland, Lying 
between the Confines of Muscovy, and the Borders of Transyl­
vania. Together with their customs, Manner of Life, and how 
they manage their Wars", in A Collection etc., 6 vols., 3rd 
ed (London, 1744), I, 477.
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republics and monarchies which existed side by side on the
2 6
principle of non-intervention. They were largely respon­
sible for the perpetuation of unique conditions which made
27
the Commonwealth a state where a lack of order prevailed;
and which served as a heaven for nobles, paradise for Jews,
28
purgatory for kings and hell for the serfs. The rise of 
this magnate class into the most prominent position within 
the Commonwealth was accompanied by the increased oppression 
of the Rusin people, especially of the unprivileged classes.
The magnates took advantage of the times of "golden 
peace" to consolidate and to extend their landholdings in 
Ukraine. At the same time as they founded new settlements, 
villages and towns, they also initiated an intensive 
campaign of exploitation. Their next step was to thrust
0
See Aleksander Jablonowski, Pisma Aleksandra Jablonow- 
skiego, 7 vols (Warsaw: E. Wende, 1910), II, 90.
2^This state of affairs was especially noted by forei­
gners. Typical of the critical remarks made by them were 
those of John Barclay. See Lukasz Opalinski, "Polonia 
Defensa contra loan. Barclaium, ubi, occasione ista, de 
Regno Genteque Polonia multa narrantur, hactenus litteris 
non traditia" (Gdansk, 1648), in Stanislaw Grzeszczuk ed., 
Wybor pism [Selected Works] (Wroclaw: Zaklad Narodowy im. 
Ossolinskich, 1959), pp. 125-232.
28See Jan Ptasnik, Miasta i mieszczanstwo w dawnej 
Polsce [Towns and Townspeople of Old Poland] (Krakow:
Polska Akademia Umiejetnosci, 1934), p. 376.
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the impositions of serfdom on the local population. In the
western palatinates, where the ruling class was firmly
29
entrenched, the yoke of serfdom was the heaviest.
In Ukraine, the burdens were lighter. The settlers 
who were enticed by the magnates into the' frontier areas in 
former years, were granted exemptions from tribute and 
duties for long periods of time. In return for these 
concessions, the settlers were required to provide defense 
against the Tatars. After the periods of free-settlement 
expired, they were obliged to pay only moderate tribute 
and rents to their masters. This was the state of affairs 
even in the 1640's on the left bank of the Dnieper. At the
9 QThe duties and the hardships of the serfs are vividly 
illustrated in Krzysztof Opalinski's satire, "Na ciezary i 
opressyja chlopska w Polszcze" [On the Burdens and the 
Oppression of Serfs in Poland], in Satyry (Wroclaw, 1953), 
Book I, Satire 3, 11, 1-140, pp. 23-29. Similarly, see the 
various “inventories" of villages in the 1630's and the 
1640's, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., I, 104-05, 168-69, 
340-41, 395-96. See also the following detailed studies. 
Stanislaw Sreniowski, "Wies polska w polowie XVII w"
[Polish Village in the Middle of the XVII Century], in K. 
Leprzy et al. eds., Polska w okresie drugiej wojny 
polnocnej 1655-1660, 2 vols (Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo 
Naukowe, 1957), I, 41-82; Edward Trzyna, Polozenie ludnosci 
wiejskiej w krolewszczyznach wojewodztwa krakowskiego w 
XVII wieku [The Situation of the Rural Population on the 
Crown Lands of the Palatinate of Krakow in the XVII Century] 
(Wroclaw: Zaklad Narodowy im. Ossolinskich, 1963),.pp. 222- 
94; and Zbigniew Cwiek, Z dziejow wsi koronnej XVII wieku 
[From the Times of a Crown Village in the XVII Century] 
(Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1966), pp. 136-81.
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same time however, conditions wors.ened for those living in 
certain districts of the right bank of the Dnieper. These
people were burdened not only with tribute and rents, but
30
also with labour and other special services.
In the 1640's more and more Rus ini people began to 
feel the tentacles of serfdom. The magnates leased certain
rural and urban areas of their estates to anyone who could
31guarantee to them a specified annual income. The mag­
nates also appointed poor petty gentry as administrators 
of their estates, and accepted Jews as their tenants, inter­
mediaries and agents. All these individuals had the task 
of raising adequate revenue for the magnates. At the same 
time they sought to reap maximum profits for themselves.
In this way the magnates' officials and tenants began an 
excessively heavy system of exploitation of the rural and 
the urban population of Ukraine. They exacted revenue from 
every available source; and their"methods were often
30See Krypiakevych, op. cit., pp. 23-33.
-^See for example the following contracts: M. Kalinowski 
and J. Dements, Liatychiv, July 9, 1638; S. Koniecpolski and 
M. Dluski, Hadiach, November 15, 1643; M. Kalinowski and K. 
Kozlowski, Vinnytsia, March 18, 1647; and J. Wisniowiecki 
and A. Zamojski, Lokhvytsia, November 1, 1647, in 
Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., I, 230-33, 359-62, 458-60, 
477-79.
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nothing more than thinly-disguised lawlessness and vio- 
32lence. Furthermore, apart from the rapacity of the mag­
nates ' creatures who waged a "war" of economic plunder with 
the inhabitants of Ukraine, the local population also
experienced periodical ravages from the undisciplined
33soldiers of the Crown Army. As the years of the "golden
peace" continued, the conditions of the Rusin people of
Ukraine were becoming unbearable:
The peasants there are very miserable, being obliged 
to work three days a week, themselves and their horses, 
for their lord; and to pay proportionately to the 
land they hold, such a quantity of wheat, abundance 
of capons, pullets, hens and goslins; that is at 
Easter, Whitsontide and Christmas: besides all this,
to carry wood for the said lord, and a thousand other 
jobs they ought not to do; besides the ready money 
they exact from them, as also the tithe of their 
sheep, swine, honey, and all sorts of fruit, and every 
third year the third beef. In short, they are obliged 
to give their masters what they please to demand; so
32For examples of the actions of various officials and 
leaseholders in Ukraine and in other Rusin ethnic terri­
tories during the 1530's and the late 1640's see Vossoedi- 
nenie Ukrainy etc., I, 115-15, 157-58, 161-62, 171-73, 
287-89, 301-07, 322-25, 329-31, 339-40, 352-53, 369-74, 
378-79, 383-84, 472, 475-77. See also Krypiakevych, 
op. cit., 21-34; Jablonowski, op. cit. , II, 84-85; III, 
242-43, 280, 309-10; and W. Lozinski, Prawem i lewem etc.,
2 vols., 4th ed (Lviv), 1931, I, 375-426.
33See S. Koniecpolski1s letter to K. Odrzywolski, Brody, 
October 24, 1643, in Pamietniki o Koniecpolskich etc., pp. 
282-84; and M. Hrushevskyi, Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy, 10 vols 
(New York, 1956), VIII, 2, 127-28.
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that it is no wonder those poor wretches never lay 
aside anything, being under such hard circumstances.
Yet this is not all, their lords have an absolute 
power, not only over their goods, but their lives; 
so great is the prerogative of the Polish nobility 
(who live as if they were in heaven, and the peasants 
in purgatory) so that it it happens that those 
wretched peasants fall under the servitude of bad
lords, they are in a worse condition than galley-
n 34slaves.
During this period the conditions of the urban 
population of Ukraine also worsened. Due to various actions 
and to restrictions of the magnates or their representatives, 
the towns in Ukraine, rather than becoming centres of 
commerce and industry, became merely centres of agricul­
tural districts. Apart from Kiev, the towns of Ukraine 
made little contribution to the cultural, political or 
social life. There were many reasons for this curious 
development. The ruling class failed to recognize the 
value of the towns for the state as a whole. Many towns in 
Ukraine claimed self-government under the Magdeburg Law, as 
well as various privileges based on royal charters; yet, 
these were often disregarded by the officials. The burges­
ses were often treated no better than serfs. In many 
districts of Ukraine, they were compelled to pay various
34Beauplan, m  A Collection etc., I, 449. (Italics m  
the original).
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taxes and tribute, and even to perforin labour services.
Their treatment in the "private" towns of the "kinglets"
35was even worse.
Apart from the serfs and tie burgesses, the mag­
nates also oppressed their "brethern", or members of their 
own class. The often-repeated maxim about the equality 
among the nobles —  a country squire, as poor as he may be, 
is equal to a palatine —  never applied in practice. The 
magnates demonstrated by countless examples that they 
regarded petty nobles merely as their pedestals. If the 
oligarchs were able to challenge their monarch, then the 
country squires presented no obstacle for them. It was 
characteristic of the times that the strong gained their 
ends by violence; only the weak had to resort to seek 
justice in the courts. It mattered little to a magnate 
that a petty noble possessed a charter from the royal 
chancery which confirmed his title to a certain estate.
35For examples on the situation of the burgesses m  
Ulcraine and in other Rus in ethnic territories during the 
1630's and the 1640's see Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., I, 
132-33, 135-37, 174, 291-92, 309, 345-46, 385-94, 404-05, 
428-31, 468-70. See also K. Opalinski, "O sposobach 
pomnozenia miast i niezad w nich" [On the Ways of Increa­
sing Towns and on the Disorder within Them], op. cit., Book 
V, satire 1, 11. 1-338, pp. 231-45; Krypiakevych, op. cit., 
pp. 34-42; Jablonowski, op. cit., III, 257-70; and Ptasnik, 
op. cit. . pp. 358-87.
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Unless the petty noble had the baching of some powerful 
patron, the charter was merely a piece of paper. In the 
majority of cases a magnate was in a position to sieze the 
property of a petty noble by force. Moreover, he was able 
to take even more drastic action against his weaker neigh­
bour: he could deny the squire's rights as a noble and
force him- to bear all the burdens and obligations imposed
* 36on his serfs.
Thus, not only the Rusin serfs or even the Rusin 
burgesses, but also the Rusin petty nobles, had various 
reasons for hating the "absolute" rule of the magnates and 
the rapacity of their creatures. The emergence of the 
magnate class into the prominent position of the Common­
wealth also coincided with the severe oppression of the 
Kozaks. In this way, by the 1640's, the process of fusion 
of the overall social, economic, religious and national 
aspirations of the Rusin people, with, the issues of the 
Kozaks, was complete. The Kozaks were for some time a
^ S e e  Lozinski, op. cit., I, 231-71, 297-99. In his 
Vol. II, subtitled "Wojny prywatne" [Private Wars] , 
Lozinski examined the armed clashes among the nobles in 
great detail. See also W. Lipinski, Stanislaw Michal 
Krzyczewski etc (Krakow, 1912), pp. 64— 68; Krypiakevych, 
op. cit. , pp. 48-49; and Jablonowski, op. cj-t. , III, 
317-18.
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kind of representative of the Rusin people as a whole.
From their ranks could come the most likely leadership; 
and they were still in the best position to call the Rusins 
to arms. The Kozaks were themselves in a very difficult 
predicament. Yet, for the first time, they were also in 
a position to fully appreciate the conditions under which 
most of the Rusins lived.
Ill
Since the implementation of the Ordinance of 1638,
the registered Kozaks, as well as their enserfed brethern,
experienced intolerable conditions of life. The posts of
commissioner and of senior regimental officers of the Kozak
Army were filled by nobles,and more and more Polish
37soldiers appeared in its rank-and-file. The high-ranking 
officers were men characterized by avarice. Commissioner 
Jacek Szemberg, for example, paid 30,000 zloty for his 
appointment. In order to make his tenure a profitable one, 
he "thought of unbearable lootings and extortions of the
37
Report of G. Kunakov to Muscovite Department of 
Foreign Affairs (1649), in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc.,
15 vols (St. Petersburg, 1861), III, 280.
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38
Kozaks". All junior-ranking posts in the Kozak Army were
39
sold for profit to the highest bidder. The officers
began to regard the registered Kozaks more or less as their
servants and as objects of exploitation. Furthermore, the
Kozaks did not only face "the avarice of the colonels and
40their tyrannical treatment", but also that of the civil 
authorities. The commissioner and the colonels, who were 
bound by common class interests with the officials of 
Ukraine, caused the Kozaks to fall prey to the autocracy 
of the local administrative authorities. They were 
burdened by illegal taxes, restricted in their rights to
I
husbandry, their properties were confiscated and they were
41
saddled with many other oppressive measures.
There was an uninterrupted flow of Kozak grievances 
to the military and the civil authorities. In 1639, the
O Q
Report on the Death of Wladyslaw IV and on the Defeat 
of the Crown Army, Warsaw, June 1, 1648. Cited by 
Hrushevskyi, op. cit., VIII, 2, 131-32, n. 3.
39See S. Grondski, Historia belli etc (Pest, 1789),
p. 31.
^ L .  Miaskowski's letter to anonymous, Bar, April 3, 
1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc (Krakow, 1864), p. 10.
^ S e e  the list of Kozak grievances prepared for 
Wladyslaw IV, Bila Tserkva, June 12, 1648, in Dokumenty 
Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc (Kiev, 1961), pp. 36-37.
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Kozaks complained that their farms, meadows and properties
42'
were confiscated by the authorities. When Crown Grand
Hetman Stanislaw Koniecpolski went on a tour of inspection
through Ukraine in 1643, he was forced to dismiss the
colonel of the Chyhyryn Regiment from his post for his
excesses.^ At the same time he saw the need to issue
strict orders to stop the harassment of the Kozaks by
44undisciplined soldiers. Kozak complaints came frequently
45to the royal chancery. Koniecpolski1s successor, Mikolaj
Potocki, received almost daily complaints about the excesses
46of the administrative authorities.
Orders issued by the king or the hetman to curb 
the excesses of officials fell on deaf ears. In Ukraine 
there was no power which could execute such commands.
42See Hrushevskyi, op. cit., VIII, 2, 138.
^ S e e  Stanislaw Oswiecim, Stanislawa Oswiecima Dyaryusz 
1643-1651 [The Diary of Stanislaw Oswiecim, 1643-1651], ed. 
Wiktor Czermak (Krakow: Akademia Umiejetnosci, 1907), p. 15.
44See S. Koniecpolski1s letter to K. Odryzywolski, Brody, 
October 24, 1643, in Pamietniki o Koniecpolskich etc., p. 284.
^ S e e  Wladyslaw IV's letter to A. Koniecpolski, Warsaw, 
June 24, 1647, in L. Kubala, "Dodatki" [Appendices], Jerzy 
Ossolinski, 2nd rev. ed (Lviv, 1924), p. 494.
46See M. Potocki's letter to J. Ossolinski, Bar,
November 21, 1647. Cited by Lipinski, op. cit., pp. 197-98.
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Potentates of the stature of Princ.e Jeremi Wisniowiecki
or Aleksander Koniecpolski ruled absolutely within their
"states” . They "distributed Ukraine among the Laszczo- 
47
wczyks, who reduced the Kozaks, the meritorious servants
of the Commonwealth into serfs, robbed them, pulled their
48
beards and harnessed them into plows". Too few of the
privileged class fully saw "the Kozaks oppressed more
49than common serfs". Too late came the realization that
the Kozaks would "venture even into hell itself in order
to cast off such bondage and oppression as the poor
50
wretches evidently experienced".
^This is a reference to the lawless nobles, named 
after Samuel Laszcz. This individual was no less than a 
bandit, having been sentenced by the courts .two hundred 
seventy-three times. Notwithstanding these sentences, he 
managed to exist outside the pale of the law and to carry 
out his terrioristic activities, chiefly because he enjoyed 
the protection of one "kinglet" -- Crown Grand Hetman 
Stanislaw Koniecpolski. See J. Jerlicz, Latopisiec etc.,
2 vols (Warsaw, 1853), I, 49-51.
48Journal of W. Miaskowski, Pereiaslav, February 20, 
1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 106.
49A. Kysil's letters to M. Potocki, Kobyshiv, March 16, 
1648, in Sprawy i rzeczy etc (Lviv, 1914), p. 83; and to 
M. Lubienski [Hoshcha), May 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie 
Ukrainy etc., II, 26.
50Speech of A. Kazanowski at the Convocation Diet, 
Fourth Session, Warsaw, July 20, 1648, in Jakuba Michalo- 
wskiego etc., pp. 118-19.
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The registered Kozaks realized that the magnates 1
policy of repression and servitude threatened the very
existence of them as a military class. Their appeals for
justice produced little results. Seeing the impotence of
the king and the growing influence and power of the
"kinglets", they had little choice but to resort to arms.
The Kozak leaders seized an opportunity to initiate steps
for an uprising late in 1645. Not trusting their own
strength to be sufficient for the task, they began to nego-
51tiate a military alliance with the Tatars. The Kozak-
Tatar alliance failed to materialize, but in 1646 a better
(
opportunity arrived to win back their liberties.
In that year King Wladyslaw IV requested their aid
52
for his planned war with the Ottoman Empire. The 
delegates of the Kozak Army, who proceeded to confer with 
the king in Warsaw, were somewhat doubtful of the whole 
business. The very secrecy in which the king conferred 
with them suggested the weakness of his position. He had 
no power to annul the Ordinance of 1638 without consulting
51 • • ■See Oswiecim, op. cit., pp. 135-36.
52‘See Wiktor Czermak, Plany wojny tureckiej Wladyslawa 
IV [Wladyslaw IV's Plans of the Turkish War] (Krakow: 
Akademia Umiejetnosci, 1895).
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the Diet; and the Diet would never consent to repeal the 
Kozak restrictions. Yet, if the king emerged a victor 
from the war against the Muslim world, he would be in a 
position to establish an absolute monarchy and thereby to 
fulfill all his promises to the Kozaks. Under these circum­
stances the delegates of the Kozak Army agreed to carry out 
the wishes of the king and pledged the support of all the 
Kozaks. Ivan Barabash was named the commander of the naval 
expedition, while one Bohaan Khmelnytskyi received the post 
of secretary.^
As a secretary, Khmelnytskyi was in charge of
54preparing Kozak enlistments. He was hardly able to 
accomplish his task in secrecy. Furthermore, the plans of 
Wladyslaw became obvious once construction of sea vessels 
and a general preparation for a naval campaign began.
Rumours began to circulate among the Kozaks that all posts 
in the Kozak Army would be changed. These grew in such an 
intensity, that Potocki interpreted them as "sedition"
55and "turbulence", and took steps to restore discipline.
53See Kubala, op. cit., p. 258.
54
See ibid., p. 257.
t
55 .M. Potocki's letter to B. Leszczynski [Bar, cai. May 
31, 1646], in Szajnocha, "Zrodla" [Sources], op. cit., I 
2, 403.
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The nobles saw the Kozak activities and their sudden
hostile attitude towards them as a conspiracy between the
Kozaks and the king against them. They decided that all
adventures of the king must be stopped, for only fatal
consequences would follow. Wladyslaw's defeat would be
disastrous to the Commonwealth; his victory would bring
56grave danger to the precious liberties of the gentry.
The nobles thus waited impatiently for the October opening
of the Diet. The Diet put an end to their fears.
By December, 1646, amid their preparations for war,
the Kozaks received unwelcome news: the Diet forbade the
king to wage war with Turkey; he was compelled to demobilize
his mercenaries and to forbid the Kozaks to raid the shores
57of the Black Sea. The Kozaks thus lost all their confi­
dence in the king, whose "power was not only limited, but 
nearly taken away from him".
56The fears of the gentry are typically illustrated m  
K. Opalinski's letter to L. Opalinski, Tuliszkow, October 
3, 1646. See Listy Krzysztofa Opalinskiego do brata 
Lukasza 1641-1653 [Letters of Krzysztof Opalinski to his 
Brother Lukasz, 1641-1653], Roman Poliak et al. eds.
(Wroclaw: Zaklad Narodowy im. Ossolinskich, 1957), p. 363.
^ S e e  Volumina Legum etc (Warsaw, 1737), IV, 83-85.
~^G. Tiepolo's letter to the Venitian government in 
1646. Cited by Szajnocha, op. cit., I, 1, 377.
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After gaining victory over the king, the magnates 
and their supporters began to vent their fury upon the 
Kozaks. The magnates declared themselves against the king 
and his plans; therefore, they saw the need of destroying 
the potential weapon of royal absolutism. The Kozaks 
were "king's men", and the chief instrument of king's 
designs. It was virtually impossible for Wladyslaw to esta­
blish absolute monarchy i^ithout the support of the Kozaks. 
For this reason the ruling class began treating Kozaks as 
bondsmen, preparing for them conditions which were worse
than those of slaves on Turkish galleys and intending even
59
to eradicate the Kozak name itself. Out of hundreds of 
similar cases of injustice inflicted upon Kozaks during 
this time, that of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi was typical.
59See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to Wladyslaw IV, Bila 
Tserkva, June 12, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho 
etc., pp. 33-34.
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CHAPTER III
THE EMERGENCE OF BOHDAN KHMELNYTSKYI: HIS LEADERSHIP AND 
AIMS IN THE INITIAL PERIOD OF CONFLICT
I
Bohdan Znovii Khmelnytskyi was typical of the half­
noble and half-Kozak well-to-do landowning officer class, 
serving in the Kozak Army.^ Khmelnytskyi was a Rusin 
noble: he considered himself a noble by birth, used the 
coat-of-arms of "Abdank" on his seal and professed himself 
to be an Orthodox Christian. Khmelnytskyi was also a 
Kozak: he served in the Kozak Army; and was strongly bound 
to the Kozak stratum by common ideals, langu-age, religion,
■*"The reconstruction of this biographical sketch of Bohdan 
Khmelnytskyi to 1647 is primarily based on the following 
sources:
(a) Letters; B. Khmelnytskyi1s letters to M. Potocki, 
Zaporozhe, March 13, 1648; and to Jan Kazimierz, Zboriv, 
August 15, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc 
(Kiev, 1961), pp. 23-26", 122-23.
(b) Charters: Charter of Wladyslaw IV confirming B. 
Khmelnytskyi's title to Subotiv, Warsaw, July 22, 1646, in 
Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., 15 vols (St. Petersburg, 1878),
X, 465-67. Some historians question the authenticity of 
this document. See F. Rawita Gawronski, Bohdan Chmielnicki 
etc., 2 vols (Lviv, 1906), I, 354-60.
(c) Reports: G. Kunakov's report to Muscovite
62
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class solidarity and family ties.
Bohdan, the son of a Rusin squire Mykhailo 
Khmelnytskyi, was born approximately in 1595 and most
Department of Foreign Affairs (1649), in Akty otnosiash- 
chiesia etc., Ill, 278-80; and H. Pinocci1s "Relatia o 
Chmielnickim i rzeczach Kozackich" [Report on Khmelnytskyi 
and on Kozak Matters] (1654) , in Oiczvste spominki etc.,
2 vols (Krakow, 1845), I, 138. For a corrected version of 
this document see W. Lipinski, Stanislaw Michal Krzyczewski 
etc (Krakow, 1912), pp. 111-12, n. 1.
(d) Miscellanea: E. I. Chrzaszcz, "Pierwszy okres
buntu Chmielnickiego w oswietleniu uczestnika wyprawy 
zoltowodzkiej i naocznego swiatka wypadkow", in Prace histo- 
ryczne etc (Lviv, 1934), pp. 257-62; S. Grondski, Historia 
belli etc (Pest, 1789); Natan Hannower, "Jawein Mecula 
t.j. Bagno Glebokie. Kronika zdazen z lat 1648-1652, 
napisana przez Natana Hannowera z Zaslawia i wydana po raz 
pierwszy w Wenecyi w r. 1656" [ laveip Metsula, that is, the 
Deep Mire. A Chronicle of Events During the Years 1648- 
1652, Written by Natan Hannower of Zaslav and Published for 
the First Time in Venice in 1656], tr. and ed., Majer 
Balaban, in Sprawy i rzeczy etc (Lviv, 1914), pp. 16-20;
V. Kochowski, Annalium Poloniae etc (Krakow, 1683);
"Kratkaja Letopis o wojnach Polakow z Kozakami 1647-1656"
[ A Short Chronicle of the Wars of the Poles with the Kozaks, 
1647-1656], in Pamiatniki etc., 3 vols., 2nd rev. ed (Kiev, 
1898), I, 173-75; Szymon Okolski, Dyaryusz transakcyi 
wojennej miedzy wojskiem koronnem i zaporoskiem w r. 1637 
r i w r 16381, ed. K. J. Turowski (Krakow, 1858); and 
Zbigniew Swita.lski, "Nieznana wiadomosc z biografii Bohdana 
Chmielnickiego przed 1648 rokiem" [ An Unknown Item from the 
Biography of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi Prior to 1648], Kwartalnik 
Historyczny [Historical Quarterly], LXVI (no. 3, 1959), 
855-57.
Since the 1850's there appeared hundreds of biographies 
and biographical sketches on Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, chiefly 
in Polish, Russian and Ukrainian. The latest biography was 
written by the Ukrainian historian Ivan Krypiakevych,
Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (Kiev: Akademiia Nauk Ukrainskoi R.S.R., 
1954).
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likely in Chyhyryn. Mykhailo endeavoured to give his son 
an upbringing and an education befitting the status of a 
noble. Bohdan therefore first passed through a school of 
one of the Orthodox brotherhoods; and later continued his 
studies at a Jesuit college in Lviv. Shortly after comp­
leting his studies, Bohdan began his military career. In 
1620 he joined his father and took part in Crown Grand 
Hetman Stanislaw Zolkiewski's disastrous Moldavian campaign 
against the Turks. The elder Khmelnytskyi fell on the 
fields of Tsetsora; the younger was taken prisoner.
After two years of captivity in the Muslim world
I
Bohdan returned to Subotiv, the estate acquired by his 
father. Soon after his arrival he enlisted as a registered 
Kozak in the Chyhyryn Regiment. Little is known about the 
following years of his military service until 1637. He 
must have participated in the various campaigns of the 
Kozak Army; proven himself to be a loyal, able and brave 
soldier; and won promotions steadily. At the time of 
Pavliuk's rebellion in 1637 he was already a senior-ranking 
officer, for he occupied the responsible administrative 
post of a secretary of the Kozak Army. In this capacity 
he signed the Kozak capitulation to Crown Field Hetman 
Mikolaj Potocki in December 1637.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
65
The duties of a Kozak officer in peacetime were not 
too demanding. Bohdan was thus able to devote his attention 
to his family and his estate. He married Hanna Somko, a 
girl of a good Kozak family, and began to raise a large 
family. Careful management of Subotiv and the adjacent 
land he acquired brought him prosperity, so that by the 
1640's he became quite a wealthy country squire. During 
this time he identified himself with the loyal and conser­
vative Kozak element —  the Kozak "aristocracy" —  which 
sought to establish a modus vivendi with the government by 
means other than the resort to arms. By his own admission,
t
he "never took part in any rebellion". His appointment to 
a junior-ranking post in the Chyhyryn Regiment following 
the progroms of Ostrianyn and Hunia in 1638 and his later 
reinstatement to the secretaryship of the Kozak Army, 
signified that the military authorities did not question 
his loyalty. Bohdan also enjoyed the confidence and favour 
of King Wladyslaw IV and of Crown Grand Chancellor Jerzy 
Ossolinski, who was one of the most influential men in the 
Commonwealth.
By virtue of his rank in the Kozak Army, Khmelnyt­
skyi was himself an individual of considerable influence 
among the Kozak; and wielded authority among them. He was
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frequently chosen to represent the interests of the Kozak 
Army before the king and the government. In September 
1638, the Kozak Council held at Kiev elected him a member 
of a delegation which proceeded to Warsaw early the follow­
ing year and petitioned the king to either repeal or to 
modify the Kozak Ordinance of 1638. He was also included 
in another delegation which brought similar petitions to 
the Diet late in 1639.
Later on, it was a mark of distinction for Bohdan 
to be called to serve in the mercenary Kozak unit hired by 
the government of Cardinal Richelieu in 1645, which took 
part in the operations against the Spaniards in Flanders 
and in the siege of Dunkirk. In April 1646 Bohdan was again 
a delegate of the Kozak Army. This time he took part in 
the secret negotiations at Warsaw with King Wladyslaw IV, 
when the latter solicited Kozak support for the war against 
the Turks. On this occasion Bohdan received a charter from 
the king which confirmed his rights to Subotiv. In 1647 
he was contacted by Ossolinski, who revealed his secret 
mission to Bohdan: the king requested him to prepare the 
Kozaks for a naval expedition into the Ottoman dominions.
As a reward for his part in the royal schemes, the king 
bestowed new honours on Bohdan.
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Khmelnytskyi was thus a man of substance, conser­
vative in his outlooks, loyal to the state and an 
individual who enjoyed the confidence of his superiors, and 
even the king and of the chancellor. But in contrast to 
Bohdan's record and environment, his destiny also amply 
illustrates the shortcoming of the "kinglet" rule in 
Ukraine.
Following the passage of the Kozak Ordinance and 
the Kozak progroms in 1638, and especially after the capi­
tulation of the king before the hostile Diet of 1646 which 
discovered his "conspiracy" with the Kozaks, even men like 
Khmelnytskyi began to experience intolerable conditions of 
life. Khmelnytskyi himself became a victim of the law­
lessness of Aleksander Koniecpolski, a typical borderland 
magnate, and of his creatures. They inflicted a series of 
injustices upon him: he was materially ruined, made a 
fugitive and finally was declared an enemy of the state. 
These injustices caused Bohdan to take unprecedented steps, 
the kind of which he avoided so carefully in the past 
years.
Khmelnytskyi's misfortunes began at the time when 
Aleksander Koniecpolski decided to increase*the size of his 
own latifundiae. Koniecpolski, as Sheriff of Korsun and
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Chyhyryn, controlled a vast territory in the heart of the 
Kozak country. Since greater landholdings made the owner 
powerful and increased his revenue, Koniecpolski took 
advantage of every opportunity to acquire more land. The 
case of Khmelnytskyi provided this magnate with such an 
opportunity. He was able to make gains at the expense of 
his weaker neighbour both by law and lawlessness.
There were "legal" ways by which Koniecpolski could 
come to possess Khmelnytskyi1s estate. Owning land in the 
Tiasmyn region, this magnate could claim Subotiv as part 
of his Mliiv property. A more effective method in dealing 
with Khmelnytskyi was simply to declare him a nulle jure 
possessor. Koniecpolski discovered that Bohdan had no 
proper documents to prove his title to the ownership of 
Subotiv. There were also no records to show that he regis­
tered any formal deed which could prove his rights. Under 
these circumstances, even the charter of King Wladyslaw 
proved to be worthless. Koniecpolski, as Sheriff of 
Chyhyryn, could therefore dispose of Subotiv as he pleased.
Koniecpolski was encouraged to take action in this 
matter by two men: Zachariasz Sabilenki and Daniel 
Czaplinski. Both men denounced Khmelnytskyi before their 
master. The former, a wealthy Jew of Chyhyryn, attributed
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loss of business profits to his competition with 
Khmelnytskyi; the latter, a Deputy Sheriff of Chyhyryn 
coveted Subotiv for some time. Furthermore, a bitter feud 
began between Czaplinski and Khmelnytskyi over a woman of 
questionable virtues, with whom Bohdan lived after the death 
of his wife.
By pledging to increase Koniecpolski's revenues, 
Czaplinski induced his master to grant him the property 
rights to Subotiv. Having the support of such a powerful 
"patron", this borderland firebrand then attempted to take 
possession of Bohdan's estate. This whole matter could
t
not be settled peacefully because Khmelnytskyi refused to 
give up his rights to Subotiv for a paltry sum appropor- 
tioned to him as compensation for the upkeep of the land.
When this method failed, Czaplinski and his hench­
men tried more drastic steps: increasing the collection of 
taxes, carrying out various requisitions, pillaging of 
stocks, damaging the manor house and even by flogging 
Bohdan's son. Czaplinski also pursued after his rival's 
mistress. Eventually he succeeded in luring her from 
Khmelnytskyi and subsequently married her. When Khmelnyt­
skyi still resisted his enemy, Czaplinski hired an assassin; 
and when the latter failed to carry out his task, he
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continued to plot on Khmelnytskyi's life. The final act 
came when Czaplinski resorted to the usual violence of the 
times: gathering an armed band he raided Subotiv, drove 
Bohdan out and then forcibly siezed his land.
Khmelnytskyi was determined to defend his rights 
through all legal means possible. He made frequent comp­
laints about the harassment and violence he suffered to his 
superiors. Koniecpolski, who permitted these outrages of 
Czaplinski, simply ignored all complaints against his 
servant. Bohdan's appeals to Crown Grand Hetman Mikolaj 
Potocki also proved futile. Failing to obtain redress at 
local courts, Bohdan journeyed to Warsaw and attempted to 
seek justice there. Here, again, the decisions were not 
in his favour. Finally, he appealed to the king. Wladyslaw 
IV was sympathetic to the complaints of outrage inflicted 
upon his loyal servant, but even he was powerless to help. 
The king was supposed to have given only a desperate advice 
to Khmelnytskyi: violence must be fought with violence.
When all avenues to escape ruin failed, Bohdan 
returned to Ukraine. At this time dissatisfaction was 
smouldering among the Kozaks, aggravated by the disappoint­
ment in the king's schemes of war with the Turks. That 
dissatisfaction dould be easily fanned into an open
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rebellion. Wladyslaw IV, whose thirst for military 
conquest was not abetted, still did not relax his efforts 
to gain the Kozak support for his cause. It was for that 
purpose that he sent Crown Grand Chancellor Jerzy Ossolinski 
to Ukraine in Avigust 1647.
Ossolinski attempted to sway the Kozaks to start a 
naval campaign in order to provoke hostilities with the 
Turks. He assured them that they should not fear any 
reprisals from the authorities. During this time he also 
contacted Khmelnytskyi and handed over the insignia of a 
commander of the entire expedition to him. Bohdan, however, 
took a dimer view of the whole matter. He thanked the
A
chancellor for the royal favour, but refused to accept the 
honours. He told Ossolinski that many of the Kozaks would 
be reluctant to act because they were kept under extremely 
strict discipline by the military authorities. All steps 
would have to be carefully thought out. The Kozaks would 
have to be convinced of the feasability of such an under­
taking. Military supplies would have to be prepared. Thus, 
explained Khmelnytskyi, all this required considerable time 
and effort. He did promise, however, to carry out the 
wishes of the king as best as he could.
It is uncertain whether Khmelnytskyi was responsible
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for the intense agitation which developed among the Kozaks 
following Ossolinski's departure from Ukraine. If he was 
responsible, there is no evidence that his actions were 
for the purpose of hatching a rebellion and not on behalf 
Wladyslaw's plans. It is also uncertain whether he was a 
leader, organizer or even a member of that group of regis­
tered Kozaks which planned a rebellion in October 1647.
To many of his contempraries, and especially to his 
enemies, no one else but Khmelnytskyi was responsible.
Bohdan's energetic attempts to defend his rights 
made him a suspect in many of the eyes of the nobles.
Hating him as a royalist, unable to get rid of him by legal 
means or by attempts on his life, and having no knowledge 
of Wladyslaw's renewed interest in war or Khmelnytskyi's 
part in it, his enemies saw an opportunity to indict him 
on political grounds. Bohdan was accused of agitating the 
Kozaks for a rebellion, plotting a sea-raid and even of 
conspiring on the life of Koniecpolski, who at that time 
was campaigning against the Tatars. Koniecpolski ordered 
Khmelnytskyi's arrest and demanded no less than capital 
punishment for him. Since Koniecpolski had no jurisdiction 
over the registered Kozaks, he had to leave the accused and 
his fate in the hands of a military trit tnal.
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Khmelnytskyi's friends vouched for his innocence.
The military authorities heeded their appeals and decided
to place Khmelnytskyi for the time being under the custody
of his commanding officer, Colonel Stanislav Krychevskyi
of the Chyhyryn Regiment. Bohdan's position was desperate:
his life, or at least his liberty, was in danger.
Krychevskyi, however, proved to be a true friend. After
hearing Bohdan's pleas, he allowed him to escape. There
was only one road open to Bohdan Khmelnytskyi —  to
Zaporozhe. There he fled at the close of 1647, accompanied
by a number of followers, to join the ranks of malcontents.
<
II
Early in January 1648, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi appeared
in Zaporozhe at the head of several hundred of his follo- 
2wers. He then took immediate steps to capture the Sich 
from the registered Kozaks. The chief reason for these 
hostile steps of Khmelnytskyi was because the Sich would
See M. Potocki's letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun], March 
31, 1648; V. Unkovskii's report to the Muscovite government 
(1650), in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., 3 vols (Moscow,
1954), II, 15, 433; and A. Kysil's letter to Iu. Dolgorukov, 
Kobyzhcha, March 28, 1648, in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., 
Ill, 166-67. Concerning the correct place of issue and the 
date of M. Potocki's letter, see K. Szajnocha, Dwa lata 
dziejow naszych.1646. 1648., 2 vols (Warsaw, 1900), II,
I, 27.
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provide for him a firm foothold in Zaporozhe, as well as a 
suitable base for his intended operations. With this in 
mind, he directed his followers to occupy one of the islands 
on the Dnieper in close vicinity of the Sich, and instruc­
ted them to fortify it. Once the island was secure, he 
sent several of his men to the Sich to agitate the garrison 
of the registered Kozaks stationed there. The efforts of 
his emissaries were successful. When the commandant of the 
garrison saw that the registered Kozaks were on a verge of 
mutiny, he assembled his guard detachment and made a hasty 
flight. Early in February Khmelnytskyi and his followers
took possession of the Sich without any opposition of the
3
registered Kozaks.
Following this initial bloodless victory, Khmelny­
tskyi began to direct a campaign of intense agitation 
throughout Zaporozhe and Ukraine. One of the main reasons 
for the success of this campaign was because Khmelnytskyi 
carried it out under a cloak of "legality". Even as 
Khmelnytskyi arrived at Zaporozhe there were rumours among 
the Kozaks that King Wladyslaw IV entrusted him with some
3
See L. Mxaskowski's letter to Anonymous, Balabanivka, 
February 16, 1648, in Lipinski, "Annexa" [Appendices], 
op. cit., p. 353; and Chrzaszcz, op. cit. , p. 262.
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important commission. Khmelnytskyi and his supporters also
spread other fantastic rumours of their own. Some of
these rumours were to the effect that Wladyslaw commanded
Khmelnytskyi to organize a Kozak army; that the king was in
sympathy with the Kozak cause; that he was their ally
against the magnates; that he would not oppose the Kozaks
even if they took up arms to fight the "kinglets" for their
lost liberties; and finalJ.y, that the king would embrace
Orthodoxy, and upon his arrival in Kiev, he would compel
4
all Poles to accept the "Christian Orthodox faith".
4Archdeacon Paul of Aleppo noted a typical rumour: 
"Between him [Khmelnytskyi] and his friend the Cral [King 
Wladyslaw IV] a secret agreement was planned, that Akhmil 
[Khmelnytskyi] should raise his head in rebellion, and that 
the Cral should assist him with troops; in order to eradi­
cate the Polish Grandees [magnates] one and all, and to 
allow him to become king in his own right, who should rule, 
and not be ruled by them", See Paul of Aleppo, The Travels 
etc., 2 vols (London, 1831), I, 2, 173.
For other versions of these rumours, see the reports of 
G. Klimov (1648) and G. Kunakov (1649) to Muscovite Depart­
ment of Foreign Affairs, in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 
216, 279; and the letters of Voevoda F. Arsenev, S. 
Bolkhovskii, Z. Leontev, I. Kobylskii, N. Nashchokin, N. 
Pleshcheev and N. Meshcherskii (May to July, 1648) to 
Muscovite Department of Defense, in Akty Muskovskago 
gusodarstva, 3 vols (St. Petersburg, 1894), II, 218-20, 222, 
227-28, 231-32; Sobieski's report to the Convocation Diet, 
Fifth Session, Warsaw, July 21, 1648, in Jakuba Michalows- 
kiego etc (Krakow, 1864), pp. 120-21; and B. Khmelnytskyi's 
manifesto to the Rusin people, Bila Tserkva [£a., May 26 to 
June 12], 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., p. 
648. Concerning the correct date and the authenticity of
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These rumours and stories were the more credible to 
the Kozaks and to the Rusin people because Khmelnytskyi
5
possessed the banner of King Wladyslaw and his "charters". 
With such proof, Khmelnytskyi had little trouble in 
convincing the Kozaks in Zaporozhe that they should enlist
t 6
under the'royal colours". In turn, these Kozaks had no
this document see L. Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, 2nd rev. ed 
(Lviv, 1924), p. 448, n. 57. For a contrary evaluation see 
Gawronski, op. cit., I, 213. These rumours are also 
pointed out by M. Golinski, MS. Eiblioteki Zakladu Narodowego 
im. Ossolinskich, Wroclaw, Poland, 189, f. 127 [Hereafter 
cited as MS. B.Z,N.Ossol. ]; P. Chevalier, A Discourse 
etc (London, 1672), p. 59-60; S. Temberski, Stanislawa 
Temberskiego etc (Krakow, 1897), p. 101; and Grondski, 
op. cit., p. 46.
IC
This whole matter is shrouded with great uncertainty.
The contemporaries agree on two points: (a) Khmelnytskyi
possessed sorae kind of documents; (b) which he had stolen 
from Ivan Barabash. See for example Chrzaszcz, op. cit., 
pp. 260, 262; and the Record of the Election Diet, Twenty- 
Sixth Session, Warsaw, November 6 , 1648, in Ksiega pamie- 
tnicza etc., pp. 299-300. There is no evidence that King 
Wladyslaw IV issued any special "charters" to the Kozaks 
which restored their liberties. Khmelnytskyi probably 
possessed a letter or letters of the king, who wrote to the 
Kozaks at the time he was preparing to launch his campaign 
against Turkey. The king probably solicited Kozak aid, 
authorized new Kozak enlistments and ordered the constru­
ction of sea-craft for a naval campaign on the Black Sea. 
According to Kysil, Khmelnytskyi only pretended to have new 
letters from the king. He actually had the letters written 
by Wladyslaw in 1646. See the Record of the Convocation Diet, 
Second Session, Warsaw, July 17, 1648, in Jakuba 
M ichalowskiego etc., p. 105. This whole matter is discussed 
at some length by Gawronski, op. cit., I, 118-125.
See L. Miaskowski's letter to Anonymous, Balabanivka, 
February 16, 16 8 , in Lipinski, "Annexa", op. cit., p. 353.
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doubt that Khmelnytskyi enjoyed confidence and favour of 
the king; thus, they formally elected him as their leader. 
Furthermore, Khmelnytskyi's recruitment programme was also 
carried out in Ukraine by his inflammatory manifestoes and 
by his extremely able emissaries. The effects of these 
manifestoes and the accomplishments of these "conspirators 
of all[the registered] Kozak regiments and of all [ the
O
people of] Ukraine" , can be best illustrated by the
following developments.
By the middle of February Crown Grand Hetman,
Mikolaj Potocki, distrusted the loyalty of all the regis-
9
tered Kozaks still under his command. A month and a half 
lciter, Potocki claimed that a "deadly fire" of rebellion 
was ignited in Ukraine: "there was neither a village nor
See the report of Iu. Mynevskyi and others at Muscovite 
Department of Foreign Affairs (1657), in Akty otnosiashchi- 
sia etc., IV, 58.
0
M. Potocki1s letter to Wladyslaw IV[Korsun], March 31, 
1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., p. 15. Typical of such 
manifestoes is the one from Chyhyryn, early in 1648. See 
Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 625-26.
9
See L. Miaskowski's letter to Anonymous, Balabamvka, 
February 16, 1648, in Lipinski, "Annexa", op. cit., p. 354. 
This explains why the registered Kozaks had to take an oath 
of loyalty before the beginning of the campaign in April.
See Chrzaszcz, op. cit., p. 264. *
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a town in which there were no cries for lawlessness"
Finally, while the serfs armed themselves and awaited for 
the outbreak of hostilities, many "Kozaks, nobles and free­
men" began to flock into Zaporozhe to Khmelnytskyi' s aid."
Khmelnytskyi proceeded with extreme caution even 
under these favourable circumstances. He was not yet ready 
to wage war. On the one hand, he underestimated the 
military preparedness and the potential of the Rusin people. 
On the other hand, he decided that the troops under his 
disposal were not strong enough to be matched against the
combined forces of the Crown Army and the private armies
(
of the magnates. Khmelnytskyi therefore decided to seek
military aid from the neighbouring countries. His appeals
to Muscovy, particularly for the aid of the Don Kozaks,
12proved to be fruitless. Khmelnytskyi, however, was more 
successful in his dealings with Crimea. In February, he 
sent his envoys to Khan Islam III. His appeals for military 
aid coincided with a time when various circumstances pressed
■*"^ M. Potocki's letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun] , March 
31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., p. 15.
■^G. Kunakov's report to Muscovite Department of Foreign 
Affairs (1649), in Akty otnosiasnchiesia etc., Ill, 281.
12See Krypiakevych, op. cit ., pp. 122-23; and V. Golo- 
butskii, Diplom-.tlcheskaia istoriia etc (Kiev, 1962), p. 96.
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Tatars for war.
Moreover, Khmelnytskyi made another good use of the 
"charters" of King Wladyslaw. These documents which served 
as an evidence of Wladyslaw's anti-Tatar designs, had the 
effect of abetting the khan to war with the Commonwealth.
Khan Islam III realized that by supporting the Kozak rebel­
lion, he would automatically paralyze the plans of the 
Polish king. It was in the khan's interest to give military 
aid to the Kozaks, even though he would face grave conse­
quences for it, because such action was expressly forbidden 
by his Turkish suzerain. The khan, therefore, decided to 
defy the sultan. He ordered a vanguard under Tuhay Bey to 
march to Khmelnytskyi's aid as soon as possible, arid then
prepared to follow it at the head of the whole Tatar horde.
13Thus came into being a Kozak-Tatar military alliance. This
13See B. Baranowski, "Geneza sojuszu kozacko-tatarskiego 
z 1648 r", Przeglad Historyczny, XXXVII (no. 1> 1648), 285-86; 
0. Gorka, "Nieznana kronika tatarska lat 1644-50", Kwartalnik 
Historyczny, LXII (no. 3, 1955), 113; and Golobutskii, op. 
cit., pp. 103-06. According to Naima, Khmelnytskyi himself 
took part in the negotiations in Crimea. See [Mustafa] Naima, 
"Zatargi z Ottomanami z powodu Kozakow i Dziennik Wyprawy 
Chocimskiey z Rocznikow Naima Efendi", in J. J. S. Sekowski, 
ed. and tr., Collectanea z Dziejopisow Tureckich Rzeczy do 
Historyi Polskiey Sluzacych, 2 vols (Warsaw, 1824), I, 201-02. 
All other sources point to the contrary. See for example, T. 
Buturlin's letter to Muscovite Department of Defense, Belgorod, 
April 17, 1648, in Akty Muskovskago gosudarstva, II, 201; and 
A. Trubetskoi and others to A. Kysil, Moscow, April 20, 1648, 
in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 180.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
80
Tatar military aid would bring incalculable advantages, as
dis
well as great manyAadvantages, to Khmelnytskyi.
During the first three months of 1648, if
Khmelnytskyi was unsuccessful in concealing his aims from
the authorities, he was successful in confusing these aims
for them. One way in which he achieved his goal was by
writing letters to various persons of importance. In these
letters he listed his personal grievances and the hardships
of the Kozaks, and then justified his and their actions.
Khmelnytskyi emphasized that neither he nor his companions
in Zaporozhe wanted bloodshed. They came to Zaporozhe not
«
to indulge in lawlessness of any sort; on the contrary,they
were driven there by the injustices of various officials
a.nd by the intolerable conditions of life they had to lead
in Ukraine. They had but one aim: to send a delegation to
Warsaw with a petition to have their former rights and
14liberties restored to them. It therefore, appeared that
14See the following letters of B. Khmelnytskyx from 
Zaporozhe: to J. Szemberg, January 6 , 1648; to M. Potocki, 
January 8 , 1648; to A. Koniecpolski, January 9, 1648; to M. 
Potocki, March 13, 1648 (and another letter to him on the 
same date written in the name of the Kozak army), in 
Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 23-26, 28-30, 
640-44. In the opinion of the editors of this documentary 
collection, Khmelnytskyi was not the author of the first 
three letters. These were most likely composed by the 
chronicler Samiilo Velychko. See p. 640, n. 1.
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Khmelnytskyi attempted to quiet the apprehensions of the
authorities and to win back their confidence in him.
But the real purpose of Khmelnytskyi1s letter
writing was more than that; he played for time. This
15became obvious to the gentry of Ukraine. These nobles
recognized unmistakable signs of another rebellion, and
sent frantic appeals to Potocki "to extinguish the deadly
fire" before it was too late,^ But the king and other
influential individuals interpreted Khmelnytskyi's
actions as the initial step in the war against the Tatars 
17and the Turks. Moreover, the vacillation of Potocki 
between the pressure of panicky nobles and the pressure of 
those who counted on war with the Muslim world, only helped 
Khmelnytskyi to gain time to further his plans.
Potocki did not attach any special significance
15See the anonymous letter from Cherkasy, April 2, 1648, 
in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p . 9
1 f)See M. Potocki' s letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun ],
March 31, 1648 in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 15.
17Kysil warned Muscovite officials that Khmelnytskyi 
might attempt to lure the Don Kozaks to carry out a sea-raid 
against the Turks. See A. Kysil's letter to Iu. Dolgorukov, 
Kobyzhcha, March 28, 1648, in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc.,
Ill, 167.
As late as c_a. , April 2.0, 1648 King Wladyslaw IV 
issued an order to Potocki not to take any hostile steps' 
against the Kozaks, and even sent part of the pay due to the 
registered Kozaks. See Gawronski, op. cit., pp. 263, 266-67.
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to Khmelnytskyi's flight to Zaporozhe at the close of 
18
1647. He became more concerned with the activities of
Khmelnytskyi at the beginning of February, 1648. By this
time the first mutiny of the registered Kozaks took place;
Khmelnytskyi was in control of the Sich; and there were
also definite signs of unrest among the Rusin people in
Ukraine. Potocki decided to solve matters by ordering the
regiment of the registered Kozaks stationed nearest
Zaporozhe to sieze Khmelnytskyi, to disperse his followers
and to reoccupy the Sich. But another unexpected event
took place: these registered Kozaks mutinied and joined the
19
ranks of their disaffected comrades-xn-arms.
Similar orders were then issued by Potocki to other
20regiments of registered Kozaks, but again, apart from 
fresh deflections to Khmelnytsky, his orders were not 
carried out. Potocki then attempted to induce those in
18In the important letter of M. Potocki to M. Ostrorog, 
Bar, December 24, 1648, cited by Lipinski, op. cit., p. 221, 
n. 2, there is no reference to Khmelnytskyi.
19L. Miaskowski1s letter to Anonymous, Balabanivka, 
February 16, 1648, in Lipinski, "Annexa", op. cit., pp. 
353-54.
20See M. Potocki1s letter to the Colonel of the Kaniv 
Regiment, Verbych, February 13, 1648. Cited by M. 
Hrushevskyi, Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy 10 vols (New York, 1956), 
VIII, 2, 180, n. 1.
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Zaporozhe to abandon Khmelnytskyi by threats of serious
reprisals on their families, and on destruction and confis-
21
cation of their properties and lands. When this stern 
manifesto failed to make any impression on the Kozaks,
Potocki then reversed to kindness and concessions. He 
promised to them that he would remove from their posts the 
commissioner and all the colonels against whom the Kozaks 
had any just grievances; to take severe action against 
those tenants by whom they were oppressed; and to insure 
that they would have a free access to their steppe occu­
pations. He also tried to lure Khmelnytskyi out of
I
Zaporozhe with offers of safe conduct, forgiveness for his
actions and restoration of his estate. Both the Kozaks and
22Khmelnytskyi, however, turned down his offers.
One of the serious mistakes made by Potocki was 
that he paid too little attention to the Kozak-Tatar 
contacts, even though he knew about them in February. He
21See M. Potocki's manifesto to the Kozaks at Zaporozhe, 
Korsun, February 20, 1648. Ibid.
22See M. Potocki1s letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun],
March 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, pp. 15-16; 
and Chrzaszcz, op. cit., p. 263.
no
See the anonymous diary in Pamiatrnki etc., 2nd rev. 
ed., I , 175.
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dismissed all nev/s of the Kozak-Tatar alliance as rumours, 
preferring to believe various reports that Sultan Ibrahim
2 ‘
I would not permit the Tatars to invade the Commonwealth.
After he received official confirmation that the Tatars
25would support the Kozaks, the aim of Khmelnytskyi's
delaying tactics became obvious to him. The Kozaks were
not planning a naval raid into the Ottoman dominions;
instead, they were prepared to march into Ukraine and with
the Tatar help to fight for their demands. At the close
of March, Potocki already received these demands from
Khmelnytskyi: withdrawal of the Crown Army from Ukraine;
removal of the colonels from their posts; disbanding of
their guard detachments; and the restoration of all former
26Kozak liberties by repealing the Ordinance of 1638.
Potocki still underestimated the role of the
24See V. Lupul's letter to L. Miaskowski, Iasi, February
1, 1648, in Lipinski, "Annexa", op. cit., p. 354; and A. 
Kysil's letters to Iu. Dolgorukov, Kobyzhcha, January 24 
and February 23, 1648, in Akty otnosiashchesia etc., Ill, 
109, 142-53.
25Muscovite officials informed Kysil that the Kozak- 
Tatar military alliance was concluded on March 15th. See 
the letter of A. Trubetskoi and others to A. Kysil, Moscow, 
April 20, 1648, in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 180. 
Potocki knew about this development before the end of March.
2^See Potocki's letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun], March 
31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 16.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
85
Tatars. Moreover, he was induced .by the friendly overtures
27
of the khan into believing that the Tatars wanted peace.
Not expecting Tatar intervention, Potocki decided to march
against the rebels and crush them. By taking this step
he ignored the orders of the king and the advice of others,
28who were decidedly against such a risky step. Potocki 
reasoned, however, that he had to crush the rebels before 
they managed to enter the settled areas of Ukraine. He 
visualized the rising of the serfs; with the influx of 
serfs into the rebel Kozak ranks, Khmelnytskyi's "three
9 7See B. K. Maskiewicz, "Pamietniki Boguslawa 
Kazimierza Maskiewicza" [ Memoirs of Boguslaw Kazimierz 
Maskiewicz], in Pamietniki etc (Wroclaw, 1961) 237-38; and 
A. Kysil's letters to A. Trubetskoi and others, Kobyzhcha, 
Mnrch 31 and April 3, 1648, in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc.,
Ill, 169-71. See also Kubala, op. cit., p. 265; and 
Tomkiewicz, Jeremi Wisniowiecki (1612-1651) (Warsaw, 1933), 
pp. 181-83.
9RM. Potocki's letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun], March 
31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 15-17 shows 
clearly that the king ordered Potocki not to initiate 
hostilities against the Kozaks. The letters of B. Khmelny­
tskyi to Wladyslaw IV, A. Kazanowski and W. Zaslawski, Bila 
Tserkva, June 12, 1648, and to Z. Czerny, Korsun, May 27, 
1.648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc. , pp. 34, 40, 
42, 31 also show that Potocki acted against the orders of 
the king. From the following letters there is additional 
evidence that other individuals were against Potocki1s 
plans; M. Ostrorog to J. Ossolinski, Lviv, May 26, 1648 and
A. Kysil to Wladyslaw IV, Hoshcha, May 27, 1648, in 
Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2, 378, 382; and A. Kysil 
to M. Lubienski, [Hoshcha], May 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie 
Ukrainy etc., II, 26.
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thousand men would quickly become one hundred thousand".
If the Kozak rebels were defeated the serfs would not dare
29to rise.
He planned to deal with Khmelnytskyi's rebels in 
Zaporozhe. Potocki considered that his task would be 
accomplished without bloodshed. The rebels would be over­
awed with his show of strength and be compelled to capitu­
late. He was so confident of success that he refused to 
wait for the arrival of the magnate private armies and he 
appointed his son Stefan to lead a vanguard into Zaporozhe. 
Late in April one detachment of the vanguard, comprising 
mainly still loyal registered Kozaks, sailed down the 
Dn^iper by boats; the other, commanded by young Potocki, 
proceeded south by land. Both detachments were to combine 
at Kodak fortress, and then the vanguard would begin its 
operations against the rebels. The main body of the Crown 
Army was concentrated near Korsun and it would aid the 
vanguard if it became necessary.
Khmelnytskyi was informed about the movements of 
the Crown Army. He acted before the rendezvous of the
^ S e e  M. Potocki1s letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun], 
March 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 15-16.
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vanguard took place. At Zhovti Vody he surrounded the
detachment of Stefan Potocki. Once this was accomplished
he was concentrating on the movements of the flotilla of
the registered Kozaks on the Dnieper. He did not need to
march against the registered Kozaks, for many of them were
in sympathy with the rebel cause. At Kamianyi Zaton there
occurred a third mutiny; these registered Kozaks killed
their loyal officers and deserted to Khmelnytskyi. During
the following days of battle the remaining registered
Kozaks and squadrons of dragoons in young Potocki's camp
also deserted their commander. From May 15’ to the 16th,
as the Tatars joined Khmelnytskyi's forces, the remnants of
the vanguard were annihilated. The vanguard of the Crown
30
Army thus ceased to exist.
Meanwhile, Crown Grand Hetman Mikolaj Potocki 
waited anxiously for news from the vanguard. Receiving no 
word for some time, he decided to march southward. On
^F o r  the Battle of Zhovti Vody (April 29 to May 15 or 
16, 1648), see the following sources and monographs: K.
Grodzicki's letter to M. Potocki [Kodak], May 9, 1648, in 
Pamiatniki etc., I, 3, 21-24; J. Belchacki's letter to 
Anonymous, Cherkasy, May 20, 1648, in Sprawy i rzeczy etc., 
pp. 110-12; Anonymous letter from Cherkasy, May 20, 164-8, 
in Lipinski, "Annexa", op . cit. , p. 355; Chrzaszcz, op. cit. 
pp. 264-67; Gorka, op. cit. , p. 114; and Iu.< Tys-Krokhmaliuk 
Boi Khmelnytskoho etc (Munich, 1954), pp. 51-64
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May 3 he finally received a message that his son's
detachment was surrounded and was defending itself against
great odds. Appealing for additional troops, Potocki then
advanced to Chyhyryn. Here news reached him about the
mutiny of the registered Kozaks on the Dnieper. On May
19, he received the tragic news about his son. Ordering
a retreat, Potocki decided to meet the enemy in a fortified
camp near Korsun. Upon the sight of such a large Kozak-
Tatar force, however, he changed his mind and resumed the
retreat. This was a fatal mistake: he led the Crown Army
into a skillfully-prepared ambush. On May 26, 1648 it
31suffered an overwhelming defeat.
These military disasters brought to an end the 
decade of that "golden peace" in effect since the Kozak 
Ordinance of 1638. The best troops of the Commonwealth, 
and the mainstay of the magnate rule in Ukraine, ceased to 
exist. Mikolaj Potocki, and the second-in-command, Crown
^ F o r  the Battle of Korsun (May 24 to 26, 1648), see 
the following sources and monographs: Anonymous report on 
the defeat of the Hetmans, [n.p.], May 26, 1648, K. 
Rajecki's letter to K. Lubomirski, Polonne, May 28, 1648; 
and the letter of J. Ulinski and S. Jaskolski to [M. 
Lubienski], Bar, June [8 ], 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego 
etc., pp. 17-24, 36-38. See also Krokmaliuk, op. cit., 
pp. 67-81. Concerning the correct address and date of 
letter of Ulinski and Jaskolski see Kubala, op. cit., 
p. 447, n. 48.
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Field Hetman Marcin Kalinowski, became Tatar prisoners.
To make the matters even worse, at the time when the 
Commonwealth needed a strong leader, it was to experience 
the chaos of the interregnum, for on May 20 King Wladys­
law died. To add to these misfortunes of the ruling order, 
the south-eastern palatinates were engulfed by a terrible
fire —  the rising of the serfs. These events were indeed
32
a "terrible rerum metamorphosis" .
Many nobles were convinced that these catastrophic 
developments were visible signs of God's wrath and punish­
ment for their sins. Some of them were driven into 
desperation by the thought that "the serfs will now rule 
over us", and fled in panic into the interior parts of the 
Commonwealth. Others saw no hope and expected that they 
would perish. The south-eastern palatinates were left to
the ravages of the serfs. There was no force to stop the 
33Kozak rebels. Yet, at such a time Khmelnytskyi actually 
32A. Kysil's letter to M. Lubienski [Hoshcha], May 31, 
1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc.', II, 25.
See ibid., W. Zaslawski's letter to M. Lubienski,
Dubno, June 2, 1648; and A. Kysil's letter to M. Lubienski, 
Hoshcha, June 7, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., II, 
2, 392, 403; Anonymous letter from Lviv, June 4, 1648, and
B. Leszczynski's speech at the Convocation Diet, Third 
Session, Warsaw, July 18, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego 
etc., pp. 32-34 112; and J. Jerlicz, Latopisiec etc., 2
vols (Warsaw, 1853), I, 62.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
90
halted his victorious advance at Bila Tserkva. To the
optimistic nobles this move was an act of "moderation" on
his part. The pessimist saw it only as an attempt to
34
prepared a death blow to the Commonwealth.
Ill
Early in June, 1648 Bohdan Khmelnytskyi found him­
self in a position similar to that of a man who attempted
to vault into a saddle, but who jumped over a horse 
35instead. Khmelnytskyi expected to carry out a success­
ful military campaign, but certainly not to annihilate the 
Crown Army in two main engagements. Although he counted on 
the rising of the serfs in Ukraine, he anticipated neither 
such a spontaneous outburst of the "serfs' fury", nor an 
eruption of a movement of such great proportions, which 
threatened with the extirpation of the ruling class. These 
unexpected developments made possible for Khmelnytskyi the
^ S e e  Letter of S. Kishevych [Lviv], July 13, 1648, 
cited by Lipinski, op. cit., p. 238; A. Kysil's letter to 
M. Lubienski [Hoshcha], May 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie 
Ukrainy etc., II, 25; Zolkiewski's letter to J. Ossolinski, 
Dubno, June 8 , 1648, and W. Zaslawski's letter to the 
Convocation Diet, Dubno, June 14, 1648, in Szajnocha, 
"Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2, 405; X, 197-203.
35See Hrushevskyi, op. cit. , VIII, 3, 9‘.
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attainment of his boldest aims. The Kozak leader, however,
had still no clearly defined plans at this time, Contrary
to the beliefs of many panicky nobles, Khmelnytskyi could
not throw all caution to the winds. He was also in no
position to send an ultimatum to the government, or to deal
a death-blow to the Commonwealth. Furthermore, h e .1 had no
intention to march at Warsaw.
Khmelnytskyi halted the victorious Kozak advance
cit Bila Tserkva for a definite purpose. His Tatar allies,
laden with plunder and numerous captives, returned to
3 6Crimea in the middle of June. Although Khan Islam III 
promised to send back his hordes in August, ^  Khmelnytskyi 
was uncertain of Tatar military aid in the future. It 
was no secret to him that Khan received strict orders from 
the Turkish government to return to Crimea and not to
■^See Islam Ill 's letter to Wladyslaw IV [ Zubzhytsa ], 
June [11], 1648 (sic) , in Jakuba Mich alov/ski ego etc., p. 41. 
Concerning the correct place and date of issue of this 
letter see Kubala, op. cit., p. 449, n. 61. The Khan must 
have pretended not to know about the death of the king 
(May 20th) at the request of Khmelnytskyi. See n. 44 
below.
37See Gorka, op. cit., p. 116.
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invade the Commonwealth again. This order meant in fact 
that the Kozak-Tatar alliance came to an end. Were the 
Khan to ignore the orders of his suzerain, he had to face 
the consequences from Muscovy. If the Tatars entered into 
the territories of the Commonwealth, Muscovy would send 
its troops against them. Both Khmelnytskyi and Islam III 
were aware that the Muscovite government was prepared to 
honour the defensive anti-Tatar alliance, which was
39concluded with the Polish-Lithuanian state m  1647.
Neither of them wished to involve Muscovy in the conflict.
Apart from these adverse developments, Khmelnytskyi
-^ I b i d . See also Ahmed Pasha's letter to Potocki 
[Constantinopole, ca., late May or early June, 1648]; [L. 
Miaskowski's letter to J. Ossolinski, Kamianets, ca., June 
11, 1648], in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., X, 293-94, 
267-68; and the summary of Ahmed Pasha's letter to J. 
Ossolinski [Constantinopole, ca., June 11, 1648], in Zygmunt 
Abrahamowicz ed., Katalog dckumentow tureckich. Dokumenty 
do dziejow Polski i krajow osciennych w latach 1455-1672 
[A Catalogue of Turkish Documents. Documents Pertaining to 
History of Poland and to the Neighbouring Countries in the 
Years 1455-167 2] (Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 
1959), pp. 326-27. Concerning the correct names, places 
and dates of issue of these letters see Szajnocha, op. cit., 
II, 1, 107-08, 110-11.
3 9See A. Kysil's letter to M. Lubienski [Hoshcha], May 
31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 26; S. 
Bolkhovskii's letter to A. Kysil, Khotmyzhsk, June 14,
1648, in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 204; and B. 
Khmelnytskyi's letter to S. Bolkhovskii, Chyhyryn, June 30, 
1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., p. 54.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
93
still faced danger from other sources. He speculated that
King Wladyslaw issued a general mobilization order for the
gentry of the•Commonwealth, and that the king had ordered
the troops of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to march against
the Kozaks. Would the Kozaks dare to take up arms against
the king? He also had some evidence that the nobles were
preparing to offer some resistance. The initial step was
taken by Prince Jeremi Wisniowiecki, who began to make
attempts to quell the rising of the serfs. This magnate
began to rally the panicky nobles to his side and
40
encouraged them to follow his examples.
I
Under these circumstances Khmelnytskyi found no 
reason to press his army towards Warsaw. The march into 
Polish ethnic territories might drive the gentry into a 
desperate defence of their fatherland. Moreover, his 
troops were weary after a strenous campaign. Many of them 
were ill-equipped, unorganized and untrained. Khmelnytskyi 
thought more about defence and consolidation of his gains.
Z^ t this early stage of struggle he achieved already, 
considerably more than he expected. The Kozak military 
successes and the rising of the serfs would help him to
40 .See Kubala, op. cit., p. 276; and Tomkiewicz, op. cit.,
p. 187.
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satisfy his personal ambitions and to secure official confi-
41rmation of the rights of the Kozak Army. He thus saw no 
need to jeopardize his bargaining position upon the outcome 
of some major battle during the Kozak drive to Warsaw.
During this period of inaction, Khmelnytskyi 
received an important messuage from Adam Kysil, the Palatine 
of Bratslav. This Orthodox magnate advised him to cease all 
hostilities, make no further advance, rupture the Tatar 
alliance and to send a delegation to Warsaw with assurance 
of loyalty to the Commonwealth. At the same time the dele­
gates should acquaint the government with Kozak grievances 
and present to it definite demands. Kysil promised to
Khmelnytskyi to use his influence in Warsaw on Kozak behalf,
42
if the conditions he proposed were carried out.
^ S e e  B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to Wladyslaw IV, Bila 
Tserkva,June 12, 1648 (sic., see n. 44 below); in Dokumenty 
Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 33-34; and the Journal of W. 
Miaskowski, Pereiaslav, February 23, 1649, in Vossoedinenie 
Ukrainy etc., II, 108.
42 See A. Kysil's letter to B. Khmelnytskyi[Hoshcha],
June [7 ], 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 46-48.
In this collection of documents Kysil's letter is dated 
June 12th; while the same copy of this letter, in Pamatniki 
etc., I, 3, 140-48, is dated June 14th. Both dates are 
incorrect. The correct date is June 7th, as evident from 
the following correspondence: A. Kysil's letter to M. 
Lubienski, Hoshcha, June 7, 1648. See Szajnocha, "Zrodla", 
op. cit., II, 2, 398-403; and Kubala, op. cit., p. 448, 
n. 50. Kysil's letter to Lubienski is also found in Jakuba 
Michalowskiego etc., pp. 65-68, but again is dated
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Khmelnytskyi siezed this opportunity to strengthen
his new position which resulted from the recent victories.
He agreed to accept Kysil's proposals and to enter into
43negotiations with the government. In order to gain
greater concessions, he pretended to know nothing about the
44death of King Wladyslaw. In a humble letter to the late 
king he emphasized that he was not responsible for starting 
of the conflict. He only acted in self-defence when 
Potocki marched against him. Khmelnytskyi assured the king 
of his faithfulness and loyalty to his person, and even 
alluded to their common interest in combatting the tyranny
incorrectly —  June 30th. Concerning the correct dates of 
these letters see Szajnocha, op. cit., II, 1. 116-17; and 
Kubala, op. cit., p. 448, nn. 50, 53.
43See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to A. Kysil, Bila Tserkva, 
June 13, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 
44-45; and A. Kysil's letter to M. Lubienski Hoshcha ,
June 16, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 50.
44 . . -King Wladyslaw IV died on May 20, 1648; yet, on June
12th Khmelnytskyi still addressed a letter to him. There is 
enough evidence to show that Khmelnytskyi knew about the 
death of the king well before June 12t.h. Some of the 
contemporaries believed that Khmelnytskyi played a game of 
pretense. See A. S. Radziwill, Pamietniki etc., 2 vols 
(Poznan, 1839), II, 293. He must have asked Khan Islam III 
to help him in this game of pretense. See n. 36 above. 
Khmelnytskyi's motives were obvious. He knew who would read 
his letter. He was able to refer specifically and to allude 
to various "promises” of Wladyslaw IV without fear of contra­
diction. See Hrushevskyi, op. cit., VIII, 3, 16.
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of the magnates. The Kozak Army would also remain loyal
to the king; it wished to be placed exclusively under his
protection. He emphasized that peace was possible if the
45
demands of the Kozaks were taken into consideration.
At the same time he also wrote humble letters to several
influential magnates, asking them for intercession upon 
46Kozak behalf.
That at this time Khmelnytskyi formulated great
political designs were only alarming rumours, without
foundation, circulating among the panicky nobles. They saw
Khmelnytskyi as a "Rusin prince" who intended to carve out
<
of the south-eastern palatinates of the Commonwealth a
"sovereign Rusin principality", or to establish a "Rusin
47
monarchy" with Kiev as his capital. Nothing of the sort
45See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letter to Wladyslaw IV, Bila 
Tserkva, June 12, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho 
etc., pp. 33-34.
46
See B. Khmelnytskyi's letters to A. Kazanowski and to 
W. Zaslawski, Bila Tserkva, June 12, 1648, ibid., pp. 39-43. 
He also wrote to J. Ossolinski and to A. Radziwill. See 
Radziwill, op. cit., II, 296.
47See the following letters: A. Kysil to M. Lubienski 
[Hoshcha], May 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 
25; Anonymous letter from Lviv, June 4, 1648; J. Ulinski and 
S. Jaskulski to [ M. Lubienski], Bar, June [8], 1648; and 
the speech of B. Leszczynski at the Convocation Diet,
Second Session, Warsaw, July 17, 1648, in Jakuba Michalow­
skiego etc., pp. 34, 39, 109. See also the following:
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was advanced by him to the government. Khmelnytskyi did
not expect to gain complete independence. The rebellion
he led was not a premeditated death blow to the Polish-
Lithuanian state. The only anti-state —  or more properly
anti-magnate —  design proposed by him, was his desire for
48strengthening the authority of the monarch. On the 
whole, he made very moderate claims. These amounted more 
or less to his desire of reaching a compromise with the 
government.
The chief aim of Khmelnytskyi, as well as that of 
all the Kozaks, was to secure the repeal of the Ordinance 
of 1638 and the official confirmation of all former Kozak 
liberties. This is evident from the demands of the Kozak 
Army brought to Warsaw by its delegates. Apart from
Extract from the letter of L. Miaskowski to anonymous, 
Kamianets, June 8 , 1648; anonymous despatch from Brody,
June 10, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla" op. cit., II, 407,
409, M. Ostrorog to J. Ossolinski, Lviv, June 4, 1648, in 
Pamietniki o Koniecpolskich etc., p. 424; and MS. B.Z.N. 
Ossol., 189, f .77.
48
See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letters to the following: Z.
Czerny, Bila Tserkva, May 27, 1648; Wladyslaw IV, Bila 
Tserkva, June 12, 1648; and Jan Kazimierz, Zamostia,
November 15, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., 
32-34, 80. See also Sobieski's report at the Convocation 
Diet, Fifth Session, Warsaw, July 21, 1648, in Jakuba 
Michalowskiego etc., p. 121; and the Diary of W. Miaskowski
Pereiaslav, February 22, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc.,
II, p. 108.
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numerous examples of grievances against the injustice of 
various officials, the Kozaks listed only four items of 
greater importance. For their Army the Kozaks asked the 
doubling of the quota of registered Kozaks to 12,000; they 
demanded pay which they failed to receive for the past 
five years; and the restoration of their former military 
self-government. Finally, on behalf of the Orthodox clergy 
the Kozaks also wanted the establishment of full authority 
of the Orthodox Church, as well as the restoration^Ortho­
dox churches held in certain towns of the Crown and the
49
Grand Duchy by the Uniates.
The Kozaks also wanted an autonomous territory
beyond Bila Tserkva under the jurisdiction of the Kozak
Army, which would be free from various Crown officials and
50
in which the Crown Army would not be stationed. This 
wish, no doubt, was the source of the alarming rumours 
about Khmelnytskyi and his ’’sovereign Rusin principality" ,
^ S e e  the Grievances and Demands of the Kozak Army, Bila 
Tserkva, June 12, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho 
etc., pp. 36-37.
Cf)
See M. Potocki1s letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun],
March 31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., pp. 15-16; 
and J. Ulinski and S. Jaskulski's letter to [M. Lubienski], 
Bar, June [8 ], 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 39.
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which circulated among the nobles.* Since nothing of 
this sort was specified in the official demands of the Kozak 
Army to the government, this must have been matter of 
secondary importance.
To Khmelnytskyi and to the Kozaks religious freedom 
was the only important "national" question. As had been 
customary since the 1520's, the Kozaks championed for the 
rights of the Orthodox Church. They were little concerned 
with other "national" questions of the Rusin people. This 
is best illustrated by their egotistical demands. They 
failed to mention the needs of the unprivileged classes.
As far as the Rusin populace was concerned, it was a handy 
tool to be used in gaining concessions for the Kozak Army. 
They cared little about the rights of the submerged 
agrarian population. It was this element, however, which 
radically changed the nature of the Kozak revolt. As the 
rising of the serfs took greater dimensions and a more 
terrible form, Khmelnytskyi was left with two choices: to 
flow with the tide, or to make attempts to dam it.
At the close of June he summoned a general council 
of the Kozak Army at Chyhyryn to deal with this problem.
^ S e e  Hrushevskyi, op. cit., VIII, 3, 12.
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Most Kozaks expressed hope that their delegates would 
return from Warsaw with a favourable answer to their 
demands, and that peace would result eventually. They were, 
however, prepared to accept even the worst news. For this 
reason they had to decide on a definite course of action.
The Kozak officers were generally against the continuing 
on with the hostilities. They proposed to move supplies 
of all available foodstuffs to Zaporozhe; Khmelnytskyi was 
even prepared to flee into the Don district of Muscovy.
From here negotiations could be carried on without danger 
with both the Poles and the Turks. If agreement was reached 
with the Poles, they would fight the Turks again; if nego­
tiations brought no fruit, they would accept the protection 
of the sultan and continue to fight the Poles. Others 
argued that all "lawless bands", serfs and Tatars should 
be called for support at the first indication of hostility 
of the Poles. The common Kozaks were decisively against
negotiations; and they openly clamoured for the continuation 
52of war.
See the Report of Rev. P. Lasko, Chyhyryn, June 29, 
1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 44-46; the Inter­
rogation of Kozak Prisoners, Halych, July 29, 1648, in 
Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 93; and S. Karpinski's letter 
to Anonymous, Bar, June 25, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", 
op. cit., II, 2, 430-32.
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The Kozak general staff decided to adopt a policy 
of caution. Khmelnytskyi, as well as many of the Kozak 
officers, belonging as they did to the gentry, were watching 
the rising of the serfs with apprehension. This group was 
not altogether pleased with the massacres'of the. nobles. 
Would the serfs accept Kozak masters in place of the 
eradicated Polish or Rusin lords? Would the serfs return 
to the tilling of the soil and to the burdens of corvee 
once peace was concluded? The Kozaks were not interested 
in any drastic changes of the existing socio-economic order. 
Khmelnytskyi decided that he did not want to dam the serf 
deluge; he only wanted to control its flow. If he allowed 
himself to be carried with the serf deluge, his personal 
position and the interests of his own class, as well as 
those of the Kozaks, might perish. Thus, on the one hand, 
the serf rising aided his plans; on the other, it hampered 
his negotiations with the government. He had to come to 
terms with the government before matters would go beyond 
his control.
At this time Khmelnytskyi had little control over 
the serf movement. The serfs acted independently and 
frequently paid no heed to his manifestoes. Khmelnytskyi 
received news that the serfs on the left bank of the Dnieper
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
intended to select another leader for themselves. He began 
to have serious misunderstandings with the popular serf 
leader Maxym Kryvonis. In order to establish his authority, 
secure his own gains and that of the Kozaks, and to quiet 
the apprehensions of the nobles, Khmelnytskyi decided to 
carry out dangerous and unpopular measures. He seemed to 
create a rift between the Kozaks and the serfs by restri­
cting serf entry into the Kozak Army, denouncing the 
cictions of the "lawless bands" , sending manifestoes to 
restore order in the countryside and by executing several
of the serf leaders. He even claimed that if the govern-
«
ment agreed to meet the Kozak demands he was willing to
53assist the.ruling class to check the deluge of the serfs. 
This was only the one side of the coin.
Past experience, however, taught Khmelnytskyi of 
the many dangers and disadvantages of being the weaker 
partner during the negotiations. He had no intention of 
being forced into that position. The Kozak leader led
53See B. Khmelnytskyi1s manifestoes to the Kozaks and 
Serfs, Chyhyryn, June 27 and July 12, 1648, in Dokumenty 
Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 54-57; Report of Rev. P. 
Lasko, Chyhyryn, June 29, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy 
etc., II, 45; and the Anonymous despatch [n.p., ca. July 
7-8, 1648], in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., II,
2, 422.
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certain men of influence to believe that he would obey the
i
demands of the government and that he was prepared to
54settle all differences over the conference table. He was
too shrewd, however to place his complete trust in the
promises of the ruling order, especially when there were
still many voices raised in Warsaw against the "humiliation"
of making too many concessions to the lowest riffraff of the 
55Commonwealth". To follow the demands of the government 
to the letter was to invite disaster. Khmelnytskyi decided 
first to consolidate his own position among the Kozaks and 
the serfs. He would then find a way by which he could apply 
pressure on the government to gain Kozak demands. Finally, 
he decided to organize a strong army which would guarantee 
that all the promises of the government woul'd be kept. In 
order to accomplish all this, Khmelnytskyi agreed to an 
armistice. All hostilities were to be suspended until 
Kozak delegates returned from Warsaw with the reply of the
~*^See B. Khmelnytskyi1 s letter to A. Kysil, Chyhyryn, 
June 27, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., 
pp. 51-52.
55See the Speech of B. Leszczynski at the Convocation 
Diet, Second Session, Warsaw, July 17, 1648, in Jakuba 
Michalowskiego etc., p. 109.
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government to the demands of the Kozak Army. The 
armistice, however, rested on a weak foundation: both
sides built the agreement on distrust and deceit.
5^See M. Lubienski's letters to J. Tyszkiewicz and J. 
Sisniowiecki, Warsaw, June 24, 1648, ibid., pp. 62-63; 
Senate's letters to J. Tyszkiewicz and J. Wisiowiecki, 
Warsaw, June 24, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op . cit.,
II, 2, 425-28, and in Pamiatniki etc., I, 3, 102; and B. 
Khmelnytskyi1 s letter to A. Kysil, Chyhyryn,1 June 27, 1648, 
in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 51-52.
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CHAPTER IV
THE CONFLICTING POLICIES OF THE OSSOLINSKI-WISNIOWIECKI 
GROUPS, AND THE TRANSORMATION OF THE KOZAK REBELLION 
INTO THE NATIONAL STRUGGLE OF THE RUSIN PEOPLE
I
At a time when unity of action for the government
was of the utmost importance to prevent further bloodshed
in the south-eastern pa.latinates , the Commonwealth was
plagued by additional difficulties. A solution how to deal
with the Kozaks and the serfs was yet to be found; new army
<
commanders to replace the captive hetmans were still to be 
appointed; and a new monarch was still to be elected.
Worst of all, at such a difficult time the Commonwealth did 
not have a strong leader. The Interrex, Primate Maciej 
Lubienski, was only a nominal head of state. This feeble 
old man was unable to provide strong leadership, or even to 
unite all the hostile factions among the nobles of the 
Commonwealth.^ As a result of these conditions, there 
emerged two main groups among the nobles: one was led by
■^ See L. Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, 2nd rev. ed (Lviv, 
1924), p. 267.
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the Crown Grand Chancellor, Jerzy Oss olinski; the other 
was dominated by the Palatine of Rus, Prince Jeremi 
Wisniowiecki. Both groups agreed on the accomplishment of 
one basic aim: the restoration of the staus quo of the old
2order in the south-eastern palatinates of the Commonwealth.
Ea.ch group, however, proposed a different programme on the
ways and means of dealing with the Kozak-serf problem;
clashed on the issue of appointment new army commanders;
and supported different candidates for the Polish throne.
The Kozak-serf problem proved to be the chief source of
disagreement between the two groups.
Jerzy Ossolinski attempted to save the Commonwealth
from the impending catastrophe by acting for the indecisive
Lubienski. Driven and guided by the love of his country and
by his personal ambitions, Ossolinski steered the ship of
3state during the interregnum by half-legal measures. His 
primary concern was to prevent the fusion of the Kozak 
rebellion with the rising of the serfs and to rupture the
2
See Zofia Libiszowska, "Stosunek polskich mas ludowych 
do walki narodowo-wyzwolenczej na Ukrainie w latach 1648- 
1654" [The Relation of the Polish Popular Masses to the 
Struggle for the National Liberation in Ukraine During the 
Years 1648-1654], in Sesja naukowa etc (Warsaw, 1956), 
p 3 8 . .
3
See Kubala, op. cit., pp. 268-74.
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Kozak-Tatar military alliance. He believed that these were 
the sources of grave danger to the Commonwealth. But these 
sources of danger could be averted by governmental conces­
sions to the Kozaks, designed to pacify them by satisfying 
their narrow class interests. Moreover, Ossolinski reasoned 
that the pacified Kozaks, in order to safeguard their newly- 
gained governmental concessions, could be easily induced to 
quell the rising of the serfs.
Once the domestic strife ended within the Common­
wealth, Ossolinski planned to revive the old animosities 
between the Kozaks and the Tatars, to smash their "unholy" 
alliance and then to direct the Kozaks against Crimea. But 
there was also another reason why Ossolinski sought to set 
into motion the war plans of the late King Wladyslaw IV 
against the Muslim world. He attempted to strengthen the 
pov/er of the candidate for the Polish throne of his own 
choice. The Crown Grand Chancellor therefore planned to 
make use of the Kozaks as an instrument in the royalist
reaction against the anti-monarchical faction of oligarchs
4
and nobles of the Commonwealth.
^See ibid., pp. 279-80. See also Libiszowska., op. cit. , 
p. 38; W. Tomkiewicz, Jeremi Wisniowiecki (1612-1651)
(Warsaw, 1933), p. 191; and Wladyslaw Czaplinski, Dwa sejmy 
w roku 1652. Studium z dziejow rozkladu Rzeczypospolitej
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For these reasons Ossolinski and his supporters
initiated a programme of "contentment", or a programme of
5
conciliary policy towards the Kozaks. The immediate aim 
of this group was to halt all hostilities with the Kozaks 
and to settle all difficulties by negotiations. Ossolinski 
encouraged the Orthodox magnate, the Palatine of Bratslav, 
Adam Kysil, to act as a mediator between the government and 
the Kozaks.^
The major aim of the other group, to use the words
of one demagogue, was to ensure that "our bondsmen would
7
not rule over us". The loudest spokesman for thxs group
szlacheckiej w XVII wleku [The Two Diets in the Year 1652.
A Study from the Times of the Declining Commonwealth of the 
Gentry in the XVII Century] (Wroclaw: Zaklad Narodowy im. 
Ossolinskich, 1955), pp. 32-34. On the renewed plans of 
war with the Turks, see E. Latacz, Ugoda Zborowska a piany 
tureckie Jana Kazimlerza (Ksrakow, 1933) .
C
This policy is clearly stated in an anonymous circular 
entitled "An opinion of One Polish Noble on the Pacification 
of the Zaporozhian Army". It was/most likely composed by 
Ossolinski or Kysil. See Sprawy i rzeczy etc (Lviv, 1914), 
pp. 119-23.
6See J. Ossolinski's letter to A. Kysil [Warsaw, June 7, 
1648], in K. Szajnocha, "Zrodla" [Sources], Dwa lata dziejow 
naszych. 1646. 1648., 2 vols (Warsaw, 1900), II, 2, 420. 
Concerning the correct date of this letter see Kubala, 
op. cit., p. 448, n. 49.
7
S. Lubomirski's letter to[A. Kysil], Wisnicz, June 14, 
1648. Cited by Zbigniew Wojcik, Dzikie Pola w ogniu.
O Kozaczyznie w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej, 2nd ed (Warsaw: 
Wiedza Powszechna, 1961), p. 176.
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was Prince Jeremi Wisniowiecki. He was a Polonized Rusin
"kinglet" , who in his youth rejected Orthodoxy for Roman
Catholicism, and who owned vast latifundiae and thousands
8of serfs in Ukraine. In Wisniowiecki1s evaluation, the
conflict within the Commonwealth was nothing more than an
insurrection of slaves, against whom must be raised the
9
severe arm of justice. The Kozaks must first be subdued; 
then suitably punished for their treason; and only then 
could certain concessions be offered to them. This meant 
in fact to resort to sword and bloodshed in quelling the 
Kozaks and the serfs, and then to dictate conditions of
I
peace to the vanquished. Wisniowiecki saw in the policy of 
"contentment" of the Kozaks the ultimate ruin of the 
Commonwealth. He believed that the rebels would only be 
encouraged to continue their lawlessness and rebellion, as 
their ambitions would never be satisfied. The result of 
such policy would be catastrophic: "the continual oppression 
of the nobles". Wisniowiecki would rather die than to 
tolerate the rule of "the bondsmen and the most foul
O
See Tomkiewicz, op. cit., pp. 6-8 , 57-113; and I. P. 
Krvpiakevych, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (Kiev, 1954), p. 18.
9See Tomkiewicz, op. cit., p. 208.
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masses".
Notwithstanding the opposition of Wisniowiecki and 
other intransigents, the programme of Ossolinski seemed to 
be: successful. It appeared that Adam Kysil managed to 
arrange an armistice. It also appeared that Khmelnytskyi 
agreed to cease hostilities and that he was prepared to 
negotiate. At first most of the gentry of the Commonwealth 
hailed these unexpected developments with satisfaction.
Some individuals even began to search for answers as to the 
causes of the conflict within the Commonwealth.
The most common conclusion, as that of K. Opalinski, 
was that God punished them for their sins, especially for 
their ill-treatment of serfs. The Lithuanian magnate,
Prince A. Radziwill, described this punishment in terms of 
retributive justice. "Formerly in this country the poor 
were oppressed; now they oppress the rich. Formerly the 
lords used various means in order to squeeze blood from 
their own serfs; now the serfs are reciprocating in kind".
Wisniowiecki1 s letter to A. Kysil, Horochky, June 
21, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc (Krakow, 1864), pp. 
55-56.
^ S e e  K. Opalinski, "On the Burdens and the Oppression 
of Serfs in Poland", Satyry (Wroclaw, 1953)', Book I, Satire 
3, 11, 1-140, pp. 23-29.
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Convinced that "Our Merciful Lord punished us less for our
sins than we deserved", he concluded that it was imperative
. . . .  12"to limit our liberties, or rather the abuse of them".
Other individuals also echoed his conclusion: the
nobles of the Commonwealth, claimed one contemporary, equate
1 1"liberty" with "licence". An anonymous noble pointed out
the main cause of the conflict within the Commonwealth in
the following way: "The nobles in our country have so much
freedom,/ That little of it was left for the burgesses, and
14
hardly any for the serfs". Another noble claimed that
the "kinglets", or "those who formed sovereign states [in
Ukraine], and infringed upon the rights of not only the
serfs, but also of the nobles", should be held responsible
15
for the conflict. These were the opinions of individuals 
who considered compromise or concessions to the Kozaks as a
12A. S. Radsiwill, Pamietniki etc., 2 vols (Poznan,
1839), II, 391. * '
13
K. Opalinski, "On the Lame or Rather on the Dead Exe­
cution of Our Laws", op. cit . , Book. Ill, Satire 8 , 1. 48, 
p. 158.
14"A Noble to Another on the Kozak War in the Years 1648 
and 1649" . Cited by Janina Bieniarzowna, Walka chlopow w 
kasztelanii krakowskiej [The Struggle of the Serfs in the 
Castellany of Krakow] (Warsaw: Ludowa Spoldzielnia Wydaw- 
nicza, 1953), p. 32.
■^Speech of S. Kobierzycki at the Coronation Diet (1649). 
Cited by Czaplinski, op. cit., p. 15.
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solution to the conflict. But these were only the voices 
of a small minority of the nobles of the Commonwealth.
The great majority of nobles of the Commonwealth 
viewed Ossolinski's policy of "contentment" with suspicion 
and regarded it extremely dangerous for themselves and for 
their state. There were several reasons for these atti­
tudes. First of all, when some of these nobles heard that 
Kysil arranged an armistice and that Khmelnytskyi was 
prepared to negotiate, they became ashamed of their former 
panic. Interpreting Khmelnytskyi1s unexpected actions and
his willingness to negotiate as a sign of Kozak weakness,
<
these nobles decided that the danger was over. At this 
point they would not "dishonour" themselves or their state 
by allowing the "riffraff" to remain unpunished. Had not 
the lowest refuse of society deserved punishment for their 
foul deeds and crimes? Were the laments and the bloody 
tears of the nobles, the desecrated churches and the treason 
and perjury of the Kozaks to be forgotten?'*"^
Another reason why the policy of compromise was
^ S e e  J. Wisniowiecki1s letter to A. Kysil, Horochky, 
June 21, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 55-56; and 
W. Zaslawski’s letter to the Convocation Diet, Dubno, July 
14, 1648, in Karol Szajnocha, "Zrodla"[ Sources], Dziela 
Karola Szajnochy [The WTorks of Karol Szajnocha] (Warsaw: J. 
Unger, 1878f7~X~ 197-203 .
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unpopular among the majority of the nobles was because they
believed that it paved the way for Khmelnytskyi to create
17his "sovereign Rusin Principality". Even if Khmelnytskyi
failed in his plans of separatism, there still existed
another danger: the Commonwealth of the gentry would face
a radical transformation. Khmelnytskyi, it was said,
favoured to change the status of the king from primus inter
pares among the nobles to an absolute monarch, as well as
1 8to drastically curtail the liberties of the nobles.
Finally, the initial successes of Ossolinski's 
policy failed to silence his greatest critics and opponents. 
On the contrary, these individuals redoubled their efforts 
to spread their point of view among the nobles of the 
Commonwealth. These intransigents had no faith in nego­
tiations. They advised the gentry to expect a long struggle
19 . .with the rebels. They wanted to make use of the armistice
17See for example D. Slugocki's letter to Niezabitowski, 
Cbolhanskyi Kamian, ca. September 8 , 1648, in Jakuba 
Michalowskiego etc., pp. 182-83.
l-^See for example D. Sobieski's report at the Convo­
cation Diet, Fifth Session, Warsaw, July 21, 1648, ibid., 
pp. 120-121; and the reaction to this report, in M. Golinski, 
MS. B.Z.N.Ossol., 189, f. 123.
19 .See S. Lubomirski1s letter to the Dietane of the Pala­
tinate of Krakow, Wisnicz, June 24, 1648, in Adam Przybos 
ed., Akta sejmikowe wojewodztwa krakowskiego [Records of
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by raising a strong army; at the same time, however, they
20
also wanted some military action against the enemy. It 
nattered little to these supporters of the policy of the 
sword what was promised to the Kozaks, because they
21
believed that "frangenti fidem, fides frangatur eidem" .
Wisniowiecki and his supporters took advantage of
the Dietines, which began their first sessions on June 25,
1648 throughout the Commonwealth. They not only spread
their credo among these assemblies of the gentry, but also
launched a strong campaign in order to discredit the policy 
22
of Ossolinski. Moreover, these intransigents were res­
ponsible for spreading malicious rumours against the late 
King Wladyslaw IV and the Crown Grand Chancellor. They 
claimed that the king sought revenge on the nobles because
the Dietine of the Palatinate of Krakow}, 2 vols (Krakow- 
Wroclaw: Polska Akademia Umiejetnosci-Zaklad Narodowy im. 
Ossolinskich, 1953-1955), II, 345.
20
See the letter of J. Tyszkiewicz and others to the 
Senate, Kolchyn, July 30, 1648; and J. Wisniowiecki's letter 
to M.Ostrorog, Zbarazh, August 12, 1648, in Jakuba 
Michalowskiego etc., pp. 98-100, 154-55.
21W. Zaslawski's letter to the Convocation Diet, Dubno, 
July 14, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., X, 202.
22Typical of this action is S. Lubomirski1s letter to 
the Dietine of the Palatinate of Krakow, Wisnicz, June 24, 
164-8, in Akta sejmikowe wojewodztwa krakowskiego, II,
344-48. ~~ '
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in 1646 they wrecked his plans of war with the Turks; thus,
in retalliation he incited the Kozaks to rebellion against
them. In another version of these rumours, the king was
supposed to depend upon the Kozaks in order to establish a
hereditary monarchy and to extend absolute rule at the
expense of the liberties of the nobles. Khmelnytskyi, it
was said, acted with the permission and the knowledge of
the king; and the third party in that arrangement was
23Ossolinski, the "author" of the Kozak rebellion.
In this way the opponents of the policy of "content­
ment" of the Kozaks gained a great deal of support from the
I
gentry as a whole, and especially from those of the eastern 
palatinates, who either lost or were threatened with the 
loss of their estates to the "riffraff". Most of the
23See for example the lampoon, "Compendium consiliorum 
of Jerzy Ossolinski, Crown Chancellor", which was composed 
in 1649 by Wisniowiecki or by one of his followers. See 
Pamietniki o Koniecpolskich etc (Lviv, 1842), pp. 422-27.
In the same year appeared "Ad nugacem militem responsio", 
which refuted all the charges made against Ossolinski in the 
above lampoon. See Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 476-83. 
Another interesting document is B. Khmelnytskyi1s letter to 
Jan Kazimierz, Chyhyryn, June 6 , 1651, in Dokumenty Bohdana 
Khmclnytskoho etc (Kiev, 1961), pp. 631-32. This letter is
an obvious forgery. It was written by some supporter of 
Wisniowiecki and therefore an enemy of the royal court. The 
main value of this letter is that it contains many charges 
against King Wladyslaw IV, Ossolinski, and other individuals. 
See also J. Jerlicz, Latopisiec etc., 2 vols (Warsaw, 1853),
I , 52-53.
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deputies elected at the Dietines to attend the sessions of 
the Convocation Diet at Warsaw were instructed by their
24electors to wreck all the "machinations" of Ossolinski.
24OssolinsKi's emergency meassures were extremely unpopu­
lar with the gentry of the Commonwealth. Contrary to law 
and custom, he attempted to transform the assembly of the 
nobles of the Palatinate of Mazowsze at Warsaw, into a kind 
of Convocation Diet. Under pressure of Ossolinski, this 
assembly issued on June 9, 1648 a manifesto addressed to the 
whole country. This manifesto contained three controversial 
items: faster election of a new king; immediate mobili­
zation; and appointment of three regimentaries (W. Zaslaw- 
ski, M. Ostrorog and A. Koniecpolski) in place of the cap­
tive hetmans.
The majority of the nobles were enraged at this mani­
festo. They held Ossolinski responsible for it. They did 
not view his actions as an attempt to save the Commonwealth 
from an impending catastrophe. On the contrary, they saw 
Ossolinski's measures as a deliberate attempt on his part to 
settle his personal differences with his enemies, as well as 
to elect a king of his own choice. The new monarch would 
undoubtedly try to extend "absolutum dominium" and thereby 
curtail their liberties. For these reasons, the Pre- 
Convocation Dietines rejected all of this manifesto of June 
9, or parts of it.
For typical attitudes of the gentry see the Resolutions 
and Instructions to the deputies of the Dietine of the Pala­
tinate of Krakow, Proszowice, June 25, 1648, in Akta sejmi- 
kowe wojewodztwa krakowskiego, II, 354-58; the Dietine of 
the Palatinates of Poznan and Kalisz, Sroda, June 24, 1648, 
and an extract from the letter of an anonymous noble from 
the Palatinate of Lublin [n.p.], July 7, 1648, in Jakuba 
Mi.chalowskiego etc., pp. 63-64, 73. See also Kubala, op.
cit., pp. 282, 450, n. 7; and W. Lipinski, Stanislaw Michal 
Krzyczewski etc (Krakow, 1912), pp. 260-61.
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II
While the pacifists and the intransigents fought 
verbal battles, the nominal leader of the latter group, 
Prince Jeremi Wisniowiecki, decided to act on his own with 
the sword.' Wisniowicki was one of the few men of importance 
who had not lost their heads' after the military disasters 
of the Crown Army, the death of King Wladyslaw and the 
rising of the serfs. Ukraine was virtually without defense, 
for the nobles left it to the prey of the Kozaks, Tatars and 
serfs. These nobles, rather than organizing some kind of 
resistance, simply fled for their lives and sought shelter 
in the fortresses of the western palatinates. Most of them 
were demoralized and only echoed words of despair. Under 
these circumstances Wisniowiecki decided to-save what could 
be yet saved. In his own way he proceeded to evolve order 
out of chaos.
For proper understanding of Wisniowiecki1s intran- 
sigency to the Kozaks and the serfs, it is necessary to 
remember that the source of that intransigency dated from 
the annihilation of the Crown Army at Korsun (May 26, 1643). 
At that time he was trapped in his own latifundiae on the 
left bank of the Dnieper by the rising of his own serfs, and 
by the Kozak-Tatar forces on the right bank of the Dnieper.
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He issued manifestoes to the gentry to flock under his 
colours, and then began to escape from his "cage". He made 
a spectacular march to the north with some six thousand 
troops and with great numbers of nobles and Jews. Turning 
westward, he crossed the rives Desna, Dnieper and Prypiats, 
marched south, and reached the northern borders of the Pala­
tinate of Kiev by the middle of June. Wisniowiecki then
undertook to oppose force by force and to check the rising
25of the serfs with all the resources at his disposal.
At the close of June, Wisniowiecki began a counter­
offensive against the roaming bands of serfs. To the cruel 
actions of the serfs he retalliated r/ith even worse 
cruelties. "Discharge your duties in such a way", 
Wisniowiecki instructed his troops regarding all those who
opposed him, "that they may feel they are being put to
26 . death". Leaving a trail of hangings, empalmgs and
9 S . .See B. K. Maskiewicz, "Pamietniki Boguslawa Kazimierza 
Maskiewicz a" [The Memoirs of Boguslaw Kazimierz Maskiewicz], 
in Pamietniki etc (Wroclaw, 1961), pp. 243-46; Natan 
Hannower, "Jawein Mecula t.j. Bagno Glebokie. Kronika 
zdarzen z lat 1648-1652, napisana przez Natana Hannowera z 
Zaslawia i wydana po raz pierwszy w Wenecyi w r 1656", in 
Sprawy i rzeczy etc., p. 22; and Tomkiewicz, op. cit.,
, 196197 7
26J. W. Rudawski, Historja polska etc., 2 vols (St. 
Petersburg, 1855), I, 37.
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decapitations in the Palatinate of Kiev, he then inarched to
Volynia. There his organized and disciplined body of
troops performed feats of "miraculous valour" against the
27motely serf masses commanded by Maksym Kryvonis. Thxs
querilla warfare in 1648, was waged to the close of 
28August. Both leaders adopted a policy of an eye for an
eye: Kryvonis' terrible atrocities were answered by even
. 29more terrible pogroms of Wisniowiecki.
By fighting fire with fire, Wisniowiecki acted
27Some historians have attempted to prove that Kryvonis 
was a Scotsman and a secret agent of the Protestant powers. 
Their claims rest on very weak foundations. See Lubomyr 
Wynar, "The Question of Anglo-Ukrainian Relations During the 
Rule of the Great Ukrainian Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi", 
Ukrainian Review, X (Spring, 1963), 37-39.
^^see Maskiewicz, in Pamietniki etc., pp. 247-54; and 
Tomkiewicz, op. cit., pp. 194-34.
29 .Kryvonis is characterized by Golinski as "the great 
tyrant and murderer, pillager of towns, villages, churches, 
priests, nobles, Jews, women and children". M. Golinski,
MS. B.Z,N.Ossol., 189, f. 113. Kryvonis' massacres of the 
Jews are described in great detail by Hannower, in Sprawy 
i rzeczy etc., pp. 28-43.
The progroms of Wisniowiecki are described in M. 
Kryvonis' letter to W. Zas lav/ski [ Polonne?] , July 25, 1648,
-*-n Jskuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 88; B. Khmelnytsky' s 
letters to the Senate, Zamostia, November 15, 1648, and to 
the Commissioners, Uladivka, August 19, 1648, in Dokumenty 
Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 82, 66; and S. Muzhylovskyi's 
report to Aleksei Mikhailovich [Moscow], February 14, 1649, 
in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., 3 vols (Moscow, 1954), II,
129.
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30against the orders of the government. While in Warsaw
attempts were made to arrange an armistice and to open
negotiations with Khmelnytskyi, Wisniowiecki took deliberate
31counter-steps in order to paralyze these attempts. On
the one hand, by these counter-steps Wisniowiecki settled
his personal accounts with Ossolinski and his group,
especially for not having been given the command of the 
32Crown Army. On the other hand, his steps resulted also 
from his love of his country. Wisniowiecki sincerely 
believed that the policy of the pacifists was a disgrace 
for the Commonwealth, and that the crimes of the "riffraff” 
could only be atoned by their blood. Regarding parlays as 
as a waste of time, he endeavoured to convince the pacifists 
that "the more we deliberate, the more . . . we perish", 
and pointed out that the enemy used the armistice to grow
^wisniowiecki received an informal note from Kysil 
about the armistice and the negotiations, who asked him "not 
to provoke the enemy". See A. Kysil's letter to J. 
WTisniowiecki, Hoshcha, June [ca. , 10-15], 1648, in Jakuba 
Michalowskiego etc., pp. 54-55. Officials announcements 
were sent to Wisniowiecki by the Primate and the Senate.
See M. Lubienski's letter to J. Wisniowiecki, Warsaw, June 
24, 1648, ibid., p. 63; and Senate's letter to J. Wisnio­
wiecki, Warsaw, June 24, 1648, in Pamiatniki etc., 4 vols 
(Kiev, 1845), I, 3, 102. ~~
31
See Tomkiewicz, op. cit., p. 194.
32See ibid., pp. 188-94.
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33
stronger and to commit more atrocities. He was right; but 
he failed to see that much of this resulted from his own 
irresponsible actions. These actions also contributed to 
the failure of negotiations and made the attainment of 
peace impossible.
Wisniowiecki was a remarkable man, an individual 
with an iron will, and an extremely gifted military 
commander. He was also a typical borderland "kinglet", who 
was hated by magnates and by courtiers in Warsaw, But he
was idealized by the gentry and the Jews, who saw in him
34 . . . , .
the saviour of the Commonwealth. Although Wisniowiecki
(
managed to hold hiw own against the overwhelming numbers 
of the serfs, he had insufficient strength to crush the 
rising of the serfs by striking a blow which would decide 
the conflict. Thus, rather than extinguishing the fire, he 
only added fuel to it. His cruel actions, which even 
alarmed some of his closest collaborators, were called as
^ S e e  J. WTisniowiecki' s letter to A. Kysil, Horochky, 
June 21, 1648, and the letter of J. Tyszkiewicz and others 
to the Senate, Kolchyn, July 30, 1648, in Jakuba 
Mlchalowskiego etc., pp. 55-56, 99-100. See also Hannower, 
-'•n Sprawy i rzeczy etc., p. 35.
^ S e e  the "Verses on the Poarom of the Hetmans at 
Korsun" (1649), in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 476; and 
Hannower, in Sprav/y i rzeczy etc., p. 22.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 2 2
35a "provocation of the enemy". Even before he initiated
his campaign of terror and pogroms, it seemed as if every
serf in Ukraine took up arms and either killed or drove
out his own master. By the beginning of July the serfs
"neither sowed nor plowed, but only wandered about armed".
While some serfs were engaged in independent fighting,
looting and killing, other serfs banded together and formed
a great army. As this army moved westward, towns and
castles fell on its path; and fresh risings of the serfs
36
began to erupt in the western palatinates.
Wisniowiecki's irresponsible actions contributed 
greatly to three important developments. First of all, his 
actions caused the "serfs' fury" to intensify and to spread 
into the neighbouring palatinates. To the nobles every 
serf was a potential enemy; and every hamlet or town a
^~*Cited by Szajnocha, op. cit. , II, 1, 201.
3 See the letter of J. Ulmski and S. Jaskolski to 
[ M. Lubienski], Bar, June [8], 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego 
etc., p. 10; Zolkiewski's letter to J. Ossolinski, Dubno,
June 8 , 1648, and S. Karpinski's letter to Anonymous, Bar, 
June 25, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2,
405, 430-31; Rev. P. Lasko's report, Chyhyryn, June 29,
1648, and S. Muzhylovskyi1s report to Aleksei Mikhailovich 
[Moscow], February 14, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., 
II, 45, 129; and B. Khmelnytskyi1s letter to A. Kysil, 
Chyhyryn, June 27, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho 
etc., p . 52.
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37 'potential enemy's nest. Moreover, as the struggle took
greater dimensions and a more terrible form, it began to 
gain support from all classes of the Rusin people. Finally, 
by August, as the deluge of the serfs innundated the Pala­
tinates of Kiev, Brats lav, Chernihiv, the1 greater portions 
of Podolia and Volynia and the southern areas of several
of the palatinates of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the
38Kozaks were also forced to move into action.
While Wisniowiecki was perpetrating reprisals 
against the serfs in Volynia, the Convocation Diet (July 
16 to August 1, 1648) began .its sessions in Warsaw. Right 
from the first session the pacifists of Ossolinski and the 
intransigents of Wisniowiecki became engaged in a verbal 
duel. Because of the great friction between the two groups, 
precious time was wasted on needless debates. The most
37See the letter of J. Tyszkiewicz and others to the 
Senate, Kolchyn, July 30, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego 
etc., p. 100.
3 8
See the list of captured towns, Session of the Senate 
Council, Warsaw, August 22, 1648, ibid., pp. 158-59: 
Hannower, in Sprawy i rzeczy etc., pp. 46-47; K. F. 
Obuchowicz, "Dyaryusz Kazimierza Filipa Obuchowicza Wojewody 
Smolenskiego i Marszalka Kola Rycerskiego" [The Diary of 
Kazimierz Filip Obuchowicz, Palatine of Smalensk and Marsha], 
of the Chamber of Deputies], in Pamietniki historyczne etc 
(Vilnius, 1859), p. 20; and E. Kotlubaj, Zycie Janusza 
Radziwilla etc (Vilnius, 1859), pp. 112-16.
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pressing problems received little attention. In general,
the Kozak matters were badly handled. Rather than sending
the delegates of the Kozak Army with a hopeful answer as
soon as possible after their arrival in Warsaw, the
wrangling Diet kept them needlessly for two weeks and then
sent them back with a vague reply. If the Kozaks showed
signs of repentence and were willing to make reparations
for their crimes, they would then merit forgiveness. In
order to show their good faith to the government, the
Kozaks were required to surrender all prisoners and leaders
of serf bands, as well as to break their alliance with the
<
Tatars. At a later date a commission would be appointed
which would study all Kozak grievances and which would also
acquaint the Kozaks with the additional demands of the 
39
government. Considering the military successes of the 
Kozaks, this was a preposterous answer.
At the same time as the Diet resolved the terms
40
under which peace was to be negotiated with the Kozaks,
O Q
See the Convocation Diet's letter to the Kozak Army, 
Warsaw, July 22, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., 
pp. 85-86.
40The peace terms with the Kozaks were resolved by the 
Diet on July 26th. The following were the main terms: the 
Kozaks had to surrender all prisoners, leaders of serf 
bands, captured cannon and arms (Arts. 1, 2 and 7); to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 2 5
it. received alarming reports. The south-eastern palati­
nates of the Crown, as far west as Volynia, and the 
bordering areas of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, were 
falling under the control of the "riffraff". Moreover, 
according to various despatches, Muscovy was also sending 
military aid to the Kozaks. These serious adverse news had 
the effect of speeding up the phlegmatic proceedings of the 
Diet. With certain promptness the Diet agreed to appoint 
Adam Kysil to hea.d a commission. He was given plenipoten­
tiary powers and entrusted with the impossible task of 
hjilting the advance of the enemy by concluding peace with 
the Kozaks. The Diet also voted to continue military 
preparations. At the end of July it approved Ossolinski's 
three appointed regimentaries in place of the captive
bring to an end their military alliance with the Tatars 
(Art. 3); to lift the siege of Kodak Fortress (Art. 6); and 
to reaffirm their loyalty to the Commonwealth and to serve 
it faithfully (Arts. 4 and 5). The commission received 
plenipotentiary powers (Art. 11). It was to hear the grie­
vances of the Kozaks (Art. 8); and to promise them pay only 
if they swore loyalty to the Commonwealth and surrendered 
the letters of King Wladyslaw IV, in which he allegedly 
granted them permission to increa.se' the quota of the regis­
tered Kozaks to 12,000 (Arts. 8 and 9). The commission was 
to offer to the Kozaks the same terms as those of 1638, but 
if they refused to accept them, it could offer them those 
of 1630 or even of 1625. See Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., 
II, 2, 462-64; and Ra.dziwill, op. cit. , II,, 309.
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hetmans, but as a precaution named,thirty-two commissioners
to aid them. On August 1st the Convocation Diet ended its 
41deliberations.
News of the rising of the serfs taking greater 
dimensions and a more terrible form brought fear into the 
hearts of many deputies lest the Kozaks, who were still 
relatively quiet, side with the serfs. This situation 
caused even the most ardent intransigents to re-evaluate 
their position. In the end the deputies were forced to vote 
for the plans of Ossolinski, which they fought so strongly 
against. Both Ossolinski and Kysil spared no arguments to 
convince the deputies that they made the right decision.
It was wiser, they claimed, to pacify the Kozaks with some 
concessions and to separate them from the Tatars and the 
serfs, rather than to have to face the combined Kozak-Tatar- 
serf menace.
Both of those men maintained that Khmelnytskyi 
really wanted peace. Kysil assured his colleagues that he 
would be able to negotiate peace without "dishonouring" the
^ S e e  the Record of the Convocation Diet, Eighth to 
Fourteenth Sessions, Warsaw, July 24 to August 1, 1648, in 
Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 126-44; Radziwill, op. cit.,
II, 309-16; Obuchowicz, in Pamietniki historyczne etc., pp. 
19-20; and M. Golinski, MS. B.Z.N. Ossol., 189, f. 112 et 
seq.
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Commonwealth by some radical concessions to the Kozaks.
Both Ossolinski and Kysil led the Diet to believe that once
the Ordinance of 1638 was repealed, the Kozaks would easily
accept terms similar to those offered to them in 1625 or
1630. In order to satsify their opponents Ossolinski and
Kysil voted for a mobilization of an army. They expected,
however, that this army would be used simply for the
purpose of overawing the Kozaks with its show of strength
42and thereby forcing them to come to terms more quickly.
It appeared that Ossolinski won a major victory at the 
C o n v o c a t ion Diet and that he would be able to put all of
I
his policy into effect. Ossolinski, however, did not win a 
victory: the Diet merely accepted the lesser of two evils.
Ill
Three basic phases can be distinguished in the 
heretofore described conflict within the Commonwealth in 
1648. The first phase was the Kozak rebellion under 
Khmelnytskyi. The rising of the serfs began the second 
phase. In the third phase all the social strata among the 
Rusin people coalesced into a united front. In this way 
the Kozak rebellion was transormed into a Rusin national
47See Kuba1 a, op . cit. , pp. 290-91, 298-99.
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struggle for independence from the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth.
The Kozak rebellion was the first phase of the 
conflict within the Commonwealth. The Kozak rebellion was 
an armed protest of one Rusin stratum against the intole­
rable conditions of life. The aims of the Kozaks were 
narrow and specific: they now wanted the government to 
repeal the Ordinance of 1638 and to confirm their former 
liberties. The Kozaks seemed to show little concern for 
the rights and the aspirations of the unprivileged classes 
of the Rusin people. They considered religious freedom the 
only important Rusin national question. One of the main 
results of the "dreadful [Kozak] rebellion" was that it
set into motion a far more terrible "war of the
* 43serfs1 .
The rising of the serfs was the second stage of the 
conflict within the Commonwealth. The beginning of this 
"serfs' fury" was almost spontaneous. Although it was 
prepared by Kozak slogans and set into motion by Kozak 
victories of May 1648, the rising nevertheless erupted
43A. Kysxl's letter to Wladyslaw IV, Hoshcha, May 27, 
1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit. , II,* 2, 382.
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44without Kozak organization or aid. From the "hell of the
serfs" emerged a great social movement which threatened to
45
destroy the existence of the "heaven of the nobles".
During this "brigantage of the serfs" began "unheard-of
turmoils and massacres". The Rusin serfs reacted savagely
against their exploiters and oppressors: Polish and Rusin
nobles and Jews, and all their families, servants, depen-
46dents and agents. Wisniowiecki1s pogroms, from June to 
August 1648, opened wider the dykes for a deluge of serfs.
^/j:The effects of these slogans are illustrated in M. 
Potocki1s letter to Wladyslaw IV [Korsun], March 31, 1648, 
in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, lf-16. The serfs took up 
arms immediately after the Battle of Zhovti Vody. See 
Maskiewicz, in Pamietniki etc., p. 239. The captive serfs 
of the Kamianets area, for example, testified under torture 
that "nullam sibi commerciium et societatem cum Cosacis 
esse, but themselves, out of their own free will, taedio 
servitutis et Poloniae dominationis impatientes arma 
adversus immodica unsurpantes corripuerunt". Letter of S. 
Kushevych [Lviv], August 26, 1648. Cited by Lipinski, 
op. cit., p. 82, n. 3.
^~*In the opinion of Pacichelli, an Italian who visited 
the Commonwealth in the middle of the seventeenth century, 
"Clarum regnum Polonorum est coelum nobiliorum, est infernus 
rusticorum". Cited by Lipinski, op . cit., p. 18, n. 1.
46See Jerlicz, op. cit.., I, 61-62; Zolkiewski1 s letter 
to J. Ossolinski, Dubno, June 8 , 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla! 
op. cit., II, 2, 405; Rev. P. Lasko's report, Chyhyryn, June 
29, 1648, and S. Muzhylovskyi1s report to Aleksei Mikhailo­
vich [Moscow], February 14, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy 
etc., II, 45, 129; and J. Jelicki1s .letter to the Sherif 
of Dybiv, Ustyluh, September 3, 1648, in Sprawy' irzeczy etc 
p. 113.
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These pogroms also set the stage for the third phase of 
the conflict.
The third phase of the conflict within the Common­
wealth was characterized by the coalescence of all the 
social strata among the Rusin people and by the emergence 
of a common Rusin front. The Kozak rebellion, which was 
first changed by the rising of the serfs, was now comple­
tely transformed by the active participation of other 
strata of the Rusin people —  nobles, burgesses and clergy.
Although there were many nobles, the so-called
"gente Rutheni, natione Poloni" , in the opposing camp, many
others chose to support the aspirations of the Rusin "riff- 
47raff". Those nobles who actively participated m  the 
rebellion did so for various reasons and acted in various 
roles. The "military" element figured prominently as 
officers in the Kozak Army. Other nobles played an 
extremely important part as organizers and leaders of serf 
movements, especially in Rusin ethnic territories which 
were not yet occupied by the Kozaks. Still others, assumed 
administrative, judicial and diplomatic duties in the areas
47On the participation of the Rusin nobles and on their 
role in the conflict, see Lipinski, • op. cit1., pp. 12-332.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 3 1
controlled by the Kozak Army. The presence of nobles in the
Kozak Army was readily admitted both by Khmelnytskyi and his
adversaries. These nobles, who "became Kozaks", were often
contemptuously referred to by their opponents as leaders of
"bands of rabble", or "traitors" who "betrayed God and the 
48Commonwealth". Many of these nobles displayed great
hostility to the Commonwealth and urged Khmelnytskyi to
. . 49resume hostilities.
Just as the nobles, the Rusin burgesses also assumed
important roles, both in the leadership of the Kozak Army
50and m  that of the serfs. Many municipalities established
contacts with Khmelnytskyi and aided both the Kozaks and 
51
the serfs. Khmelnytskyi1s appeals to the burgesses for
48See A. Kysil's letter to J. Ossolmski, Rovne, August 
12, 1648 and the anonymous report on the activities of 
Khmelnytskyi, n. p., July 30, 1650, in Jakuba Michalowsklego 
etc., pp. 150, 554; L. Miaskowski1s letter to W. Miaskowski, 
Kamianets, August 17, 1648 and W. Zaslawski's letter to the 
Convocation Diet, Dubno, July 14, 1648, in Szajnocha, 
"Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2, 457-58; X, 202.
AQ
" See G. Kunakov's report to Muscovite Department of 
Foreign Affairs (1649), in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., 15 
vols (St. Petersburg, 1861), III, 404; and Hannower, in 
Sprawy i rzeczy etc., p. 22.
50Interrogation of Kozak prisoners, Halych, June 29,
1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 91-94; and Lipinski, 
op. cit. , pp. 126-27.
51See A. Konecpolski1s manifesto the gentry [n.p.], May
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the surrender of their towns to him were received by them
52
with enthusiasm. A contemporary noted that if this trend
continued, "there would.be no town [left] which would
53defend itself against Khmelnytskyi". By such frequent
examples of "treachery", the Rusin burgesses facilitated
for the "rebels" their movement into the interior of the
western palatinates.
In many cases, the messengers sent from Rusin
54burgesses to Khmelnytskyi were Orthodox priests. With 
religious differences so pronounced between the combat- 
tants, it is not difficult to imagine the role played by
f
the Orthodox clergy. The "bishops, archimandrites, abbots, 
archpriests, priests and other servants of the houses of 
God", whom Khmelnytskyi called to defend their "ancient
31, 164-8, in Pamiatniki etc., I, 3, 44-45; Interrogation of 
Kozak prisoners, Halych, July 29, 1648, in Jakuba 
Michalowskiego etc., pp. 93-94; Maskiewicz, in Pamietniki 
etc., pp. 247, 252; and Hannower, in Sprawy i rzeczy etc., 
pp. 2,9 et seq.
c; p
See A. Kysil's letter to M. Lubienski [Hoshcha ], May 
31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 25-2.6.
r  o
Letter of J. Ulinski and S. Jaskolski to [M. Lubienski], 
Bar, June [8 ], 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 40.
C  A
See Aleksander Czolowski, "Relacya o oblezeniu miasta 
Lwowa przez, Bohdana Chmielnickiego 1648 roku", Kwartalnik 
Historyczny, VI (no. 3, 1892), 549; and Lipinski, op. cit., 
pp. 84-85.
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55Greek [Orthodox] faith", responded to his appeals. The
lower clergy played an especially important role in the
56conflict. They were the "priests conspirators" who
fomented the Rusin people with religious slogans and encou-
57
raged them to take up arms "for the faith". They
organized serf bands, and even served as their leaders.^8
They set up a network of communications among themselves
59and sent frequent reports to Kiev. They were also the
60emissaries of Khmelnytskyi. They were "more a hinderance 
than aid" to those who attempted to resolve the conflict by
Khmelnytskyi1 s manifesto to the Rusin people, 
Chyhyryn [ca. early 1648], in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho 
etc., p. 625.
56W. Miaskowski's letter to L. Miaskowski, Lviv,
September 27, 1648« Cited by Lipinski, op . cit., p. 22.
67~ This is typically illustrated in F. Arsenev's letter 
to Muscovite Department of Defense, Voinov, June 7, 1648, in 
Akty Moskovskogo gosudarstva (St. Petersburg, 1894), II, 222; 
and in W. Zaslawski's letter to the Convocation Diet, Dubno, 
July 14, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., X, 200.
^ S e e  W. Lozinski, Prawem i lewem etc., 2 vols., 4th ed 
Lviv, 1931), I, 420.
59See the interrogation of Kozak prisoners, Halych,
July 29, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 93.
^ S e e  W. Miaskowski's letter to L. Miaskowski, Novosilka, 
February 1, 1649, ibid., p. 365.
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negotiations.6'1' The ruling order suspected most of the
r r-\
Orthodox clergy of secretly supporting the "rebels" An
apprehended "priest conspirator" suffered savage reprisals
0  3
for the part he played.
Thus on the whole the third phase of the conflict 
within the Commonwealth was characterized by the trans­
formation of the Kozak rebellion into the national struggle 
of all the strata of the Rusin people. Both sides in the 
struggle emphasized that the conflict did not concern the 
people of the same nationality. Khmelnytskyi used 
national-religious slogans effectively in order to gain 
support for the Kozak rebellion. He stirred all those of 
"the same faith and blood" to rise against the "Poles, the 
enemies of our [Rusin] people". To those in the camp of 
the ruling class —  Poles or Polonized Rusins -- everything 
"Rusin" was detested, feared, suspected or distrusted.
^Letter of A. Kysil and W. Miaskowski to Jan Kazimierz, 
Vasylkiv, February 11, 1649, in Ojczyste spominki etc., 2 
vols (Krakow, 1845), II, 10. See also M. Golinski, MS.
B.Z.N.Ossol., 189, f. 210
Cs o
See Lipinski, op. cit., p. 85, n. 7.
6^See M. Kryvonis1 letter to W. Zaslawski [Polonne?], 
July 25, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 88; and B. 
Khmelnytskyi1 s letters to the Commissioners', Uladivka,
August 19, 1648 and to the Senate, Zamostia, November 15, 
1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 66, 82.
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In their correspondence, the nobles of the Commonwealth
stressed the fact that it was the "Rusin Kozaks" and the
"Rusin dragoons" who mutinied, deserted the Crown Army and
then joined the ranks of the rebels. "We are all in
extreme danger from the treacherous Rusins, our serfs",
complained one noble to another. Prince Wisniowiecki was
also endangered by the rising of his own "Rusin" serfs;
moreover, he was unable to trust all of his own troops
because many of them were "Rusins". In the opinion of one
noble, most "Rusins" were either in sympathy with the
rebels, or took an active part in the rebellion. Still
another noble complained that it was very difficult to spy
among the "Rusins" because "all of them are traitors". It
was therefore obvious to the contemporaries that a "Rusin
rebellion" was taking place, in which "the conspiracy of all
64the Rusins" was evident. .....
^S e e  B. Khmelnytskyi's manifesto to the Rusin people, 
Chyhyryn [ca. early 1648], ibid., p. 625; Z. Czerny's letter 
to J. Ossolinski, Bila Tserkva, May 25, 1648, M. Ostrorog's 
letter to J. Ossolinski, Lviv, June 12, 1648 and the letter 
of Lviv burgesses to Karol Ferdynand, Lviv, September 15, 
1648, in Pamiatniki etc., I, 3, 25-26, 94, 269; Anonymous 
despatch from Ukraine, Pidhortse, May 21, 1648, Z. Czerny's 
letter to Anonymous, Bila Tserkva, May 26, 1648, W.
Miaskowski's letter to P. Gembicki, Lviv, May 28, 1648, and 
the Anonymous letter from Lviv, June 4, 164j3, in Jakuba 
Michalowskiego etc., pp. 17, 25-26, 32; M. Ostrorog's letter 
to J, Ossolinski, Lviv, May 26, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla",
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The conflict within the Commonwealth was thus not 
a civil war, because it concerned mainly two ethnic groups 
—  Polish and Rusin —  which were sharply divided by reli­
gious, linguistic and cultural differences. For the Rusins 
this was a struggle for national liberation.
IV
The third phase of the conflict within the Common­
wealth v/as characterized by the emergence of the Rusin 
united front, which coalesced from all the social strata 
among the Rusin people. The Rusin ethnic solidarity alone 
would not have been sufficient to bring about this common 
front and to transform the Kozak rebellion into a national 
struggle for liberation. Rather, the most important and 
dominant single factor which bound all the Rusins together, 
and which gave cohesion to the whole movement for their 
liberation, was their common religion. Religious, more 
than ethnic differences, deepened the gulf between the 
Poles and the Rusins. For the latter, Orthodoxy emphasized 
their ethnic origin, and in the majority of cases the
op. cit., II, 2, 380; M. Ostrorog's letter to J. Ossolinski, 
Zbarazh, July 3, 1649, in Ojczyste spominki etc., II, 54; 
and W. Zaslawski's manifesto the the Crown Army, Dubno, July 
19, 1648, cited by Lipinski, op. cit., p. 99.
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cleavage in the social structure of the Commonwealth. At
the same time, the Orthodox faith was the main factor which
fostered the national consciousness of all the classes of
the Rusin people.
No better example can be found of this fact than by
examining the actions and the attitudes of the many Polo-
nized Rusin nobles, who were still Orthodox, yet who chose
to take up arms against their Orthodox brethern. At the
Convocation Diet the Orthodox deputies were prepared to
declare "every noble" who took part in the rebellion as
"an enemy and a betrayer of the fatherland". They also were
(
ready "to shed blood" fighting along with the Polish nobles
. 65agaxnst "the lawless [Rusxnj serfs". The same men, how­
ever, at a time when their "fatherland" seemed to be on the 
brink of disaster, took advantage of this predicament to 
demand concessions for the Orthodox Church. They clamoured
for the abolition of the Uniate Church and for the resto-
66ratxon of all rxghts to the Orthodox Church.
6 3 •Record of the Convocatxon Dxet, Exghth Sessxon, Warsaw,
July 24, 1648. Cited by Lipinski, op. cit., p. 28.
66See the Record of the Convocatxon Dxet, Seventh and 
Eighth Sessions, Warsaw, July 23-24, 1648 and the Record of 
the Election Diet, Thirteenth Session, Warsaw, November 12, 
1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 122-23, 126-27, 
311-14. See al_o Radziwill, op. cit., II, 340.
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When similar demands were brought by the Kozak 
delegation before the Diet, many Polish nobles suspected 
their Orthodox colleagues and other Orthodox nobles of 
secret collaboration with Khmelnytskyi or of influencing the 
course of the conflict. Only the nobles, reasoned one 
magnate, were sufficiently enlightened to concern them­
selves with religious matters. It was certainly not the 
concern of all "the perjurers, tyrants, rebels, bandits, 
invaders and profaners of churches". It would be ridiculous 
to assume that the serfs, "who have no knowledge about God 
and who have no faith . . . [and who] live not only like
barbarians, but also like wild beasts", would demand the
68
restoration of Orthodox churches held by the Uniates. 
Contrary to his opinion, the religious issues concerned not 
only the Rusin nobles, but all strata of the Rusin society.
The scrupulous and detailed reports of the Muscovite 
envoy Grigorii Kunakov to the Posolskii Prikaz illustrate 
the significance of the religious factor. According to him, 
the senators at the Election Diet were prepared to pass a 
resolution which called for the abijgition of the rights of
^ S e e  Lipinski, op. cit., pp. 29-30.
t
(ZQ
W. Zaslawski's letter to the Convocation Diet, Dubno, 
July 14, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., X, 200.
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the Orthodox Church. They argued that "one faith in the 
whole state" would prevent future "strife and quarrels . . . 
among lords, nobles and common people" within the Common­
wealth. The Catholic Primate was against it. lie advised 
them not to adopt such dangerous measures, for "all of them 
[i.e., Rusin nobles] will join Khmelnytskyi and the Kozaks. 
He also pointed out that even at this time there was "much
i 69
blood being shed for the [Orthodox] faith .
Khmelnytskyi also fully realized that the common
religion of the. Rusin people gave the cohesion to the whole
movement against the Commonwealth. He therefore made use
of religious slogans to stir the Rusins into action. The
Kozaks, it was said, were fighting the Poles "for the
70[Orthodox] faith". These slogans were re-echoed by the
6 9G. Kunakov1s report to Muscovxte Department of Foreign 
Affairs (1649), in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 304.
70Archdeacon Paul had no doubt that Khmelnytskyi 
"fought for the cause of religion [and therefore] . . . God 
gave him strength, and assisted his endeavours from the 
beginning of his career till the end? and hurled destruction, 
by his sword, on the vanity and discord of his enemies".
Paul of Aleppo, The Travels etc., 2 vols (London, 1831), I,
2, 73, 175.
This slogan, "for the faith", appeared frequently in 
Muscovite sources. See for example the reports of Muscovite 
voevodas to the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Defense, 
as well as letters of private individuals, from May to 
August 1648, in Akty ontosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 212-13,
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71Orthodox priests to the Rusin populace. The serfs there­
fore regarded Khmelnytskyi as a "Saviour", who would free
them from the yoke of serfdom and who would safeguard their 
7 2religion. The serfs, as well as other "people of Greek
[Orthodox] faith", anxiously awaited the arrival of Kozak
troops into their districts, in order to surrender towns
73to them or to participate with them m  the conflict.
Since it seemed that "all the Rusins" reacted with hate
74 .
"against the Catholics and the Poles", it is little
wonder that one Polish magnate wrote: "all hope lies only
75m  our Catholic people; . . . only these we can trust". '
216, 227, 237, 229-30; in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 
50-51; and in Akty Moskovskogo gosudarstva, II, 222.
^ S e e  w. Zaslawski's letter to the Convocation Diet, 
Dubno, July 14, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit.,
X, 200.
7 2M. Ostrorog's letter to J. Ossolinski, Lviv, June 4, 
1648, in Pamietniki o Roniecpolskich etc., p. 423; and 
Anonymous letter from Lviv, June 4, 1648, in Jakuba 
Michalowskiego etc., p. 33.
73Anonymous letter from Lviv, June 4, 1648, m  -Jakuba 
M ichalowskiego etc., p. 34.
74Anonymous letter from Lviv, September 7, 1648, Cited 
by Lipinski, op. cit., p. 22.
75L. Opalinski's letter to Borowski, Poznan [June] 2, 
1648, ibid., p. 20. This letter is dated May 2nd, but June 
2nd makes more sense.
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The ruling class thus began to equate "Orthodox" with 
76"-creason .
The nature and the intensity of the rebellion
against the Commonwealth started by the Kozaks was first
changed by the participation of the serfs, and then by the
participation of the Rusin people as a whole. It was
therefore-, a "Rusin rebellion" . During this rebellion the
most important single factor which bound all the Rusins
together, and which gave cohesion to the whole movement,
was their common religion. The chief aim of the Rusins
engaged in belligerence was to gain independence from the
Commonwealth. Both of the opposing sides emphasized that
the conflict was concerned with this issue.
Already at the eleventh hour of the Kozak rebellion
the ruling class expressed grave fears that the Kozaks
77wanted "absolute rule m  Ukraine". Following the first 
Kozak victories the gentry grew more alarmed. Rumours 
began to circulate among them that the Kozaks intended to 
create an independent state, and that Khmelnytskyi was
76 .See M. Ostrorog's letter to J. Ossolinski, L v i v ,  June
4, 1648, in Pamietniki o Koniecpolskich etc., p. 423.
77m. Potocki1 s letter to Wladyslaw IV [.Korsun ], March 
31, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 15.
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prepared to assume the title of "Prince of Rus" and to
78
declare Kiev as his capital. By September 1648 some
contemporaries analysed the conflict within the Commonwealth
as "the Rusin rebellion and the deluge of the serfs, allied
with the heathen", which "already gained control over all 
79ox Ukraine". In these words they descrxbed a natxonal 
rising of'the Rusin people in which the social element still 
predominated, and which was strengthened by a political 
alliance with the Tatars. At present time the Rusins 
gained control of Ukraine. Fresh rumours began to circulate 
among the nobles of the Commonwealth that these "traitors"
80
also had the intention of "separating Rus from the Crown". 
Their aim was then to secure independence for all of the 
Rusin ethnic territories. These developments influenced 
the course of action and the plans of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, 
who began to assume control of the whole movement for Rusin 
liberation.
7 RTypical of these rumours is A. Kysil's letter to M. 
Lubienski [Hoshcha], May 31, 1648, ibid., II, 25.
79Letter of Lviv burgesses to Karol Ferdynand, Lviv, 
September 15, 1648, in Pamiatniki etc., I, 3, 269.
80D. Slugocki's letter to Niezabitowski, Cholhanskyi 
Kamian, ca. September 8 , 1648, in Jakuba Midhalowskiego 
etc., p. 183.
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CHAPTER V
KHMELNYTSKYI'S DIPLOMACY PRECEDING THE BATTLE OF 
PYLIAVTSI AND THE CHANGE OF HIS AIMS FOLLOWING 
THE FRESH KOZAK MILITARY SUCCESSES
I
The Convocation Diet ended its deliberations on 
August 1, 1648. This Diet appointed Adam Kysil as the head 
of a commission! instructing him to proceed to Kiev and to 
negotiate peace with Bohdan Khmelnytskyi. The efforts to 
solve the grave difficulties of the Commonwealth by diplo-
f
matic means were, however, hindered by several obstacles.
One of these obstacles was the overconfidence of 
the government that the conflict would be resolved over a 
conference table. For this reason the Diet issued a vague 
reply to the Kozak demands, and formulated a series of 
highly unrealistic counter-demands of its own.^ Further­
more, because of the phlegmatic proceedings of the Diet and 
the needless debates, the delegates of the Kozak Army were
•^ See Convocation Diet's letter to the Kozak Army,
Warsaw July 22, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc (Krakow, 
1864), pp. 85-86.
143
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2
kept waiting in Warsaw to July 2 2nd. This two week delay
created serious misunderstandings between the two sides.
Khmelnytskyi, who despatched the Kozak delegates to Warsaw
on June 12, still awaited for their return with the answer
3
from the government at the end of July. To make matters
worse, malicious rumours began to circulate among the
4
Kozaks that their delegates were executed m  Warsaw. Thus, 
this unnecessary delay led only to the worsening of 
tensions and the the resumption of the hostilities.
Another serious obstacle was the renewal of the 
hostilities between the two sides before the term set for 
an armistice expired. Many nobles disregarded the orders 
of the government and began to wage a guerilla war against 
the serfs. Prince Wisniowiecki, the leader of the reaction, 
being alarmed at the steady gains of the "riffraff" and the 
general lack of resistance of the gentry, redoubled his
2 . . . .See the Record of Convocation Diet, Sixth Session,
Warsaw, July 22, 1648, ibid., p. 121; and A.S. Radziwill, 
Pamietniki etc., 2 vols (Poznan, 1839), II, 302.
3
See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letter to W. Zaslawski, Pavoloch, 
July 30, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc 
(Kiev, 1961), p. 62.
4
See M. Kryvonis' letter to W. Zaslawski [Polonne?],
July 29, 1648; and A. Kysil's letter to J. Ossolinski, 
Khorlupie, August 9, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., 
pp. 88, 152. See also Radziwill, op. cit., II, 318.
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terroristic activities. Vindicating his own cause and that
of his timid "brethren", he continued to provoke the serfs
5
with his particular brand of atrocities. These actions
came at a time when Kysil sought contact with Khmelnytskyi
to begin negotiations.
Finally, after having to fight his way through the
6
roaming bands of serfs, Kysil began to realize that there 
existed yet another obstacle. The success of the negotia­
tions and the attainment of peace did not depend on the 
goodwill of Khmelnytskyi alone, but also on that of "the 
multitude of riffraff". Reports reached him that "lawless
I
men" gained the upper hand in the Kozak camp; they did not 
wsmt peace but war. Kysil speculated that if Khmelnytskyi 
was not killed during the disturbances among the Kozaks, 
then he surely remained "in the discretion of[these]
C
See M. Kryvonis' letter to W. Zaslawski [Polonne?],
July 29, 1648; J. Wisniowiecki's letter to M. Lubienski, 
Cholhanskyi Kamin, August 30, 1648, and A. Kysil's letter 
to M. Lubienski, Ukhanie, September 29, 1648, in Jakuba 
Michalowskiego etc., pp. 88, 175, 204. See also B. 
Khmelnytskyi1s letters to the Commissioners, Ulaaivka,
August 19, 1648 and Kumanivtsi, August 28, 1648, in Dokumenty 
Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 66, 68.
^See A. Kysil's letter to J. Ossolinski, Rovne, August 
2, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 149.
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congregated multitudes". Thus, it was the "rabble", the 
common Kozaks and serfs, that constituted the greatest 
menace to the Commonwealth.
Yet, Kysil remained optimistic; he was certain that 
all his efforts would not be in vain. He was also encou­
raged by the willingness of Khmelnytskyi to meet the demands 
of the government. The Kozak leader claimed to have sent 
the Tatars back to Crimea. He released all nobles which 
were captive in the Kozak camp, and either executed or 
punished many of the serf leaders. Khmelnytskyi even 
showed goodwill by agreeing to accept the mediation of the
I
Metropolitan Bishop of Kiev, Sylvestr Kosiv. Finally, even 
at the end of August his letters still expressed hope that
g
reconcilliation was possible. This was, however, only the
7
See A. Kysil's letters to J. Ossolinski, Khorlupie,
August 9, 1648; to M. Lubienski, Ukhanie, September 29,
1648, ibid. , pp. 149, 204; to B. Khmelnytskyi [ Lutsk j],
August 12, 1648, in K. Szajnocha, "Zrodla "[Sources], Dwa lata 
dziejow naszych. 1646. 1648., 2 vols (Warsaw, 1900), II,
2, 451; and to S. Potocki, Karchivka, September 7, 1648, in 
Karol Szajnocha, "Zrodla" [Sources], Dziela Karola Szajnochy 
[The Works of Karol Szajnocha] (Warsaw: J. Unger, 1878), X 
220. See also M. Krosnowski's letter to S. Zadorski, Lviv, 
September 1, 1648, and A. Szoldrski's letter to Anonymous, 
Warsaw, September 23, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., 
pp. 178, 199-200.
8
See B. Khmelnytskyi's letters to the Commissioners, 
Uladivka, August 19, 1648, and Kumanivtsi, August 28, 1648, 
in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 66-68. See
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one side of a coin.
The other side was entirely different. Khmelnytskyi
must have decided sometime in July that the whole business
of negotiations would come to naught. The Poles were not
ready to make concessionsthey were acting in bad faith,
for while Kysil was sent to negotiate with him, a new army
9
was being mobilized. He was, however, prepared either to
carry on negotiations, or in case this failed, to wage war.
He was not inactive during the term set for the armistice.
On the contrary, just like his enemies, Khmelnytskyi also
took advantage of the armistice and planned out his strate-
(
gic moves. His diplomatic policy was devised to gain time.
At the same time as Khmelnytskyi sent manifestoes 
to restore order among the serfs, denounced their"lawless­
ness” before the officials of the Commonwealth and punished 
or executed some of their leaders, he also encouraged the
also the following letters; A. Kysil to J. Ossolinski,
Rovne, August 2, 1648 and Nadhoryn, August 22, 1648; A.
Kysil e t a l ., to M. Lubienski, Cholhanskyi Kamin, September 
13, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 149, 160, 186; 
and the Anonymous despatch from Hlyniany, August 13, 1648 
and [M. Lubienski] to W. Zaslawski [Warsaw], August 10,
1648, in Szajnocha, i;Zrodla" , op. cit. , II, 2, 454; X, 210.
g
See B. Khmelnytskyi's letters to A. Kysil, Chyhyryn, 
June 27, 1648, and to S. Bolkhovskii, August 8 , 1648, in 
Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 52. 65.
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the serf movement. His emissarj.es- and agitators fomented 
revolt among Rusin and Eelorusin people in the territories 
where serfdom was firmly entrenched. From the Kozak Army 
he sent small detachments of troops into areas where the 
serfs took up arms. These provided leaders for the serf 
bands, organized them and took possession of towns or for­
tresses captured by the serfs.
Although Khmelnytskyi complained to the government 
about the atrocities committed by Wisniowiecki, he excused 
the actions of Kryvonis. He also made no definite steps to 
restrain the activities of other popular leaders,--Hanzha, 
Holovetskyi, Nebaba, Topyha, Vysochan and Morozovetskyi —  
who spread the rising of the serfs into all Rusin and Belo- 
rusin ethnic territories of the Commonwealth.^^ Khmelnytsky 
thus created a barri.er of serfs between the Kozak troops and 
those of the Commonwealth. He was protected by the serfs, 
and made a coordinated Polish-Lithuanian military action 
against him extremely difficult. At this time he was also 
able to devote his attention to other matters, especially
^ S e e  S. Muzhylovskyi1s report to Aleksei Mikhailovich 
[Moscow], February 14, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc.,
3 vols (Moscow, 1954) , II, 129; W. Lipinski, Stanislaw 
Michal Krzyczewski etc (Krakow, 1912), pp. 86-98; and I. P. 
Krypiakevych, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (Kiev, 1954), pp. 134-38.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 4 9
to the building and reorganization of the Kozak Army.
While Khmelnytskyi1s "bands of riffraff" intensified 
the serf rising within the southern palatinates of the 
Grand Duchy of L i t h u a n i a , t h e  Kozak leader also attempted 
to create a rift between Polish and Lithuanian nobles and 
to paralyze any common military undertakings. He establi­
shed contacts with Belorusin Orthodox clergy, burgesses and 
nobles, arid sought their aid. As far as the gentry was 
concerned, he contacted those who expressed little hostility 
to the Kozak revolt and disenchantment with their Polish 
"brethern". By his declarations of goodwill to the
Lithuanian magnates, Khmelnytskyi hoped to gain their sym-
12pathxes for the Kozak cause.
Of particular interest to him were the men who were 
known for their views of "separatism" from the Crown. The 
leading figure of this group was the Lithuanian Field 
Hetman Janusz Radziwill, the head of the Calvinists in
^ S e e  K. F. Obuchowicz, "Dyaryusz Kazimierz Filipa 
Obuchowicza Wojewody Smclenskiego i Marszalka Kola Rycer- 
skiego", in Pamietniki historyczyne etc (Vilnius, 1859), 
pp. 19-20; and E. Kotlubaj, Zycie Janusza Radziwilla etc 
(Vilnius, 1859), pp. 112-14.
12"See B. Khmelnytskyi1s manifesto to the Zaporozhian 
Army, Pavoloch July 27, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana 
Khmelnytskoho etc., p. 58.
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Lithuania and the "protector" of Protestants within the
Commonwealth. Some kind of secret, understanding was reached
between Khmelnytskyi and Radziwill, for although the latter
initiated limited action against the rising of the serfs,
13
he still showed no desire to march against the Kozaks. By 
these steps Khmelnytskyi was able to confine the troops of 
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania within its own territories. 
Furthermore, he rekindled the antagonisms among the gentry 
of the Commonwealth.
During the same time Khmelnytskyi attempted to 
convince other magnates or men of influence of his good 
intentions. By writing humble letters to them, Khmelnytskyi 
hoped to gain their support and intercession on Kozak
14behalf, as well as to camouflage his true intentions.
13See G. Unkovskii's report to Muscovite Government 
(1649), in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 160-61; Lipinski, 
o p. cit., pp. 270-71; and Kotlubaj, op. cit., pp. 113-16.
14See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letters from Bila Tserkva and 
Natashka, to A. Kazanowski, June 12; to W. Zaslawski, June 
12; to A. Kysil, June 13; and to W. Zaslawski, June 14, 1648, 
in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 3 9-47. He also 
wrote to A. Radziwill and to J. Ossolinski on approximately 
the same dates. See Radziwill, op. cit., II, 296; and J. 
Ossolinski's letter to the Kozak Army, Warsaw, July [9],
1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 86-87. In this 
documentary collection the letter of Ossolinski is dated 
July 22, but it is evident from the. text that this date is 
incorrect. The correct date should be July 9. See L. Kubala, 
Jerzy Ossolinski, 2nd rev. ed (Lviv, 1924), p. 451, n. 20.
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He wrote to Wisniowiecki that he had no quarrel with him;
the serfs, not the Kozaks, were responsible for all the
ravages. Being aware of the feuds among the "kinglets", he
tried to set one against the other. To his most obvious
enemies he wrote soothing letters, and attempted to win
their confidence and to quiet their apprehensions by
15promising that no harm will come to their estates. 
Khmelnytskyi1s greatest success, however, was that he was 
able to convince such men as Ossolinski and Kysil that he 
was ready to settle everything by means of negotiations.
By arranging an armistice he gained time to further his
i
plans.
Although Khmelnytskyi was protected from the
interior of the Commonwealth, he still faced danger from
the east. According to the treaty concluded in 1647,
Muscovy was obliged to send military aid to the Common-
16
wealth if it were invaded by the Tatars. When the Tatars 
came to aid the Kozaks, the Commonwealth appealed to
15See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letters to S. Laszcz, Pavoloch, 
July 29, 1648, and to W. Zaslawski, Pavoloch, July 30,
1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 59-60, 
62-63; and Rev. P. Lasko's report, Chyhyryn, June 29, 1648, 
in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2, 440.
^ S e e  the terms of the treaty in Akty otnosiashchiesia 
etc., 15 vols. 'St. Petersburg, 1861), III, 128-30.
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17
Muscovy to honour its obligations. This the Muscovites
18
were prepared to do. Khmelnytskyi was thus compelled to 
take quick steps to prevent the materialization of the 
Muscovite military intervention. Even though the Muscovites 
were to fight the Tatars only, a blow against the Tatars 
was also a blow against the Kozaks.
Khmelnytskyi began by cutting the communication 
lines between Warsaw and Moscow; he intercepted the envoys 
from both sides and seized their letters. He flattered Tsar 
Aleksei Mikhailovich by referring to him as the protector of 
of Orthodoxy; and tempted the tsar with the vacant throne
I
of Poland, the recovery of Smalensk territories, and with 
the vague suggestions that the Kozaks wished to accept him 
as their protector. Khmelnytskyi also appealed for tsar's 
troops to support the Kozak cause; shamed the Muscovites 
that they, the strong defenders of Orthodoxy, even consi­
dered giving aid to the Poles against people of the same 
faith; and emphasized that Muscovy should expect only
1 7See A. Kysil's letter to N. Pleshcheev, Hoshcha, May 
11, 1648, ibid., III, 188-90.
18See A. Kysil's letter to M. Lubienski [Hoshcha], May 
31, 1648, Decree from the Department of Defense to N. 
Pleshcheev [Moscow], May 30, 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy 
etc., II, 26, 496, n. 21.
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goodwill from the Kozaks. He issued threats, that if no
troops were sent from Muscovy to the Kozak aid, the Kozaks
would be forced to co-operate with the Tatars against the 
19
Muscovites.
Khmelnytskyi was fortunate that internal distur-
20bances broke out m  Muscovy. The tsar, whether he wished
to take advantage of the Commonwealth's predicament to carry
out the traditional wishes of Ivan Kalita, or really to come
to its aid, now was in no position to send his troops out 
21
of Muscovy. Early m  August Khmelnytskyi learned that no
19See B. Khmelnytskyi's letters to Aleksei Mikhailovich, 
Cherkasy, June 18, to S . Bolkhovskii, Chyhyryn, June 30, 
and to N. Pleshcheev, Rosava, July 11 and Pavoloch, August 
3, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 48-50, 
54-55, 57, 64. See also G. Klimov's report to Muscovite 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, June 26, 1648 in 
Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 215-17; and A. Buinosov- 
Rostovskii and S. Veliaminov's letter to Muscovite Depart­
ment of Defense, Iablonov, July 6 , 1648, in Akty Moskovskogo 
gosudarstva, 3 vols (St. Petersburg, 1894), II, 232-33.
20
See A. A. Novoselskn and A. N. Speranskii, "Gorodsk.ie 
vosstaniia v Russkom gosudarstve v seredine XVII v. Zemskii 
sobor 1648-1649 gg." [Town Risings in the Russian State in 
the Middle of the Seventeenth Century. Land Assembly of 
the Years 1648-1649], in Ocherki istorii S.S.S.R. etc 
(Moscow, 1955), pp. 224-49. These uprisings, the first 
which began in June, 1648 in Moscow, continued to spread in 
1649 and 1650. See M. N. Tikhomirov, "Vosstaniia v Novgo- 
rode i Pskove v 1650 g." [The Risings in Novgorod and 
Pskov in 1650], ibid., pp. 249-56.
^S e e  Aleksei Mikhailovich's decree to Z. Leontev and I. 
Xobylskii, Moscow, July 6 , 1648, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy 
etc., II, 53; and Radziwill, op. cit. , II, 287.
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22Muscovite troops were being sent to a .id the Poles. He
was therefore also safe from the east.
From the south Khmelnytskyi was protected by his
Tatar allies. It was not in their interest that peace
should materialize; therefore, they urged Khmelnytskyi to
23continue the hostilities. Khan Islam III pledged to send
Tatar troops for a new Kozak campaign, even though he knew
that this would be against the orders of his suzerain. The
High Porte was at war with Venice; thus, it had no desire
to antagonize the Commonwealth. Even before official
protests arrived in Constantinopole against the actions of
the Tatars, the khan received strict orders not to invade
24the territories of the Commonwealth again. Once
See B. Khmelnytskyi' s letter to S. Bolkhovskn, 
Kostiantyniv, August 8 , 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana 
Khmelnytskoho etc., p. 65.
23See Rev. P. Lasko's report, Chyhyryn, June 29, 1648, 
in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2, 439-40.
24
See M. Ostrorog's letter to J. Ossolinski, Hlyniany, 
August 4, 1648; [L. Miaskowski's letter to J. Ossolinski, 
Kamianets, June 11, 1648]; and Ahmed Pasha's letter to M. 
Potocki, Constantinopole [ca. late May or early June, 1648], 
in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit., X, 206, 267-68, 293-94.
Seie also Ahmed Pasha's letter to J, Ossolinski, Constantino­
pole [ca. June 11, 1648], in Zygmunt Abrahamowicz ed., 
Katalog dokumentow Tureckich. Dokumenty do.dziejow Polski 
i krajow osciennych w latach 1455-1672 (Warsaw: Panstwowe 
Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1959), pp. 326-27.
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Khmelnytskyi learned of this decision, he spared no efforts 
in Constantinopole to secure permission for the Tatar 
military aid. Favourable circumstances brought him success 
again.
Early in August the government of' Grand Vezir Ahmed
Pasha was overthrown, and Sultan Ibrahim I was dethroned
25during a mutiny of the Janissaries and later executed.
The new government accepted Khmelnytskyi1s irresistible
offers; money, troops, prisoners for Turkish galleys and
cession of the Podolian fortress Kamianets. In return it
officially approved the Kozak-Tatar alliance and the anti-
Commonwoalth enterprises of Khan Islam III. On August 28
Kalga Crim Giray led the Tatar hordes from Crimea to
26Khmelnytskyi1s aid.
25See P. Rycaut, The History etc. (London, 1680), [2], 
pp. 33-34; Radziwill, op. cit., II, 318; Despatch of [D. 
Cieklinski? ] , Hlyniany, August 26, 164-8, in Szajnocha,
"Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2, 461; arid M. Golinski, MS. B.N.Z. 
Ossol, 189, f. 141
^ S e e  Radziwill, op. cit. , II, 318; L. Miaskowski1s 
letter to W. Miaskowski, Kamianets, October 27, 1648, in 
Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 211; Despatch of [D. 
Cieklinski?], Hlyniany, August 26, 1648, in Szajnocha,
"Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2, 461; and 0. Gorka, "Nieznana kronika 
tatarska lat 1644-50", Kwartalnik Historyczny, LXII (no. 3, 
1955), 116-17. The hostile attitude of the new government 
of the Ottoman Empire to the Commonwealth is well expressed 
in the letter of the new Grand Vezir Sufi Mehmed Pasha to 
J. Ossolinski, Constantinopole, [ca. August or September,
1648), in Abrahamowicz, op. cit., p. 328.
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Even as the Tatars marched, Khmelnytskyi continued
to call for parleys and expressed hope that reconcilliation
27with the Commonwealth was still possible. However, the
commission, led by Kysil, found so many obstacles on its
path, that it was virtually impossible for it to begin
negotiations. By the middle of September —  after a month
and a half since the commission departed from Warsaw —  the
two sides had not met. Even the over-optimistic Kysil
28became skeptical of the whole business. By this time it 
became clear that Khmelnytskyi was only playing for time 
and that the whole issue would have to be resolved by the
I
force of arms.
During this diplomatic game of Khmelnytskyi, the 
rising of the serfs took even a more menacing form and 
spread over vaster areas. At the close of July, a great
27See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to the Commissioners, 
Kumanivtsi, August 28, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana 
Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 67-68.
2 8See the various letters and reports of Adam Kysil and 
the Commissioners during the months of August and early 
September: in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 149-53, 
159-66, 169-74, 177; and Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit.,
II, 2, 449-53, 464-66; X, 209, 220-21. The following 
are the final reports: A. Kysil et al., to M. Lubienski, 
Cholhanskyi Kamin, September 13, 1648, and A. Kysil to 
M. Lubienski, Kostiantyniv, September 15, 1648, in Jakuba 
Michalowskiego etc., pp. 184-86, 192-93.
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battle was fought near Staro-Kostiantyniv between the 
forces of W.isniowiecki and Kryvonis. Although neither side 
won a decisive victory, the battle proved to be more advan­
tageous for the "riffraff". Wisniowiecki had insufficient
troops to carry on the hostilities; he was thus forced to
29withdraw beyond the Horyn River. More and more fortresses
and towns-fell to the serfs; early in August they captured
30the "impregnable" arsenal-fortress of Bar. By this time 
Khmelnytskyi began a slow march with the Kozak Army into 
Volynia. It was to be opposed by an army of "deer"; a 
disorganized, but a splendid assembly of the gentry.
Most of the magnates and the country squires, among 
the anatagonists of Khmelnytskyi, entered the concentration 
area at Cholhanskyi Kamin as if they were attending some 
sort of a celebration. Their camp was filled with luxurious 
tents, furniture, gold and silver plate and expensive 
clothes. Immense transport brought in rich food supplies.
29On the Battle of Staro-Kostiantyniv (July 26 to 28,
1648) see; Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 97-100, 145-48; 
Sprawy i rzeczy etc (Lviv, 1914), pp. 97-98; B. K. Maskie- 
wicz, "Parnietniki Boguslawa Kazimierza Maskiewieza" , in 
Pamietniki Maskiewiczow etc (Wroclaw, 1961), pp. 250-54;
and w. Tomkiewicz, Jeremi Wisnioweicki (1612-1651) (Warsaw, 
1933), pp. 216-20.
I
30See the correspondence m  Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., 
pp. 149-211.
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The magnates tried to outdo each other by giving great 
feasts; at the same time, their old feuds were renewed.
Even though attempts were made to reconcile them, little 
cooperation resulted. Thus, in the camp of Khmelnytskyi's 
antagonists quarrels continued, disorganization prevailed 
and general military discipline vanished.
Many of the nobles regarded their presence in the 
camp as a mere formality. They believed that negotiations 
between Kysil and Khmelnytskyi would eventually lead to the 
cessation of hostilities and then to the re-establishment 
of peace. Arriving in this state of mind in the camp, they 
expected to witness this event. At the same time they also 
expected that by their large numbers they would strengthen 
the bargaining position of the commission. Moreover, they 
would make sure that the rebels did not ask for too many 
concessions.
Others, while not ruling out a conflict, showed 
great, contempt for the Kozaks and the serfs. If they failed 
to overawe the enemy with their numbers and splendour, then 
they thought, they would use whips, not swords, against the 
"rabble". Finally, still others, were not too happy at the 
prospect of destroying their own serfs. Who would replace
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the serfs and do their work?
While the Kozak Army had in Khmelnytskyi one leader
who possessed extraordinary powers during the time of war,
nothing of the kind existed in the camp of the gentry.
There was no unity of command. The three regimentaries, who
received temporary command of the army while the hetmans were
Tatar captives, had little talent and experience as military
commanders. The Kozaks gave each of them appropriate
labels; "Feather bed" to Prince Wladyslaw Zaslawski, the
Palatine of Sandomierz; "Latinist" to Mikolaj Ostrorog, the
Crown Cup-Bearer; and "Babe" to Aleksander Koniecpolski,
32
the Crown Ensign. To make matters‘worse, thirty-two com­
missioners were appointed by the Convocation Diet to aid
these three regimentaries. This sufficed not to lose one,
33
but thirty-five battles in all.
31See V. Kochowski, Annalium Poloniae etc., 4 vols 
(Krakow, 1683), I, 53; S. Grondski, Historia belli etc (Pest, 
1789), 75; S. Temberski, Stanislawa Temberskiego etc (Krakow, 
1897), pp. 87-90; and M. Golinski, MS. B.Z.N.Ossol., 189, 
f. 149.
32Zaslawski ("Feather bed") was a pleasure-loving 
magnate; Ostrorog ("Latinist") was a man of learning; and 
Koniecpolski ("Babe") was still a young man. See Kowalski's 
letter to his father, Warsaw, November 22, 1648, in Sprawy 
i rzeczy etc., p. 116; and Grondski, op . cit., p. 72.
^ S e e  Kubala, op. cit., p. 289.
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A contemporary observed that an army of deer led by
a lion was worth much more than an army of lions commanded 
34by a deer. Prince Jeremi Wisniowiecki was this "lion".
He had the admiration respect and confidence of the mass of
quarrelsome country squires, among whom could be found every
shade of opinion. But he was excluded from the high
command by his opponents. It mattered little to them that
this "lion" had the necessary military experience and
excellent leadership qualities, and that he alone was able
to restore discipline among this "deer" army of the nobles.
Wisniowiecki was an opponent of Ossolinski's policies; the
latter considered that power in Wisniowiecki1s hands was the
35
same as a sword in the hands of a madman. Wisniowiecki 
thus observed the military preparations of the regimentaries 
with ironic aloofness.
This was the state of affairs of an army of the 
gentry which became engaged in "pursuit" of the Kozaks in 
the middle of September. After a few successful skirmishes, 
it came face to face with the main Kozak strength at Pylia- 
vtsi. The enormous and poorly-located camp of the gentry
34 . .See Radziwill, op. cit., II, 320.
O  C
-3See F. Rawita-Gawronski, Bohdan Chmielnicki etc., 2 
vols (Lviv, 1906), I, 292.
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"could not be fortified in any manner". While waiting for 
the Kozaks to attack, the gentry made use of this time by 
carrying on drunken revelries. On September 23 alarms were 
sounded that the Kozaks were advancing, but "the army cared 
nothing about this". Disorderly groups rushed out against 
the enemy. The battle lasted the entire day without a deci­
sive result for each side. The gentry was greatly disturbed 
by the shouts of "Allah". They believed that great numbers 
of Tatars joined the Kozaks, The result was that "the army 
nearly lost its heart". To make; matters worse, rumours 
began to circulate during the night that its officers were 
deserting. The effects of these rumours was catastrophic: the
gentry panicked and fled in all directions. The regulars
3 6that remained by their posts were annihilated.
Such was the fate of the brilliant and seemingly 
powerful army. The country squires, who came prepared to 
defend their Fatherland, to terrify any foreign invaders and 
to compell the rebellious serfs and Kozaks to fall on 
their knees, were now no more than disorderly bands of
•^On the Battle of Pyliavtsi (September 20 to 23, 1648) 
see Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 200-10; Sprawy i rzeczy 
etc., pp. 117-19; M. Golinski, MS. B,Z.N.Ossol., 189, ff. 
146-51; and Iu. Tys-Krokhmaliuk, Boi Khmelnytskoho etc.
(Munich, 1954), pp. 85-103.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 6 2
fugitives. The way to the heart of the Commonwealth was
opened once more to the Kozak-serf-Tatar forces. "We have
perished totally", despaired one noble, adding that the only
37
hope for the Commonwealth lay in the Divine Providence.
II
After the disaster at Pyliavtsi, the remnants of the 
nobles gathered in Lviv and entrusted the command of the 
decimated army to Prince Jeremi Wisniowiecki. Doubting 
that the city could be defended, Wisniowiecki left the 
burgesses to their own resources and retreated with most of 
his troops to Zamostia. He was more,confident that this
3 8
strong fortress would stop the enemy's drive toward Warsaw.
Furthermore, he was faced with a new problem; the Palatinate
of Rus became engulfed by a rising of all classes of the
3 9Rusin population. While Wisniowiecki made a hasty retreat, 
Khmelnytskyi began a slow march towards Lviv. His lack of
37Anonymous letter from Lviv, September 29, 1648, in 
Jakuba Mich alowskiego etc., p. 200.
3 R
See Tomkiewicz, op. cit., pp. 248-257; and L. Kubala, 
Szkice historyczne, 1st ser., 5th ed (Lviv, 1923), pp.
53^58.
39See W. Lozmski, Prawem i lewem etc., 2 vols. , 4th ed. 
(Lviv, 1931) , I, 419-26; and Volumina Legum (Warsaw, 1737) , 
IV, 302-03. *
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haste can be explained by the fact that he awaited the
arrival of the main Tatar horde under Crim Giray. When the
Tatars appeared, the combined armies then marched to Lviv
40
and besieged it.
Khmelnytskyi was not particularly eager to capture
Lviv, since this would expose that city to the merciless
sacking by his savage allies. He thus agreed to lift the
siege when the burgesses proposed to pay an enormous
idemnity, most of which went to the Tatars. At the close
of October he sent the bulk of the Tatars to Crimea; at
the same time he ordered the Kozak Army to march to 
41Zamostia. Khmelnytskyi reached his objective early in 
November and laid siege to it. The Kozak Army now stood 
on the ethnographic frontiers of Poland, facing the last 
obstacle of some strength before Warsaw.
During this time the Election Diet (October 6 to 
November 25, 1648) was in session at Warsaw. Most of the 
deputies regarded the fiasco at Pyliavtsi as a direct
40See Gorka, op. cit., p. 117.
^ S e e  ibid. On the siege of Lviv (October 6 to 26,
1648) see: A. Czolowski, "Relacya o oblezeniu miasta Lwowa 
przez Bohdana Chmielnickiego 1648 roku", Kwartalnik 
Historyczny, VI (no. 3, 1892), 544-50; and Kubala, Szkice 
historyczne, op. cit., pp. 53-66.
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result of Ossolinski1s conciliary policy to the Kozaks.
Their temper indicated that this Diet would not only bury
the conciliary policy, but also that any candidate for the
Polish throne who supported it would not be elected. In
November only the two remaining brothers of the late king
were competing for the crown: Jan Kazimierz, ex-Jesuit,
ex-cardinal and the hereditary "King of Sweden"; and his
younger brother Karol Ferdynand, Bishop of Wroclaw and
Plock. The former was supported largely by the conciliary
group at the head of which stood Ossolinski; the latter, by
the intransigents headed by Wisniowiecki.
Jan Kazimierz established contacts with Khmelnytskyi 
42sometime m  August. In October, while the Kozak-Tatar
forces were besieging Lviv, the Kozak leader declared his
43
support for the candidacy of Jan Kazimierz. While under
the walls of Zamostia, Khmelnytskyi received promises from
Jan Kazimierz that once elected he would satisfy all Kozak
44
demands and would enforce their rights. Khmelnytskyi 
responded by his renewed pledges of support for Jan Kazimierz .
42See Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, op. cit., p. 322.
43See Czolowski, op. cit., p. 549.
44
G. Kunakov's report to Muscovite government (1649), 
in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 285.
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This he revealed in his letters to the nobles and the
burgesses of Zamostia, to the Senate and to various other 
45
individuals. In the diplomatic maneouvermg which 
surrounded the election, Khmelnytskyi thus cast the deci­
sive vote for Jan Kazimierz. The rest was accomplished by 
the much-talented ijerzy Ossolinski. On November 14 the 
younger brother officially withdrew his candidacy. On
November 20, 1648 Jan Kazimierz became the King of Poland
46
and the Grand Duke of Lithuania.
On November 15, before his official election, Jan 
Kazimierz sent his envoy Jakob Smiarowski to the Kozak 
camp with the announcement that he was elected king. He 
also requested Khmelnytskyi to show his goodwill by ceasing 
all hostilities and by marching back with his army to
45See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letter to the Nobles and the 
Burgesses of Zamostia, November 6 , 1648, in Dokumenty 
Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., p. 72. The contents of this
letter of Khmelnytskyi became known in Warsaw by November
12. See the Record of the Election Diet, Thirtieth Session, 
Warsaw, November 12, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., 
p. 312. The following sources reveal that Khmelnytskyi 
wrote to other persons: Kochowski, op. cit., I, 95; W.
Rudawski, Historia polska etc., 2 vols (St. Petersburg,
1855), I, 45; and A. Kysil's letter to an Anonymous Kozak 
Colonel, Hoshcha, May 18, 1649, in Ojczyste spominki etc.,
2 vols (Krakow, 1845), II, 27.
^ S e e  Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, op. cit., pp. 301-28.
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Ukraine. On the same day, Khmelnytskyi sent his envoys 
48
to Warsaw. The Kozak envoys, headed by Reverend Andrzej
Mokrski, — ■ Khmelnytskyi1s former professor at a Jesuit
college —  arrived in Warsaw on November 24, missing the;
49
envoy Smiarowski on the way to Khmelnytskyi. They brought 
two letters: one for the senators, the other for Jan 
Kazimierz.
In his letter to the senators Khmelnytskyi defended
his position and actions, begged for forgiveness and
requested the punishment of the magnates, especially Koniec-
pclski and Wisniowiecki, whom he blamed for the existing 
50conflict. He wrote to Jan Kazimierz that he was prepared
to serve him, and claimed that the only reason he marched
to Zamostia was to ensure that no one else was elected 
51
king. Khmelnytskyi also instructed his envoys to 
4-7See A. Kraushar, "Poselstwo Jakoba Smiarowskiego do 
Bohdana Chmielnickiego pod oblezony Zamosc w r. 1648 (Ze 
zrodel rekopismiennych)", Kwartalnik Historyczny, V (no. 4, 
1891), 818-21; and Radziwill, op. cit. , II, 350.
A  Q
See Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, op. cit., p. 331.
^^See the Record of the Election Diet, Forty-first 
Session (Senate only), Warsaw, November 24, 1648, in Jakuba 
Michalowskiego etc., p. 359.
cn
See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letter to the Senate, Zamostia, 
November 15, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc.,
pp. 81-82.
51 . .See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to Jan Kazimierz,
Zamostia, November 15, 1648, ibid., p. 80.
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negotiate directly with Jan Kazimierz. They were to inform
the government that if any other candidate was chosen king,
52it should expect neither negotiations nor peace.
The envoy Mokrski presented the following demands 
to the king-elect: amnesty to all participants in the rebel­
lion; confirmation of the rights and privileges of the 
registered Kozaks; increase of their number to 12,000; 
dependence of the Kozak Army on the king alone, not on the 
government; sheriffs and other officials would have no 
jurisdiction over the Kozaks; they were to be judged by the 
same laws as the nobles; free election of officers of the 
Kozak army; blanket permission to send naval, expeditions to 
the Black Sea; free access to and unrestricted use of the 
steppes; a land grant for Khmelnytskyi; official confir­
mation of his office as a Kozak Hetman; no punishment to 
the rebel serfs; legal recognition of the Orthodox Church;
restoration of all churches and benefices belonging to it;
53and the abolition of the Uniate Church. These demands did 
not differ greatly from those Khmelnytskyi sent to Warsaw
^ S e e  Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, op. cit., p. 331.
C" O
See the Demands of the Zaporozhian Army, Zamostia, 
November 15, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., 
pp. 83-84. See also Jan Kazimierz's letters to B. 
Khmelnytskyi, Warsaw, December 1, 1648, in Szajnocha,
UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR LIBRARY
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in June. Thus, even after three decisive victories the 
Kozak leader limited himself to very moderate demands.
Not too many of the senators shared this opinion. 
After a great deal of heated debate, they decided to post­
pone the answer on the grounds that Khmelnytskyi1s envoys 
were not sent to the king-elect, but only to the candidate 
for that office. In order to receive their decision, he 
must send new envoys with petitions to the king-elect.
Using this pretext, they prepared an anti-dated manifesto in
55
the name of the king and addressed it to the Kozak Army.
The manifesto announced the election of Jan
I
Kazimierz; the king-elect ordered the cessation of all 
hostilities; and commanded the Kozak Army to retire to its 
territories in Ukraine, to send the Tatars to Crimea and
"Zrodla" , op. cit. , II, 2, 473-75, and December [11] , 1648, 
in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 217-19; (Concerning the 
correct date of this last letter see Kubala, Jerzy 
Ossolinski, op. cit ., p. 462, n. 25); Record of the Election 
Diet, Forty-first Session (Senate only), Warsaw, November 
24, 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 359; and 
Radziwill, op. cit., II, 350.
54See the Instructions to the Delegates of the Kozak 
Army, Bila Tserkva, June 12, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana 
Khmelnytskoho etc., p. 37.
R C
See the Record of the Election Diet, Forty-Second 
Session (Senate only), Warsaw, November 25, 1648, in Jakuba 
M ichalowskiego etc., p. 359; and Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, 
op. cit. , p. 33':-33.
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to despatch new envoys to Warsaw with assurances of 
fidelity. In return, the king pledged to confirm all the 
Kozak liberties and to send a commission which would 
examine all Kozak grievances and begin negotiations with 
them.
Jan Kazimierz did not see the value of such 
pjroceedings. He thus called the envoy Mokrski for a con­
ference without the knowledge of the senators. Following 
the secret discussions with the king, Mokrski left Warsaw 
on December first. He carried a letter in which Jan
57Kazimierz agreed to accept all of Khmelnytskyi1s demands. 
Shortly after his departure the royal envoy Smiarowski 
returned; with him also arrived new Kozak envoys. These 
announced that Khmelnytskyi lifted the siege of Zamostia, 
sent the Tatars to Crimea and ordered the Kozak Army to 
march to Ukraine. The Kozak leader also asked the king to 
appoint a commission so that peace negotiations could be
C(Z . . .
^uSee Jan Kazimierzfs manifesto to the Kozak Army, 
Warsaw, November [21], 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", 
o]3. cit. , II, 471-73. Concerning the correct date of this 
document see Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, op. cit. , p. 461, 
n. 22.
See Jan Kazimierz's letter to B. Khmelnytskyi, Warsaw, 
December 1, 1648, in Szajnocha, "Zrodla", op. cit. , II,
2, 472-75.
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started.
In his reply Jan Kazimierz repeated the offers he
made in his previous letter. He also added the following
instructions: Khmelnytskyi and his officers should arrive
at a place designated by the commissioners to take an oath
of fealty; there he would receive the insignia of his office
and begin negotiations. Once this was accomplished, Kozak
envoys should bring the petitions of the Kozak Army to the
Coronation Diet, where they would be ratified. The king
again insisted that Khmelnytskyi must send the Tatars back
to Crimea, himself retire to Ukraine with the Kozak Army,
order all the serfs to return to their homes and issue
manifestoes banning lawless bands. Neither the Crown nor
the Lithuanian armies would hinder him in carrying out the 
59royal orders.
Jan Kazimierz was now satisfied that peace would 
materialize. On December 12, he issued a manifesto decla­
ring an end of all hostilities.^  Following this he
~^See G. Kunakov's report to Muscovite government 
(1649), in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., III, 284.
59
See Jan Kazrmierz's letter to B. Khmelnytskyx, Warsaw, 
December [11] , 1648, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 
217-19. . ' ~
60See Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, op. - it., p. 334.
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appointed members to a commission, at the head of which
he placed Adam Kysil. Negotiations with the Kozaks
were scheduled to begin at the end of January, 1649, in 
61Kiev. It thus appeared that the Commonwealth would be
spared further strife and bloodshed. In Warsaw the
unexpected "moderation" of Khmelnytskyi was attributed to
62
the divine intervention.
Ill
Thus, at the height of his success Khmelnytskyi 
halted his advance, supported the candidacy of Jan Kazimierz, 
entered into negotiations with him, ^imited himself to 
modest demands, left all the decisions at the hands of the 
king, sent back his Tatar allies and began a return march 
to Ukraine. Khmelnytskyi1s motives were quite plain. By 
taking these steps he found a good opportunity to settle 
matters without continuing war. In Jan Kazimierz and his 
advisors, he found men who would follow his bidding. 
Furthermore, his troops were weary after a long campaign, 
and as it was not customary for the Kozaks to undertake a 
a winter campaign, Khmelnytskyi decided to halt all military
k^See ibid., p. 335.
62 . .
See ibid. p. 336.
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operations.
Moreover, the Kozaks had penetrated the ethnographic
boundary of Poland; thus, they were faced with a more
hostile population. More important still, Khmelnytskyi
wanted to gain time to further his ambitious plans, which
began to take shape after the victory at Pyliavtsi. By
accepting'the offers of the king, Khmelnytskyi also assured
himself a safe return to Ukraine with all the plunder. He
therefore issued manifestoes throughout all territories
under Kozak control, which announced the end of war. The
nobles were urged to return to their estates; the serfs, to
/■
obey their masters. At the same time he began to march to 
Kiev.
No palatine of Kiev ever received such a welcome
from the Kievan burgesses as had Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, when
64
he entered Kxev on the Orthodox Christmas Eve. On the 
outskirts of the city he was welcomed by all the inhabi­
tants. He was met by the visiting Patriarch of Jerusalem
0 3
See B. Khmelnytskyi's manifesto to the Rusin people, 
Ostoroh, December 12, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelny- 
tskoho etc., pp. 85-86. See also S. Oldakowski's letter to
A.. Sieniawski, Sokal, January 2, 1649, in Szajnocha, 
"Zrodla", op. cit., II, 2, 479.
I
^ S e e  Joachim Jerlicz, Latopisiec etc., 2 vols. (Warsaw, 
1853), I, 72.
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and the Metropolitan Bishop of Kiev, who gave him a place 
of honour in his sleigh. They proceeded to the gates of 
Kiev through the processions formed by the Orthodox clergy; 
the crowds cheered, the bells pealed and the guns roared. 
The professors and students of the Kievan' Academy honoured 
him with "orations and acclamations". They welcomed him as 
"Moses, saviour and liberator of the Rusin people from the 
Polish bondage, and as a good omen called Bohdan —  God 
Given". On this occasion the Patriarch bestowed the title 
"Illustrious Prince" upon him. The archmandrite of the
Monastery of the Caves prepared a feast in his honour.
65
There were foreign envoys seeking to confer with him.
Khmelnytskyi was profoundly stirred by this enthu­
siastic reception by the Kievans. He was welcomed by all 
classes of the Rusin society in Kiev, "the mother of the 
cities of Rus"; the capital of old Kievan Rus, at one time 
a metropolis which was a rival to Constantinopole, from 
whence Grand Princes Volodymyr and Iaroslav ruled a vast 
territory and where the monuments of their times were still 
visible —  Golden Gate, Cathedral of St. Sofiia, Monastery
65See the Journal of W. Miaskowski, Pereiaslav,
February 23, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 
109-10. '
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of the Caves. Kiev was also the cradle of the Orthodox 
Church among the East Slavs. Even in Khmelnytskyi’s time 
it was the most progressive centre of the religious and the 
intellectual life in the whole Orthodox world. By his 
triumphant entry into Kiev, Khmelnytskyi sanctified his 
military and political leadership with the halo of histo- 
rical tradition.66
Moreover, it was through the discussions with the 
enlightened Rusin ecclesiastical and lay circles at Kiev, 
that he grasped the magnitude of his achievements. Bohdan 
Khmelnytskyi thus began to view his position and responsi­
bility in a new light. He realized that he was no longer 
merely a leader of rebel Kozaks, but the head of all the 
Rusin people, with wider duties and more lofty political 
ideals. If at Zamostia he still took advantage of his 
military successes for the benefit of the narrow interest
of the Kozak class, then at Kiev he changed his plans
67 .
radically. This he revealed to Adam Kysil and the commis­
sioners upon their arrival at Pereiaslav in February 1649.
^ S e e  G. Vernadsky, Bohdan, Hetman of Ukraine (New Haven, 
1941) , p. 58. ”
67See M. Hrushevskyi, Istoriia. Ukrainy-Rusy, 10 vols (New 
York, 1956), VIII, 3, 12 2-1297"
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Even at their first meeting Kysil observed a change 
in the attitude and plans of Khmelnytskyi. First of all, 
he insulted the commissioners by not receiving them at Kiev, 
but making them travel to Pereiaslav. Although he received 
them with great pomp and ceremony, he accepted the royal 
insignia of his office without enthusiasm, almost indig­
nantly. Kysil's efforts to begin negotiations on the basis 
of Khmelnytskyi1s declarations at Zamostia brought no 
re;sults. Khmelnytskyi ended the first session by a long 
denounciation of the "kinglets". The following day he 
announced that the Poles had no right to "Ukraine and all
i
Rus". He even tried to persuade the commissioners to 
renounce their loyalty to the Crown and to cast their lots 
with the Kozaks, prophesying that "Poland will perish and 
Rus will rule very soon this year".^
At the third round of negotiations Kysil attempted 
to use his old stratagem of divide et impera by appealing to 
the personal interests of Khmelnytskyi and to the class 
interests of the Kozaks. He stated that the king was 
prepared to satisfy all the grievances of Khmelnytskyi and
68See the Journal of W. Miaskowski, Pereiaslav,
February 19-22, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 
105-08.
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those of the Kozaks. As a bait he proposed to increase the
number of the registered Kozaks to fifteen thousand. Kysil
stated that the Kozaks v/ere men of knightly rank; therefore,
they should concern themselves with military matters and
with the waging of war. The Kozaks had nothing in common
with the serfs; they must sever all ties with the "rabble"
and leave'them to the tilling of the soil. Finally, Kysil
attempted to rekindle the Kozaks' hate of the Tatars by
appealing to their "patriotism" and faith. His aim, of
course, was to rupture the Kozak-Tatar alliance; he also
aimed at turning them against the Turks. The Kozaks should
be aware of the fact that while they laid waste to Poland
and Lithuania, they also destroyed Rusin ethnic territories.
By acting with the infidels, the Kozaks endangered their
faith and the Orthodox Church. Rather than destroying the
Commonwealth, the Kozaks should wage wars in foreign lands;
rather than destroying Christians within their ov/n country,
69the Kozaks should destroy the infidels.
One member of the Commission, the Chamberlin of 
Lviv, Wojciech Miaskowski, summarized Khmelnytskyi1s answer 
to Kysil. In it Khmelnytskyi refuted Kysil's arguments and
4
69See ibid., II, 108.
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outlined his new political credo:
It is useless to talk too much. . . . Now there is no 
time [to negotiate]. Hitherto I have undertaken tasks 
which I had not thought through? henceforth, I will 
pursue aims which I have considered with care. I will 
free all the Rusin people from the Polish bondage. Up 
to now, I have fought because of wrongs done to me 
personally; now, I will fight for our Orthodox faith.
All the people as far as Lublin and Krakow will help me.
I will not abandon them, for they are our right hand.
In order that you may not subdue the serfs and then 
attack the Kozaks, I will maintain two to three hundred 
thousand men, as well as all of the Tatar horde. . . .
The Kozak friendship with them [Tatars] is eternal, . . . 
I will neither wage foreign wars, nor will I draw my 
sword against the Turks or the Tatars. I have enough 
to do in Ukraine, Podolia and Volynia; and now I am 
enjoying sufficient ease, wealth and benefit from my 
land and principality as far as Lviv, Kholm and Halych. 
When I will reach the Wisla [River], I will say to the 
rest of the Poles: "Be still and keep silent Poles!"
I will drive the wealthier Poles and the dukes and the 
princes beyond the Wisla, and if they become too unruly 
there, I will seek them out there too. Not a single 
noble or prince will I permit to set foot here in 
Ukraine, and if any one of them will desire to eat our 
bread, he must be obedient to the Zaporozhian Army, and 
must make no outcries against the king.
Khmelnytskyi also emphasized that he no longer con­
sidered himself only the leader of the Kozaks. He became
71
"by the will of God . . . the independent ruler of Rus".
Thus, Khmelnytskyi seemingly wanted to rule an independent 
Rusin state. At this time he did not wish to sever all ties
7°Ibid., II, 108-09. 
71Ibid., II, 108.
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with the Commonwealth, because he still professed allegience 
to Jan Kazimierz. This, however, was a very thin link.
Khmelnytskyi was unprepared to send the commissio­
ners back to Warsaw with a declaration of war. Playing for 
time, he signed an agreement with them. It declared that 
an armistice was arranged to last till May 22. The negotia­
tions were not completed because Khmelnytskyi faced grave 
logistical problems; therefore, he was neither able to 
compile the lists of the registered Kozaks, nor to send 
back the commoners back to their homes. Because of this 
problem, the nobles were requested not to return to their 
homes, until May 22. By this date Khmelnytskyi would be 
ready and a new commission could resume negotiations.
During the term of the armistice; neither the Crown, the 
Lithuanian nor the Kozak Armies were to cross into each 
others territories; the boundaries being the Rivers Horyn 
and Prypiats and a line running north.to Horyn from 
Kamianets in Podolia. Finally, Khmelnytskyi consented to
return all prisoners-of-war, on condition that his enemy
72Daniel Czaplmski would be surrendered to him.
7 7See the Agreement between the Commission and B. 
Khmelnytskyi, Pereiaslav, February 24, 1649, in Dokumenty 
Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 103-04; and Commission's 
manifesto the Crown Army, Pereiaslav, February 24, 1649,
-*-n OjczYste spominki etc., II, 13-14.
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In another document Khmelnytskyi really dictated 
his conditions for peace. It took the form of a humble 
"petition" to the king: abolition of the Uniate Church; 
guarantee of all the rights of the Orthodox Church, and the 
restoration of all of its former churches', foundations and 
benefices; appointment of the Kievan palatine and castellan 
to be restricted to Rusins of the Orthodox faith; at least 
three seats in the Senate for the Rusin people which would 
go to the Kievan Metropolitan bishop, the palatine and the 
castellan. In Kiev all churches were to remain as they 
were at this time; the Jesuits were to be expelled from 
that city; Czaplinski was to be surrendered by the commis­
sioners to Khmelnytskyi; and Prince Wisniowiecki was not
73to be given command of the Crown Army.
The commissioners saw that Khmelnytskyi had no
intention of compromising any further. It became clear to
them that, they failed: Khmelnytskyi dared to dream "about
a duchy and rule"; he would be satisfied with nothing less
74than an independent state. His attitude during the
73Articles of Petition of the Zaporozhian Army to Jan 
Kazimierz, Pereiaslav, February 24, 1649, in Dokumenty 
Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 105-06.
74See Commission's letter to Jan Kazimierz [Hoshcha], 
March 8, 1649. Cited by Lipinski, op. cit., p. 294.
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negotiations was enough evidence for them that he also had
75
no intention of keeping any agreement. The line of 
demarcation, the truce and the absence of nobles from their 
estates would give Khmelnytskyi enough time to forge a 
strong army without any interference. During this time he 
would also look for new allies. His excuses for not 
demobilizing the Kozak Army were too obvious: Khmelnytskyi
had no intention of weakening his army; at the same time he 
had no desire of creating dissentions in its rank-and-file 
by excluding the serfs. Furthermore, although Khmelnytskyi 
knew that the magnates in Warsaw would declare his demands 
as impossible, he gambled that neither the king nor the 
"peace party" would flatly reject them. Both Jan Kazimierz 
and Ossolinski would try to humour him as long as possible. 
During this time he would gain the needed time to prepare 
fcr a new campaign in the spring of 1649.
7 5See the Journal of W. Miaskowski, Pereiaslav, 
February 23-26, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II,
108-13.
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CHAPTER VI
KHMELNYTS KYI'S FRESH PREPARATIONS FOR WAR, THE RENEWAL 
OF HOSTILITIES AND THE TREATY OF ZBORIV
I
When the commissioners submitted their report on 
the outcome of the negotiations with Khmelnytskyi at 
Pereiaslav to King Jan Kazimierz, he still had hope that all 
difficulties would be eventually resolved in one way or 
another. Both the king and the Crown Grand Chancellor,
Jerzy Ossolinski, realized that there were several reasons 
for Khmelnytskyi1s negative attitude to negotiations, and 
for his general lack of confidence in the goodwill of the 
government.
The Coronation Diet (January 19 to February 13,
1649) failed even to discuss Khmel-nytskyi' s demands which 
he submitted from Zamostia. The resolutions of this Diet 
also must have made him suspicious. While the commissioners 
were on the way to open negotiations with Khmelnytskyi, the 
Coronation Diet proposed to increase the strength of the 
Crown Army and even authorized the king to call a general
181
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levy of nobles. Furthermore, although Prince Jeremi
Wisniowiecki was not appointed a temporary hetman, he was
successful in recruiting more adherents to his intransigent
camp. The intransigent nobles issued threats against
Khmelnytskyi and also expressed vehement objections to any
proposed concessions for the Kozaks.'*'
Both Jan Kazimierz and Ossolinski wanted peace at
all cost. They still harboured the old war plans of King 
2
Wladyslaw IV. A war with the Ottoman Empire, at a time 
when it was engaged in hostilities with Venice, was both 
desirable and necessary for the Commonwealth. It would
I
employ the energies of the Kozaks and thus solve most of the 
internal problems of the Polish-Lithuanian state. In order 
for such plans to materialize, peace had to be first 
concluded with the Kozaks. Contrary to the advice of many 
senators and even some of the commissioners, but pressed 
into action by Ossolinski, Jan Kazimierz decided to remove
"^ See L. Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, 2nd rev. ed (Lviv, 
1924), pp. 340, 347-48; and Jozef Leszczynski, "Projekty 
reformy panstwa polskiego na sejmie koronacyjnym Jana 
Kazimierza w 1649 r." [The Draft of Reforms of the Polish 
State at the Coronation Diet of Jan Kazimierz in 1649], in 
O Naprawe Rzeczypospolitej etc (Warsaw, 1966), pp. 90-91.
^See Kubala, op. cit., pp. 279-80, 337-39; and E.
Latacz, Ugoda Zborowska a plany tureckie Jana Kazimierza 
(Krakow, 1933), pp. 10-11.
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all the existing obstacles from the road leading to nego­
tiations.
Since the Commonwealth was to reap great benefits 
from the successful war with the Turks, no sacrifice was
too great for it in order to satisfy the demands of
3
Khmelnytskyi. With the exception of refusal to surrender 
Czaplinski, whom he promised to punish severely, Jan
Kazimierz agreed to accept all other main demands of
4Khmelnytskyi. The king also attempted to win Khmelnytski's
confidence and goodwill by granting him titles to various 
5
estates.
Khmelnytskyi took advantage of this policy of 
"contentment" pursued by the king and the chancellor, and 
used it effectively to camouflage his far-reaching aim: to
prepare the final blow for the Commonwealth, both from with­
in and from without. In order to gain time for his plans 
and to keep the Commonwealth unprepared for war, Khmelnytskyi
3
See Kubala, op. cit., p. 349.
^See Jan Kazimierz's letter to B. Khmelnytskyi, Warsaw, 
March 27, 1649, in Ojczyste spominki etc., 2 vols (Krakow, 
1845), II, 113-17.
5
See Jan Kazimierz's charter for B. Khmelnytskyi, Warsaw, 
March 27, 1649, in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., 15 vols (St. 
Petersburg, 1878), X, 462-63.
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continued to lull the king and other influential men to 
sleep with his offers of peace.^ He also initiated some 
steps by which he sought to sow dissention among the gentry 
of the Commonwealth, in addition to other steps by which he 
attempted to prevent the coordinated action of Crown and 
Lithuanian armies against him. Externally, his plans were 
very ambitious: he sought to isolate the Commonwealth and
to draw into the struggle against it as many of the neigh­
bouring countries as possible. Khmelnytskyi1s diplomacy 
was a series of schemes or intrigues, carried out in a true 
Kozak fashion.
Khmelnytskyi made numerous attempts to persuade 
Moscovy to take a hostile stand against the Commonwealth. 
Through his letters, by means of his envoys and by his 
conversations with Muscovite envoys, Khmelnytskyi begged 
Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich not to aid the Poles; to give him 
permission to engage the Don Kozaks against the Common­
wealth; to protect the rights of the Orthodox Christians; 
and to use diplomatic intervention in his favour. He also
^See B. Khmelnytskyi's letters to S. Lanckoronski and 
A. Kysil, Chyhyryn, April 20, April 24, and May 13, 1649, 
in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc (Kiev, 1961), pp.
109-10, 114-15, 118-19. See also A. Kysil's< letter to B. 
Khmelnytskyi [Hoshcha, ca. late March or early April,
1649], in Ojczyste spominki etc., II, 30-33.
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did not fail to tempt the tsar. Khmelnytskyi pointed out
that a good opportunity existed to regain the lost Muscovite
lands from the Commonwealth. Furthermore, he claimed that
if the tsar would heed his pleas, the Kozaks were prepared
7
to accept his overlordship over them.
The Muscovite government rejected all these tempting 
offers. During the 1640's it adopted a policy of extreme 
caution in its foreign relations. Furthermore, Muscovy 
itself was faced with serious domestic problems: agrarian
and religious disorders were rife throughout the country. 
Muscovite nobles also viewed, somewhat with apprehension, 
the social radicalism of the conflict within the Common­
wealth. The tsar was therefore advised against undertaking 
any foreign adventures and urged to ratify peace with the 
new Polish king.
The attitude of Muscovy was thus one of "wait and
7
See for example B. Khmelnytskyi1s letters to Aleksei 
Mikhailovich, Pereiaslav, February 18; Chyhyryn, May 2 and 
May 13, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., 
pp. 94-95, 115-16, 117-18. See also the Report on the 
Mission of the Patriarch of Jerusalem at the Department of 
Foreign Affairs, Moscow, December 11, 1648 to August 7,
1649; S. Muzhylovskyi's report to Aleksei Mikhailovich, 
Moscow, February 14, 1649; and the Report of G. Unkovskii 
to the Muscovite government, Moscow-Chyhyryn, March 23 to 
June 1, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., 3 vols (Moscow, 
1954), II, 81-104, 127-31, 145-62.
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see". The Muscovite government answered Khmelnytskyi1s 
appeals only with general assurances and vague promises. 
Khmelnytskyi was praised for his good intentions, but would 
not receive military aid because "eternal peace" existed 
between Muscovy and the Commonwealth. The tsar agreed to 
extend his protection over the Kozaks and to become their 
sovereign, but only under the condition that King Jan
Q
Kazimierz would agree to this arrangement.
Khmelnytskyi made the best of these circumstances. 
Even though Muscovy remained strictly neutral, he began to 
spread rumours that he succeeded in concluding a military
I
alliance with it. The tsar consented to send him 20,000
troops; the Muscovite armies would protect him from the
Lithuanians by not allowing them to cross the Dnieper to
9
fight the Kozaks. These rumours caused serious difficulties 
between the Commonwealth and Muscovy. The bulk of
g
See the Reply of Prince A. Lvov to the Patriarch of 
Jerusalem, Moscow, May 19, 1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy 
etc., II, 100-01. See also Aleksei Mikhailovich's letters 
to the Senate, Jan Kazimierz and B. Khmelnytskyi, Moscow, 
January 4, May 18 and June 23, 1649, in Akty otnosiashch- 
iesia etc., Ill, 25-26 (Dopolneniia) , 309-11, 320-21.
^See Olszewski's report to the Commissioners [Taikury 
May 25, 1649]; and the Senate Council, Warsaw, June 4,
1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc (Krakow, 1864), pp.
396, 405.
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Lithuanian troops was left to guard the Muscovite frontier. 
Khmelnytskyi thus capitalized on false rumours. He 
strained the relations between the Commonwealth and Muscovy, 
and prevented the coordinated action of the Crown and 
Lithuanian Armies against him.
He was, however, more successful in his other under­
takings. Late in 1648, he sent his envoys to Constantino- 
pole with a tempting proposition to the Turkish government. 
He offered to the sultan all of the territories of the 
Commonwealth under Kozak control and begged him to accept 
the Kozak Army as vassals of the High Porte. In return for 
these offers Khmelnytskyi expected to get permission for the 
Tcitars to support him in the forthcoming campaign, as well 
as some Turkish military aid, and consent for his appoint­
ment as the ruler of Moldavia.'*'^ The High Porte thought it 
wise to sanction the whole project. If the Kozaks were 
turned down, they could conclude an agreement with the 
Polish king, who then would be in a good position to seek 
revenge for the Tatar depredations in his realm by
^ S e e  B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to Muhammed IV, Stare 
Selo, November 28, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho 
etc., pp. 626-27. The editors of this documentary 
collection believe that this is not an authentic letter of 
Khmelnytskyi, but that it was fabricated by some of his 
enemies. See p. 627, n. 9.
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declaring war against the Turks.
Khan Islam Ill's envoys supported Khmelnytskyi1s
schemes at Constantinopole, and in response to Khmelnytskyi's
12frequent letters, the khan agreed to embark on a new cam­
paign as soon as possible. At the close <bf May, 1649 the
13Tatar hordes left Crimea and marched northward.
Khmelnytskyi was therefore successful in gaining the support
of the Muslim world. His prospects were further brightened
by the uphevals within the Turkish government early in May.
Since a belligerent faction was now in power. Khmelnytskyi
hoped that he would be able to involve the Turks directly
14
m  the conflict with the Commonwealth.
^ S e e  W. Bieczynski's letter to L. Miask.owski, Constan- 
tinopole, January 30, 1649: and S. Lanckoronski's letter to 
[the Deputy Judge of Lviv, Manachyn, May 3.3 , 1649], in 
Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 363-64, 408. Concerning the 
correct address, place and date of Lanckoronski1s letter see 
W. Lipinski, Stanislaw Michal Krzyczewski etc. (Krakow,
1912), p. 278, n. 1.
1 See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letters to Antimir, Peri Aga and 
Crim Giray, Chyhyryn, April 10, 11, and 20, 1649, in Doku- 
menty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 110-11, 113-14, 112. 
There are frequent references to this effect in the corres­
pondence of various nobles: see Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., 
pp. 388-89, 392; and Ojczyste spominki etc., II, 17, 19, 35„ 
49, 51-52.
13See O. Gorka, "Nieznana kronika tatarska lat 1644-50", 
Kwartalnik Historyczny, LXII (no. 3, 1955), 117.
ee L. Kubala, Wojna moskiev/ska r. 1654-1655 [The
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The other vassal states of the High Porte —  
Moldavia, Walachia and Transylvania —  also played a signi­
ficant part in Khmelnytskyi1s plans. Acting on the advice 
of the visiting Patriarch of Jerusalem, Khmelnytskyi 
sought to take advantage of his military successes and his
power by inducing Muscovy, Moldavia and Walachia to form an 
15alliance. Once this league of Orthodox states material­
ized, Khmelnytskyi hoped to direct it against the Common­
wealth, or if need arose, even against the Ottoman Empire. 
To this end he initiated an intensive diplomatic action.
Muscovy, however, preferred to be uncommitted at
(
this time. The Hospodar of Walachia seemed to favour the 
idea and even promised some military assistance to 
Khmelnytskyi. The warmest response came from Hospodar 
Vasyl Lupul of Moldavia. Lupul seemed to show his whole­
hearted approval by pompously addressing Khmelnytskyi as 
the "Prince of Rus", by showering him with gifts, by 
promising him substantial military aid, and by expressing
Muscovite WTar of 1654-1655] (Warsaw: Gebethner and Wolff, 
1910), pp. 26, 346, n. 86.
^ S e e  M. Golinski, MS. B.Z.N.Ossol., 189, f. 212 and 
Paul of Aleppo, The Travels etc., 2 vols (London, 1831),
I, 2, 173.
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willingness even to abdicate in favour of Khmelnytskyi.
With Princes Gyorgy and Zsigmond Rakoczy of Transyl­
vania Khmelnytsky again concluded an alliance to cooperate 
in military action against the Commonwealth. He also had a 
very tempting offer for the Rakoczys: after the rout of the
Crown Army he promised to elevate Zsigmond to,the Polish 
17 ■throne.
At the Transylvanian court Khmelnytskyi1s envoys 
learned that the Rakoczys had many supporters within the 
Commonwealth. Moreover, Khmelnytskyi was assured by the 
envoys of the Rakoczis that many nobles of the Grand Duchy 
of Lithuania, as well as most of the Protestants, were in 
sympathy with the Kozak cause. The head of all these mal­
contents was the Lithuanian Field Hetman Prince Janusz
-^See w. Bieczynski's letter to L. Miaskowski, Constan- 
tinopole, January 30, 1649; and W. Miaskowski1s letter to 
Anonymous, Novosilka, February 1, 1649, in Jakuba Michalo­
wskiego etc., pp. 363, 365.
17See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letters to the Rakoczys, from 
November, 1648 to May 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnyts- 
hoho etc., pp. 84-85, 91, 93, 97, 97-98, 98-99, 99-101, 
120-21. see also L. Miaskowski's letter to Anonymous 
[Kamianets?] , April 23; S. Lanckoronski's letter to [the 
Deputy Judge of Lviv, Manachyn, May 13]; Senate Council, 
Warsaw, June 4, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 
389, 405, 407, 408; and S. Lanckoronski1s letter to the 
Deputy Judge of Lviv [Manachyn], May 5, 1649, in 0 jczyste 
spominki etc., II, 19.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 9 1
Radziwill; he would also support Zgigmond Rakoczy to gain
18the Polish throne.
It was no secret to Khmelnytskyi that this magnate
supported Rakoczy1s candidacy during the interregnum, and
that he continued to keep contact with this Transylvanian
ruler who was declared an enemy of the Commonwealth at the
19Coronation Diet. Radziwill hated Jan Kazimierz, for whom
he prophesied a short life. If the King did not die, he
would be dethroned as a result of the civil war, which would
take place even if Jan Kazimierz managed to pacify the 
20Kozaks. Radziwill was publicly accused of trying to
separate Lithuania from Poland and to set up a sovereign
duchy with the help of Rakoczy. in Warsaw his name was
21
synonymous with treason.
Khmelnytskyi thus found a perfect opportunity to 
reestablish good relations with the Lithuanian magnate and
"I O
See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letter to the Rakoczys, Pereia- 
slav, February 20, 1649, in Dokumenty Rohdana Khmelnytskoho 
etc., pp. 100-01.
19See S. A. Radziwill, Pamietniki etc., 2 vols (Poznan, 
1839), II, 357; and Kubala, Wojna moskiewska etc., op. cit. , 
p. 247.
20
See Kubala, Wo]na. moskiewska, op. cit. , pp. 247, 415,
n. 24.
21See Radziwill. o p . cit.. II, 371; and E. Kotlubaj, 
Zycie Janusza Radziwilla etc. (Vilnius, 1859), p. 135.
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to make use of his ambitions. There were frequent exchanges
of envoys between the Kozak and Lithuanian hetmans.
Furthermore, some sort of secret understanding was reached 
22between them. At the same time Khmelnytskyi contacted
other Lithuanian men of importance. His envoys requested
the Lithuanian senators to use their influence not to send
23the troops of the Grand Duchy to ard the Poles. By
denouncing the serf rising in Lithuania, he hoped to esta-
24blish friendly relations with the Lithuanian nobles. The 
aim of all these activities was to sow dissention between 
the nobles of the Crown and of the Grand Duchy. He also
I
wanted to contain the Lithuanian troops within the 
boundaries of the Grand Duchy while the Kozak Army marched 
against the Crown Army.
2 2See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letter to J. Radziwill, Pereia- 
slav, February 19, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho 
etc., p. 96; G. Kunakov's Report to the Muscovite Government 
(1649); and the letters to the Muscovite Department of 
External Affairs of N. Pleshcheev, Putivl, April 16, 1649; 
and Z. Leontev and N. Kirillov, Sevsk, June 9, 1649, in 
Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 299-300, 307, 62 (Dopel- 
neniia). See also Lipinski, op. cit., pp. 274-75, 277-79.
23see G. Unkovskii's report to the Muscovite Government 
(1649), in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 161.
74See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letter to H. Czyz, Kiev,
December 31, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., 
p. 87; and D. Horski's letter to K. Chodkiewicz, Zaliesie, 
January 30, 1649, in Ojczyste spominki etc., II, 7-10.
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On the whole, Khnielnytskyi seemed to have accom­
plished his aims by diplomatic means. True, he was unable 
to rouse Muscovy out of its lethargy. Its statesmen were 
interested in his propositions, but they were cautious and 
in no hurry. They were proverbially "measuring the cloth 
seven times before they cut it". Khmelnytskyi at least had 
the satisfaction that while Muscovy would not support him, 
it would not aid his enemies either. Khmelnytskyi seemed, to 
have secured the support from the High Porte and all its 
vassals: he was certain about the whole-hearted cooperation 
of Crimea; he was assured of some military aid from Moldavia, 
Walachia and Transylvania; and he imagined that the Turks 
would enter into the hostilities with the Commonwealth in 
spite of their war with Venice. Finally, Khmelnytskyi 
seemed to utilize all the hostile elements within the 
Commonwealth for his ends.
The realization of Khmelnytskyi1s new political 
plans did not only depend on the support of foreign powers 
or the hostile factions within the Commonwealth; he had a 
vast resevoir of "riffraff" at his disposal. At the same 
time as he roused the Commonwealth's neighbours, he also 
appealed to the Rusin people. Issuing callfe for aid to 
" all the common people and the Kozaks who believed in God",
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Khmelnytskyi promised them freedom from their masters after
25a victory over the Poles. In response to his appeals
2 6"the rebellious serfs thronged together". Having already
experienced "freedom from labour and tribute, the rabble
27armed itself"; their slogan was; "no lords forever".
They did not even want to hear any talk about negotiations
28with their oppressors. This was to be a conflict to the
last drop of blood. Khmelnytskyi declared that his aim was
29
"to exterminate the Polish name and race"; his militant
followers cried out defiantly: "human tongues will first
30turn backward before the Poles will rule over us". This
Despatch of L. Sapieha [Loeu, c_a. August 1, 1649], in 
Ojczyste spominki etc., II, 42.
T. Obuchowi.cz' s letter to L. Sapieha, Manashyn,
May 22, 1649, ibid., II, 29.
27Journal of W. Miaskowski, Hoshcha, March 7, 1649, m  . 
Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 385.
O Q  *
See Anonymous letter to A. Szoldrski, Warsaw, March 
23, 1649, and A. Kysil's letter to B. Khmelnytskyi [Hoscha, 
late March or early April, 1649], in O jczyste spominki 
etc., II, 16, 30-32; Revelations of Kozak prisoners, 
Treshyn, April 18, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 
387; and M. Golinski, MS. B.Z,N.Ossol., 189, f. 210.
29Senate Council, Warsaw, June 4, 1649, m  Jakuba 
M ichalowskiego etc., p. 406.
30L. Miaskowski's letter to Anonymous, [Kamianets?], 
April 23, 1649, ibid., p. 389.
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movement was also supported actively by Rusin nobles, clergy 
31
and burgesses. In April Khmelnytskyi announced the 
final orders for a general mobilization of his forces. His 
manifestoes designated all regiments to concentrate at 
Mcisliv ' Stav.^^
H
So far Khmelnytskyi was successful in "lulling the
Commonwealth to sleep with the hope of peace and uncertain 
33negotiations". By May he was ready; he had no further 
need of his mask. Early in June there was no question 
about his true motives and plans eveij. in Warsaw. The royal 
envoy Smiarowski reported that Khmelnytskyi received him 
indignantly, treated him with contempt and showed no 
respect for the letter of the king. Furthermore, the
31See W. Miaskowski1s letter to Anonymous, Novosilka, 
February 1, 1649, and the Journal of W. Miaskowski, Pereia- 
slav, February 26, 1649, ibid., pp. 365, 383, See also 
Commissioners' report to Jan Kazimierz, Vasylkiv, February 
11, 1649, in Ojczyste spominki etc., II, 10-12; M. Golinski, 
MS. B.ZCN. Ossol., 189, f, 210; and J. Jerlicz, Latopisiec 
etc., 2 vols. (Warsaw, 1853), I, 95-96.
3 2 .See the various reports, despatches and letters m
Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 45, 54, 58 (Dopolneniia);
VIII, 289, 294-95; Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 389, 397;
and in Ojczyste spominki etc., II, 17.
33S. Lanckoronski’s letter to the Deputy Judge of Lviv 
[Manachyn], May 5, 1649, in Ojczyste spominki etc., II, 19.
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astonished royal envoy heard a declaration of war. Khmel­
nytskyi stated that no further compromise was possible;
"two walls will collide: one will fall in; the other will
remain standing". In Smiarowski1s opinion, the hostilities 
could only be prevented if the government consented to
humour Khmelnytskyi with the creation of a "sovereign
34
Principality of Rus".
Already in February 1649 Khmelnytskyi —  this
35"Zaporozhian Machiavelli" -- revealed to the commissioners
that "by the will of God" he became "the independent ruler 
3 6of Rus". Yet, at that time he still considered himself 
to be a "loyal" subject of the Polish King. Three months 
later, however, he decided to sever even this weak link 
with the Commonwealth, for he refused to acknowledge alle­
giance to Jan Kazimierz. This he revealed to the Muscovite 
envoy Gii^orii Unkovskii in the following form:
In Poland and in Lithuania Jan Kazimierz was elected 
king. . . . and the Poles and the Lithuanians crowned
34Senate Councils, Warsaw, June 4, 1649; and 
Olszewski's report [Taikury, May 25, 1649], in Jakuba 
M ichalowskiego etc., pp. 3 97, 405-06.
O C
Letter of T. Obuchowicz to[L. Sapieha?] , Taikury, 
May 25, 1649, ibid., p. 396.
■^^Journal of W. Miaskowski, Pereiaslav, February 22, 
1649, in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 108.
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him and swore fealty to him, and the king swore an oath
to them, and God delivered us from them. The king was
neither elected nor crowned by us . Vie have not kissed
the cross [i.e., swore by the cross]for him. And they
had neither written nor notified us about this; and in
this way, by the will of God, we have gained freedom
from them. . . . And we do not wish to remain under
37their subjection and m  their bondage.
Thus, in all the Orthodox churches within the terri­
tories controlled by the Kozaks, the Orthodox faithful
38
ceased to recite the king s name in their common prayers.
All traces of the former magnate rule were slowly disappea- 
39
ring. Khmelnytskyi aimed to unite all Rusin ethnic terri­
tories within such boundaries as were ruled by the Kievan
, . 40grand princes.
Even the greatest optimist among the "peace party" 
began to realize that such "madness" of Khmelnytskyi must 
be checked. The king called his ministers to counsel, how
37G. Unkovskii's report to the Muscovite Government, 
C'hyhyryn, April 29, 1649, ibid. , II, 152, 154.
O Q
J See I. P. Krypiakevych, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (Kiev, 
1954), p. 338.
■R 9See the various letters and report to the Muscovite 
Government in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 211, 227, 
232, 235, 242, 21 (Dopolneniia) .
^ S e e  G. Unkovskii's report to the Muscovite Government 
(1649), in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., II, 154.
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"to save and to protect the institutions of the Father­
land, . . . because not only the sleeve of the gown, or the
gown itself is at stake, but the whole body of the Father- 
41
land" . Realizing that the armies of the Commonwealth 
would be matched against the "fearless soldiers" of the 
Kozak Army, the government sought as many troops as possible. 
German mercenaries were to be recruited; Prussian regiments 
were ordered to march south; all existing troops were to 
mass together; and a general call to arms was issued for 
the gentry.
In order to gain military aid, diplomatic support
<
and to secure confirmation of various treaties, envoys were
dispatched from Warsaw to Muscovy, Sweden, Transylvania, the
42
Empire, the Holy See, S p a m  and France. All these efforts
came too late. In hope of peace with the Kozaks, Jan
Kazimierz demobilized many regiments; now he had no time to
43
build a strong army. Thus, as the term of the armistice 
expired, the Commonwealth was "neither prepared for war nor
^ J a n  Kazimierz1s summons of the Senators, Warsaw, May 
E>, 1649, in Ojczyste spominki etc., II, 20.
42
See the Senate Councils, Warsaw, June 4, 1649, in 
Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 408; and Kubala, Jerzy 
Ossolinski, op. cit., p. 351.
43 . . . .
See K. F. Obuchowicz, "Dyaryusz Kazimierza Filipa
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for peace negotiations".
The government still tried to gain time in order to 
reiise a strong army. It thus proposed to Khmelnytskyi to 
extend the term of armistice from May 22 to July 1st. The 
other steps it took were desperate. The royal envoy 
Sniarowski was sent to bribe the Kozak colonels. Kysil also 
wrote letters to them in an attempt to discredit Khmelnyts­
kyi and to turn them against him. All these attempts 
failed: Khmelnytskyi would not hear any arguments against
the extension of the truce; the Kozak officers did not desert 
their leader; there was no mutiny in the Kozak Army. Khmel­
nytskyi retained his command and his iron grip on the Army
45
and Smiarowski paid for the provocation with his life.
Obuchowicza Wojewody Smolenskiego i Marszalka Kola Rycer- 
skiego", in Pamietniki historyczne etc., (Vilnius, 1859), 
p. 28.
44A. Kysil's letter to J. Ossolinski, Hoshcha, May 11, 
1649, in Ojczyste spominki etc., II, 21.
45See H. Pmocci's report on Khmelnytskyi and the Kozaks 
(1654); Anonymous letter to A. Szoldrski, Warsaw, March 23, 
1649; A. Kysil's letters to J. Ossolinski and to the Kozak 
Colonels, Hoshcha, May 11, 15 and 18, 1649; and K. Przyjem- 
ski's letter to A. Kysil, Zviahel, June 15, 1649, ibid., I 
142; II, 14, 21-23, 24-26, 26-29, 45-46. See also the 
Senate Councils, Warsaw, June 6 , 1649, in Jakuba Michalow­
skiego etc., p. 404; B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to Jan 
Kazimierz, Zboriv, August 16, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana 
Khmelnytskoho etc., p. 125; and Jerlicz, op.‘ cit. , I, 98.
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Hostilities were resumed by both sides even before 
May 22. Khmelnytskyi sent various regiments to harass the 
Crown Army; at the same time he massed his troops near Bila 
Tserkva and awaited the arrival of his Tatar allies.
The forces of the Commonwealth were grouped in three
divisions. The first was commanded by the new Regimentaries,
Castellan of Belz, Andrzej Firlej and Castellan of
Kamianets, Stanislaw Lanckoronski. It was engaged in
sporadic skirmishes in the region of Sluch and Horyn Rivers.
As the Kozak-serf pressure mounted, this division was forced
to withdraw westward and finally to seek shelter of Zbarazh,
a fortress in Podolia. There it was strengthened by the
arrival of several magnate regiments and finally by the
private army of Prince Jeremi Wisniowiecki. Wisniowiecki
soon became the de facto commander of the troops. The second
division, commanded by King Jan Kazimierz, acted as a
reserve and marched to the aid of the first. The third
division, comprising troops of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania
and commanded by Field Hetman Prince Janusz Radziwill, was
46
poxsed to enter Ukraine from the northeast.
46See the various despatches, letters and reports m  
Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 315., 325, 392, 45, 48,
54, 58, 71 (Dopolneniia); VIII, 289, 294-95; X, 243;
Ojczyste spominki etc., II, 37-50, 57-58- and in Jakuba 
Michalowskiego etc., pp. 398, 409-10.
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Late in May the whole Kozak Army was on the move.
By July 10 the Kozak-Tatar forces appeared before the walls
of Zbarazh. As the siege began, the assaults at the
fortress and the defence of it were characterized by unparal-
47
lelled acts of bravery. During this siege Khmelnytskyi 
received disturbing news. The Kozak forces in the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania were routed, and Radziwill, whom he 
expected to remain passive, was preparing to march south.
At the same time he learned that Jan Kazimierz was also 
marching towards Zbarazh to save the besieged first 
division.
t
Khmelnytskyi could not allow himself to be trapped 
between two fires. He reacted quickly by dividing his army 
into three parts and assigning to each a specific task. A 
strong force under Colonel Stanislav Krychevskyi marched 
into Grand Duchy of Lithuania. His mission was to prevent 
Radziwill's penetration into Ukraine. On July 31 a battle 
was fought near Loeu, on the Dnieper, and the Kozaks 
suffered a disastrous defeat. Krychevskyi, however,
47 On the siege of Zbarazh (July 10 to August 22, 1649) 
see the following accounts found in Akty otnosiashchiesia 
etc., Ill, 392-93; Ojczyste spominki etc., II, 53-58;
Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 413,- 428, 448-70. See also 
Kubala, Szkice historyczne, op. cit., pp. 73-88, 105-09, 
116-18; and Gob! a, op. cit. , pp. 118-19.
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accomplished his mission; for the Lithuanian troops suffered 
so many casualties that Radziwill thought it unwise to 
march south.^
The second part of Khmelnytskyi1s army continued to 
1ay siege to Zbarazh. Although the fortress repulsed all 
attacks, its defenders were in a desperate state: their
ranks were decimated; they were short of food supplies and of 
ammunition1. Thus, the issue of the campaign was to be 
decided by the clash between the third Kozak force under 
Khmelnytskyi himself, together with the Tatars led by Khan 
Islam III, and the division commanded by the king. It was 
this division that the Kozak.-Tatar allies sped to intercept.
King Jan Kazimierz departed from Warsaw on June 
24; and on July 3 he entered Lublin. If he had previously 
any misgivings about the whole campaign, he gained more and 
more confidence upon his arrival in Lublin. His envoys 
returned from Muscovy and from Transylvania, and informed 
him that neither country would support the Kozaks. Lupul 
of Moldavia, himself a born intriguer, was never a true 
ally of Khmelnytskyi and would not hesitate to turn against
48On the Battle of Loeu (July 31, 1649) see the 
following accounts: Lipinski, op. cit., pp.*284-322, 355-69; 
and Kotlubaj, op. cit., pp. 140-48, 367-71, 416-19.
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him if he could profit by it. The.Hospodar of Walachia 
was more concerned in keeping his throne secure than to 
embark on an uncertain adventure. Furthermore, the 
Venetian envoy announced that his countrymen won a resoun­
ding naval victory over the Turks at the Dardanelles.
Under these circumstances, the High Porte would not 
da.re to permit the Tatars to support the Kozaks or to make 
any plans about invasion of the Commonwealth. There were 
also despatches for the king: these announced the early
victories of both the Crown and the Lithuanian armies over 
the Kozaks. Jan Kazimierz now did not need to fear about 
the intentions of Radziwill. This magnate, upon learning
of the adverse predicaments of Khmelnytskyi, would have no
49
other choice but to march against the Kozaks.
These reports and the advice of Ossolinski made Jan
49See G. Rakoczy's letter to Jan Kazimierz, Alba lulia, 
June 4, and M. Ostrorog's letter to J. Ossolinski, Zbarazh, 
July 3, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 398-99, 
410-12; Despatches from Kamianets [ca. end of June], from 
Lublin, July 14, 1649, in Ojczyste spominki etc., II,
51-52, 62; Aleksei Mikhailovich's letter to Jan Kazimierz, 
Moscow, May 18, 1649, in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill 
309-11; J. Radziwill's letter to Jan Kazimierz, Kaz.
Slaboda, June 28, and Jan Kazimierz's letter to J. Radziwill, 
Lublin, July 13, 1649, in Kotlubaj, "Dodatki" [Appendices], 
op. cit., pp. 365-67, 357; Radziwill, op. cit., II, 277-80; 
Latacz, op. cit., p. 4; and W. Rudawski, Historia polska 
etc., 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1855), I, 80.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 0 4
Kazimierz overconfident. He ordered Radziwill to lay waste
to Ukraine and to capture Kiev; in the meantime, he would
50
deal with Khmelnytskyi himself. Another rash act on the
king's part was to march against the vastly superior forces
of the enemy with insufficient intelligence and strength.
Ossolinski did not wish to expose the king to the
tumultuous gentry. Their military worthlessness was clearly
shown at the Battle of Pyliavtsi; furthermore, the king might
have to change his plans under their pressure, and now there
was no time for that. He advised the king to rely more on
foreign mercenaries and the various contingents of the mag- 
51nates. Jan Kazimierz agreed. He thus called to his colours
only the gentry militia of the Palatinates of Rus, Belz and
Lublin, which were nearest to the base of operations; the
52rejst were to report a month hence. Obviously, he did not 
want their presence, for he considered the campaign to be 
terminated by that time. Later, when the danger became 
obvious to him, the king did issue the customary third call.
50See Jan Kazimierz1s letter to J. Radziwill, Lublin,
July 13, 1649, in Kotlubaj, "Dodatki", op. cit., pp. 357-58.
51See Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, op. cit., pp. 355-57.
See Jan Kazimierz's manifesto to the nobles, Lublin,
July 13, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 414-15.
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to arms to all the gentry; by that time, however, it was 
53too late.
Having made up his mind to proceed to the rescue of
the first division at Zbarazh, Jan Kazimierz marched on
without being able to gather the necessary information about
the activities of the enemy. He discredited all despatches
which stated that Khmelnytskyi was supported by many 
54
Tatars. The reports of various Kozak prisoners, and
55
others, were conflicting, but on the whole encouraging; The
despatches from Grand Duchy of Lithuania announced that
56Radziwill was on his way to Kiev.
His advisers assured him that Khmelnytskyi would 
not dare to resist the will of anointed monarch, the 
representative of God upon earth. The very presence of 
the king among the troops would strike fear into the hearts 
of the serfs. The Rusin burgesses would open the gates 
of their towns at his command without so much as a
53 .See Kubala, Jerzy Ossolinski, op. cit., p. 359.
54See A. Trzebicki's letter to Anonymous, Sokal [ca.
July 31, 1649], in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 424-25.
55See the various letters in ibid., pp. 421-26, 429-31.
56See A. Szoldrski's letter to Anonymous, Poznan, August 
9, 1648, ibid., p. 430.
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57
murmur. In his manifestoes to the Rusin populace the
king thus promised the grant of amnesty and the restoration
of all liberties, if they abandoned Khmelnytskyi. The
Kozak hetman was declared a traitor and an enemy of the
state, and a price was placed on his headi He was replaced
by the Kozak Semen Zabuskyi, whom the king appointed to
59command the Kozak Army after great ceremonies.
By the end of the first week of August Jan Kazimierz 
weis notified that the defenders of the Zbarazh fortress 
were in a desperate situation. The king, even though he 
knew by this time that the Tatar khan supported the Kozaks 
at Zbarazh with all his hordes, decided not to wait for 
the gentry militia to assemble in full force, but to press 
with his relatively small army to Zbarazh.^0 In doing 
so he led his army into a skillfully-prepared ambush near
^ S e e  Radziw.il! , op. cit. , II, 378; Rudawski, op. cit. ,
I, 76; and V. Kochowski, Annalium Poloniae etc., 4 vols 
(Krakow, 1683), I, 69.
^ S e e  M. Golinski, MS. B ,Z,N.Ossol., 189 f. 264.
59See Radziwill, op. ext., II, 368; and Rudawski, op. 
cit., I , 83.
^ S e e  A. Szoldrski's letter to Anonymous, Poznan,
August 9, 1649; and Regimentaries1 letter to Jan Kazimierz 
[ca. early August, 1649], in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., 
pp. 430, 428-29.
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■ 61 Zboriv.
On August 15 the royal army was crossing the River 
Strypa. The main part of the army, as it approached the 
river, was attacked by a Kozak-Tatar force from the rear 
and both flanks. Since its progress forward was blocked by 
the great variety of vehicles in the baggage train and then 
by the river, this part of the army had no chance at all 
to make an organized stand against the enemy. As a terrible 
confusion resulted, these troops were systematically 
decimated. Following this massacre the victors siezed the 
baggage train and most of the guns.
r
Meanwhile, that part of the army which crossed the 
river also came under a surprise attack, but was in a 
better position to organize a hasty defense. Nevertheless, 
some regiments faltered under the pressure of the superior 
strength of the enemy and began to retreat in confusion. 
During these critical moments the king made frantic efforts 
to inspire his army to resist. Moved by his gallantry,
^ O n  the Battle of Zboriv (August 15 to 16 1649) see the 
following accounts: Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 409- 
10; Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 435-39; and M. Golinski, 
MS. B.Z.N.Ossol., 189, f. 267. See also Kubala, Szkice 
historyczne, op. cit., pp. 88-105, 119-22; Gorka, op. cit.,
119-21; and L. Fras, "Bitwa pod Zborowem w r. 1649", 
Kwartalnik Historyczny, XLVI (nos. 3-4, 1932), 350-70.
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the soldiers rallied to defense.
At sunset the fighting ceased. During the night 
Jan Kazimierz again managed to calm his panicky troops, 
many of whom were on a verge of flight after hearing rumors 
that the king and their leaders planned to desert them. As 
order was restored, the king commanded that stronger forti­
fication be erected around the camp. "For several hundred 
of years neither Poland nor any king had been in such 
straits as on August 15" remarked one participant of the 
battle. "It almost came to the repetition of disasters at
Varna or Legnica, or of the times when the Tatar Batu Khan
62
lived twelve weeks in Krakow".
During the night more Kozak troops arrived. By 
dawn, on August 16, the royal army was surrounded, and 
assaults were renewed mainly by the Kozaks, for the main 
Tatar horde received orders from the khan not to take part 
in the fighting. The royal troops continued to resist these 
attacks, but in the process of fighting suffered heavy 
casualties. By noon, as the fighting subsided, the morale 
of these soldiers was low, for they realized that their
/■
W. Miaskowski1s letter to Anonymous, Zboriv, August 
22, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p . *439.
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position was almost hopeless. Jan‘Kazimierz also saw the 
dangerous position. He therefore, decided to extricate his 
army from an impending disaster by negotiating peace with 
the enemy.
Ill
During the night of August 15, following the
critical moments of the first day of the battle, King Jan
Kazimierz assembled his council of war. The king, his
ministers and other high-ranking officers discussed various
courses of action. In the end they agreed that the plan of
the Crown Grand Chancellor would save them all. Jerzy
Ossolinski sought to create a rift between the Kozaks and
the Tatars. He believed that Khan Islam III would be
induced by suitable concessions to withdraw the Tatar
support from the Kozaks, and perhaps even to turn his hordes 
63
against them.
At the conclusion of the meeting Jan Kazimierz sent 
a messenger with his letter to Islam III. The king wrote 
that he was dismayed that the khan should support his rebel 
subjects, especially when there were no causes for
^ S e e  Rudawski, op. cit. , I, 84-85; and V. Golobutskii, 
Diplomaticheskaia istoriia etc (Kiev, 1962), p. 205.
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hostilities between Crimea and the1Commonwealth. He assured
the khan of his friendship and reminded him that the late
King Wladyslaw IV was extremely kind to him. The king also
proposed to the Tatar ruler that negotiations be started
64 •
and offered him suitable indemnities.
Islam III was interested in the proposals of Jan
Kazimierz. The khan therefore replied that he was prepared
to extend his own friendship to the king. At the same time
he reproached the king for his failure to notify him that
he was elected the King of Poland. But the khan decided to
overlook this lack of tact, and requested the king to send
his chancellor to confer with his own vezir on matters of
65
mutual interest.
After being informed about the khan1s demands by his
envoy, Jan Kazimierz answered that he agreed to accept them
and that he would send his chancellor to a designated place
between the two armies. He also urged the khan to stop all
66hostilities without delay.
64See Jan Kazimierz1s letter to Islam III, Zboriv, August 
15, 1649, in Pamiatinki etc., 4 vols (Kiev, 1845), I, 3, 454- 
55.
65
See Islam Ill's letter to Jan Kazimierz, Zboriv,
August 15, 1649, ibid., I, 3, 456-58.
66See Jan Kazimierz1s letter to Islam III, Zboriv,
August 16, 1649, ibid., I, 3, 459-60.
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At sunset on August 16, as.the fighting of the 
second day of the battle subsided, Jerzy Ossolinski and 
Sefer Gazi Aga met for the first round of negotiations. The 
vezir then made the following demands: the Tatars will have 
the right to plunder and to take prisoners along their 
return march to Crimea; and they will be paid ransom for 
the king's army and tribute due to them for several years.
He: also stated that the khan wished that the Kozaks be 
pacified, that a territorial autonomy be guaranteed to them, 
that their quota be increased to forty thousand and that 
they be paid for their services. At this point the nego­
tiations were suspended because Ossolinski wanted time to 
discuss these demands with the king. Jan Kazimierz, how­
ever, had little choice but to accept them. Moreover, as 
the negotiations resumed on August 17, he even agreed to a 
new demand that additional ransom be paid to the Tatars by 
the defenders of Zbarazh. On the following day both sides 
prepared the texts of their agreements. On August 19 the 
signed copies of the treaty were exchanged between the king 
and the khan.^
r  '-j
See the anonymous journal (1649), in Akty otnosiash- 
chiesia etc., Ill, 412-13; W. Miaskowski's letter to
Anonymous, Zboriv, August 22, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego 
etc., pp. 437-38 (a more complete text oJ~ a similar letter
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 1 2
Both Jan Kazimierz and Khan Islam III agreed to 
maintain peace between their states and to give mutual 
support against their common enemies. The king pledged 
himself to observe the following terms: never to wage war 
against the Ottoman Empire; to pay annual tribute to the 
Khan; to recognize Tatar pasture rights along the northern 
shores of'the Black Sea; and to permit the Tatars an unob­
structed passage to Crimea through the south-eastern 
peilatinates of the Commonwealth. Jan Kazimierz also pledged 
to grant amnesty to all Kozaks, to confirm Khmelnytskyi’s 
post as Hetman of the Kozak Army, to restore all Kozak 
rights and liberties and to ensure that they no longer 
suffered injustice from officials and nobles. In turn, the 
khan pledged to cause the least possible damage to the terri­
tories the Tatars passed en route to Crimea and to forbid
68all his subjects to make incursions into the Commonwealth.
is listed in Kubala's "Dodatki" [Appendices], Szkice histor- 
yczne, op . cit., pp. 119-22, but the dates are different 
from the two accounts cited above); and Gorka, op. cit.,
pp. 120-21.
For the treaties between Jan Kazimierz and Islam III, 
Zboriv, August 19, 1649, see Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 
413-15; and Kubala, "Dodatki", Szkice historyczne, op. cit., 
p. 122. The Muscovite envoy to the Commonwealth was con­
vinced that a secret alliance was concluded between the king 
and the khan directed against Muscovy. See G. Kunakov's 
report to the Department of Foreign Affairs (1649), in
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These shameful and difficult conditions clearly 
indicate that Ossolinski did not effect a split between the 
Kozaks and the Tatars. Nevertheless, Khmelnytskyi was sur­
prised that the khan decided to negotiate with the king, 
whom he intended to capture, send to Crimea and then to 
negotiate an enormous sum for his ransom. Obviously, Islam 
III now changed his mind because he decided that he would 
gain more by negotiations. It was certainly not in his 
favour to have one of the hostile sides completely over­
power the other. The khan also favoured the old device of 
divide et impera.
It was therefore for a definite reason that his 
main horde did not take part in the second day's battle. He 
was content to watch the Christian "infidels" as they 
attempted to destroy each other, and decided to intervene 
only when it became obvious that the Kozaks would emerge 
victorious. At this time he ordered Khmelnytskyi to cease 
hostilities and to begin negotiations with the king. 
Khmelnytskyi therefore had little choice but to yield to 
the pressure of the Tatar ruler. Were he to refuse to heed
Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 404-05. Nothing of the
sort is mentioned in other sources, including the Tatar 
chronicle. See Gorka, op. cit., p. 121.
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the khan, he faced the possibility of the Tatars turning
, . 69
against him.
Khmelnytskyi was already contacted by the king on
August 15. Jan Kazimierz declared in his letter that he
was astonished that Khmelnytskyi dared to lift the sword
against him, the anointed representative of God. He
ordered Khmelnytskyi to stop all fighting and to withdraw
his troops from the field of battle. Once he complied with
this order, he should send his envoys with Kozak grievances.
At this time the king would appoint a commission to resolve
all difficulties. Jan Kazimierz promised that if
Khmelnytskyi heeded him, he would do everything in his power
70
to restore the Kozak rights and liberties.
Khmelnytskyi's answer to the king was delivered 
together with the khan's letter. The Kozak hetman claimed 
that both he and his father were always faithful servants of 
the Crown. He did not take up arms against the king; on 
the contrary, this was his last resort to seek justice from
69See G. Kunakov's report to the Department of Foreign 
Affairs (1649), in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 395; 
and Gorka, op. cit. , pp. 120-21.
70
See Jan Kazimierz's letter to B. Khmelnytsky, Zboriv, 
August 15, 1649. Cited by Hrushevskyi, op. ‘cit., VIII, 3, 
199-200.
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the tyranny of the magnates. Khmelnytskyi emphasized that
he: would gladly place himself under the protection of the
king and would obey his commands to the letter, were it not
for the lawlessness of the nobles, who wielded more power
than their own monarch. He concluded his' remarks to the king
by repeating the proposal he made at Zamostia: the Kozaks
want to serve the king faithfully and want to free him from
71the bondage of the "kinglets".
Jan Kazimierz responded the following day by admonish­
ing Khmelnytskyi for the fate of his envoy Jakob Smiarowski, 
but the king was even willing to overlook this atrocity. He 
offered Khmelnytskyi another chance to earn royal favour and 
to keep his post of Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army. Jan 
Kazimierz proposed that Khmelnytskyi carry out several con­
ditions. Khmelnytskyi must swear an oath of fealty; and he 
must prove himself a loyal subject by ceasing to carry on 
relations with foreign rulers, by pledging not to stir the
serfs, by withdrawing all his troops from the battle area and
72
by sending all the serfs back to their homes. Khmelnytskyi1s
71See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letter to Jan Kazimierz, Zboriv, 
August 15, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., pp. 
122-23.
72See Jan Kazimierz's letter to B. Khmelnytskyi, Zboriv, 
August 16, 1649. Cited by Hrushevskyi, ■ -p. cit., VIII, 3, 
203-04.
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answer was delivered to the king the same day. He explained
in detail why Smiarowski deserved his fate, and added that
he was prepared to discuss all other matters with the Crown
73
Grand Chancellor.
Khmelnytskyi did appear during the second round of 
Ossolinski-Sefer Gazi negotiations. At this time he attem­
pted to introduce Kozak matters into discussion. Ossolinski,
however, told him to prepare all his demands in writing and
74to submit them to the king. Khmelnytskyi followed this 
instruction by sending Kozak envoys with two letters. In 
his own letter Khmelnytskyi assured the king of his loyalty
f
and asked him for a personal favour: capital punishment for
75his enemy Daniel Czaplinski. The other letter had the 
form of an eighteen-article petition of the Zaporozhian 
Army to the king, which was to serve as the basis for the
7 3See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letter to Jan Kazimierz, Zboriv, 
August 16, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., 
pp. 124-25.
7  A
'See W. Miaskowski's letter to Anonymous, Zboriv,
August 22, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 438; Anon­
ymous journal (1649), in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill,
413; and Hrushevskyi, op. cit., VIII, 3, 206.
75See B. Khmelnytskyi1s letter to Jan Kazimierz, Zboriv, 
August 17, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., 
pp. 126-27.
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Jan Kazimierz gave his verbal assurances to the 
KC'Zak envoys that the petition would receive his consider­
ation. He made similar promises in a letter to Khmelnyt­
skyi, adding that he would send the commissioners as soon
as possible. He again emphasized that all troops and field
77
artillery.must be withdrawn. On August 18 Khmelnytskyi 
answered that he was delighted that finally all the diffi­
culties would be settled amicably. He had already removed
the guns; he had not yet withdrawn his troops because of
7 8
the danger from the roving bands of Tatars.
On the same day Ossolinski and other commissioners 
began to negotiate with Khmelnytskyi. Late at night the 
terms of peace were finally agreed upon by the two sides.
On August 19 Khmelnytskyi was called to take an oath. The 
commissioners had considerable difficulty in administering
7 6
See the Petition of the Zaporozhian Army to Jan 
Kazimierz, Zboriv, August 17, 1648, ibid., pp. 128-30.
77See the Anonymous journal (1649), in Akty otnosiash- 
chiesia etc., Ill, 413. Jan Kazimierz's letter to B.
Khmelnytskyi has perished. It is evident from Khmelnytskyi 
letter to the king of August 18 (see n. 78 below) that he 
did write such a letter and made these comments.
7 8See B. Khmelnytskyi's letter to Jan Kgzimierz, Zboriv 
August 18, 1649, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc., 
pp. 131-32.
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the oath to Khmelnytskyi, because he demanded that the king
take a similar oath and that his enemy, Daniel Czaplinski,
be: immediately surrendered to him. Next day the whole
proceedings ended with a ceremony in the king's tent.
Khmelnytskyi appeared before Jan Kazimierz did homage to him
79
and asked for his pardon. Finally, with the lifting of
the siege of Zbarazh on August 22 , the whole campaign
80
Ccime to an end.
The agreement concluded at Zboriv between Jan
Kazimierz and the Commonwealth, on the one side, and Bohdan
Khmelnytskyi and the Zaporozhian Army, on the other, was
de facto a treaty. Officially, however, it was regarded
only as an act of royal grace: the king merely consented to
approve the petitions of his subjects. Its official name
was "A Declaration of His Royal Majesty's Grace, given [in
response to] the Articles of Petition of the Zaporozhian 
81
Army".
79See W. Miaskowski's letter to Anonymous, Zboriv, August 
22, 1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., pp. 438-39; and the 
anonymous journal (1649), in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc.,
Ill, 413.
80See the anonymous diary on the siege of Zbarazh (1649), 
in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc., p. 469.
R1 For the full text of the Treaty of Zboriv see Appendix
I.
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The 1 Declaration" was divided into three main parts. 
Articles 1, 2, 3, 6 , 7 and 11 dealt exclusively with Kozak 
ma.tters. The chief provisions of these articles were the 
following: all former rights and liberties of the Zaporo­
zhian Army were restored; the king issued a separate charter
82in confirmation of this article; The new quota of the 
registered Kozaks was raised to forty thousand; Kozak terri­
tories roughly comprised the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav 
and Chernihiv; neither the Crown Army nor the Jews were to 
have access into areas where Kozak regiments were stationed; 
the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army was responsible for the 
preparation of the new register; and'he was granted the 
district of Chyhyryn.
Articles 4 and 5 stated that all Kozaks and their 
supporters were granted a general amnesty. Articles 8 , 9 
and 10 dealt with other matters. All questions dealing with 
the abolition of the Uniate Church and with the restoration 
of the rights and the benefices to the Orthodox Church were 
to be discussed at the forthcoming Diet. The metropolitan
8 2
See Jan Kazimierz’s charter to the Zaporozhian Army,
Zboriv, August 18, 1649, in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., X,
453-54. This charter is incorrectly dated August 18, 1650. 
This must have been a simple case of a clerk's slip of the 
pen as this charter was entered into the Kievan records.
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bishop of Kiev was to receive a seat in the Senate. All 
offices in the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv 
were to be restricted to nobles of the Orthodox faith. The 
Jesuits were neither to reside nor to found schools through­
out Ukraine. Finally, all these articles were to be rati­
fied by the Diet.
The aims, desires and slogans of the Kozaks and of 
the Rusin people found their expression —  at least in 
part —  in the terms of the Treaty of Zboriv. This treaty 
was not a complete failure. On the contrary, it was a bold 
experiment. The following analysis will show that the 
individuals who draughted the terms of the Treaty of Zboriv 
attempted at once to solve the pressing Kozak problem and to 
remedy the chief aims of the Rusin society as a whole.
In the past the government of the Commonwealth never
made such sweeping concessions to the Kozaks as it had by
83
the Treaty of Zboriv. This m  itself was a useful prece­
dent for the future. Articles 1 and 2 of the treaty, as 
well as the royal charter, fulfilled the aims and satisfied 
the interests of all those in the ranks of the Kozak Army.
83In the view of E. Latacz, these concessions were made 
to the Kozaks because Jan Kazimierz wanted to gain their 
support for his planned war with the Turks. See Latacz, 
op. cit. , pp. 6-7.
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The Commonwealth retained the registered Kozaks in its 
service and their quota was increased from six thousand to
the nominal figure of forty thousand. They secured the 
repeal of the draconic Ordinance of 1638. Thus, this meant 
that they regained such rights as their military self-govern­
ment and the election of their own officers. Jan Kazimierz 
also issued a special charter which confirmed all former 
Kozak liberties.
Ukraine gained political autonomy within the frame­
work of the Commonwealth. Its new status was stressed by 
the royal charter and articles 2, 6 , 7 and 9 of the treaty. 
Comprising the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv, 
the new Kozak territories were to be ruled by the Hetman of 
the Zaporozhian Army. By the virtue of his office he 
assumed great powers. Kozak troops were responsible for the 
defense of their lands; and the Crown Army was denied access 
to them. As the Kozaks gained control of Ukraine, their 
military system of government and administration was intro­
duced. Thus, a kind of military republic was born. Its 
links with Warsaw were very weak. Even these links empha­
sized the autonomy of Ukraine, for only Rusin nobles of 
Orthodox faith were eligible to hold appointments within it.
Articles 8 and 10 of the treaty were further
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expanded by a special royal charter issued in Warsaw on 
January 12, 1650. It stressed that "all the Rusin people"
—  churchmen and laymen, nobles and commoners —  retained 
their national, religious and cultural rights and liberties 
throughout the Commonwealth. The Orthodox Church was guaran­
teed its rights; the Orthodox clergy were granted a number 
of concessions; and the Orthodox faithful were promised 
freedom of worship. Special reference was made to the rights 
of the burgesses. Finally, all Rusin schools and printing
84
presses were permitted to function without any obstruction.
No concessions of importance were made to the serfs, 
because neither the ruling class nor 'the Kozaks intended to 
liberate them.
The circumstances surrounding the agreements reached 
at Zboriv by all the combattants were highly unusual. Khan 
Islam III emerged as the central figure. By concluding a 
separate peace with King Jan Kazimierz, the khan betrayed 
his Kozak allies. Moreover, he "mediated" peace between Jan 
Kazimierz and Bohdan Khmelnytskyi, and became the guarantor 
of the terms of the treaty between the King of Poland and 
his subjects. The khan therefore made the real gains at the
R4See Hrushevskyi, op. cit., VIII, 3, 262-63.
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expense of the two combattants. Apart from the enormous 
ransom, renewal of the payment of tribute, great amount of 
plunder and the useful alliances, he left the two warring 
sides in a weakend position and still hostile to each other. 
Furthermore, he secured permission from the king to plunder 
and to sieze captives from the Rusin ethnic territories.
This Khmelnytskyi previously would not allow to him.^~*
The treaty of Zboriv between Jan Kazimierz and the 
Commonwealth, on the one side, and Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and 
the Zaporozhian Army, on the other, was built on very weak 
foundations. Both sides were compelled to accept its 
terms: the Polish king, by the exigencies of war; the Kozak 
hetman, by Tatar threats of retalliation. Neither side was 
satisfied with the treaty. Most of the Commonwealth1s 
nobles considered its terms humiliating. These terms also 
neither corresponded with the actual successes of Kozak 
arms, nor satisfied the expectations of the Rusin society, 
especially the serfs. It was clear to all that the treaty 
was merely a temporary arrangement and that the issues would 
have to be resolved once more in the near future by the force 
of arms.
I
See Gorka, op. cit. , p. 115.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
The religious persecution, the economic exploitation 
and the varying degrees of oppression of all classes of the 
Rusin people within the Polish-Lithuanian state, combined 
with the degeneration of the "Commonwealth of the gentry", 
caused a terrible conflict in 1648 and in 1649. Some nobles 
of the Commonwealth described these beginning years of the 
reign of King Jan Kazimierz as the "Initium Calamitatis 
Reipublicae". ^  It was a suitable label for a period during
I
which their Commonwealth experienced many serious reversals. 
True, the Commonwealth managed, to survive the worst ravages 
of the storm: fluctuat nec mergitur. But in the process 
the Commonwealth also received unparalleled military, poli­
tical and ideological blows, as well as incalculable extre­
mely severe wounds.
There were many shades of opinion among the contem­
poraries about the causes and tie issues of the conflict 
within the Commonwealth. Most of those who searched for
pun on the royal cipher I.C.R. (loannes Casimirus Rex) 
which appeared on coins.
224
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answers as to the cause of the conflict, or who sought to 
find explanations for the great calamities, invariably 
concluded that God punished them for their sins, especially 
for their ill-treatment of serfs. Most of those contem­
poraries who attempted to analyse the nature of the conflict 
generally stressed its social aspect. In their correspon­
dence, diaries and memoirs, they described some kind of 
antithesis between the nobles on the one hand, and the serfs 
on the other. But still there were those who saw the real 
issues of the great conflict. They admitted that the 
struggle within the Commonwealth concerned the Rusin people, 
who for the most part were fighting for three main goals: 
political independence, religious freedom and socio-economic 
improvement. There was, however, little disagreement among 
the contemporaries on two points: that the Kozaks played a 
decisive role in the struggle; and that the greatest enemy 
of the Commonwealth was that "Zaporozhian Machiavelli" —  
Bohdan Khmelnytskyi.
Bohdan Khmelnytskyi was an individual of exeptional 
genius. It was he who managed to unite the "perfidious" 
Kozaks, the "traitorous" nobles, the "conspirant" clergy, 
the "senseless" and "embittered" burgesses and the "blood­
thirsty" serfs —  all the social strata of the Rusin people.
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For all these people, who represen,ted conflicting interests, 
he found a common aim. He alone managed not only to demand 
obedience from them, but also to hand out punishment to 
them. He was a talented military commander, an able admini­
strator and, above all, extremely dexterous diplomat. Much 
of his success resulted from his ability of finding gifted 
individuals to assist him. If all his difficulties are 
considered and the steps he took to overcome them, then 
Bohdan Khmelnytskyi certainly deserves more credit for his 
accomplishments than another of his contemporaries in some­
what similar situation —  Oliver Cromwell.
One of the greatest tasks before Khmelnytskyi was the 
fulfilment of his chief aim: to build a Rusin state on the 
ruins of the medieval Kievan Rus. This was an extraordinary 
task. Khmelnytskyi was therefore faced with a mass of prob­
lems . He had no trained civil service to carry out the 
administration. He had to rely on two patterns with which 
he was familiar: the Kozak military organization and the 
Commonwealth's form of government. But neither of these two 
patterns exactly suited for the structure of the new Rusin 
state. The organization of its administration, finances, 
justice, police, as well as solutions to the many social 
problems, especially those dealing with the serfs, therefore
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rested in his hands.
Despite all these difficulties and lack of precedents 
to fall back on, Khmelnytskyi proceeded to carry out his 
aim. Already following his first military successes, a 
"separate Commonwealth" began to take shape in the terri­
tories under Kozak control. Khmelnytskyi's immediate concern 
was to provide his troops with food and ammunition; but, in 
doing this, he also had to organize an effective system of 
administration, finances, justice and police. In this way 
he organized a nucleus of state machinery.
Khmelnytskyi1s chief helpers were the Kozaks. The 
composition of this Rusin stratum wa? radically changed 
during the conflict by the mass influx of serfs, burgesses 
and nobles into its ranks. The Kozaks therefore became the 
most important group among the Rusin people: their leading 
class; their spokesmen; their dominant military force; and 
even the state authority in the territory controlled by 
them. By this time the meaning of the Zaporozhian Army was 
becoming synonymous with the emerging Rusin state. Khmel- 
nytskyi endeavoured to consolidate the position of the Kozaks 
smd to bind the other Rusin social classes with the Kozaks.
Under these circumstances it is no wonder that 
Khmelnytskyi commenced to organise a kind of Kozak military
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republic. This was especially clear after the signing of 
the Treaty of Zboriv. The territory within the boundaries 
delineated by the Treaty of Zboriv was divided by him into 
sixteen regiments, and each regiment into a number of 
hundreds. The regiments and hundreds functioned both as 
military and territorial units. In each of these units 
administration, legislation, finances, justice and police 
functions were carried out by the Kozaks. The Kozak 
general council became the highest popular representative 
body. It shared legislative and executive powers with the 
Kozak hetman.
This council played an extremely important part in 
the years 1648-1649, and influenced many of Khmelnytskyi's 
decisions. The representatives of the general council 
consisted of the secretary general, the quartermaster 
general, the judge general and the two adjutants general. 
They were the chief military and civilian officers, and they 
acted as a sort of permanent cabinet or chief advisers to 
Khmelnytskyi. Each one had specific function or functions 
to carry out: the secretary directed Khmelnytskyi1s chancery; 
the quartermaster maintained the register of the Kozak Army 
and frequently acted as a census taker; the.judge dealt with 
all matters of justice; and the two adjutants organized
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military councils and participated in the reception of 
foreign envoys.
The government consisted of the council of Kozak 
officers. It was this council that was frequently called 
into session by Khmelnytskyi, for it was easier to work with 
and influence it than the unruly general council. The Kozak 
officers examined all major military, legislative, adminis­
trative, economic and general political matters. The^also 
pronounced on such matters as war and peace, embassies and 
diplomatic contacts. Finally, the office of the Kozak 
hetman was vested with great power. Khmelnytskyi therefore 
became the supreme military commander and at the same time 
a kind of prime minister and minister of foreign affairs.
At the same time as Khmelnytskyi began to lay foun­
dations for the Rusin state, he was undecided whether it 
should be part of the Commonwealth or whether it should 
lead a separate existence. He seriously considered a plan 
whereby the dual structure of the Polish-Lithuanian state 
would be transformed into a trialist state, and in which 
the position of the Rusin segment would be both equal and 
autonomous. This transformation was possible only if the 
position of the king was changed from a mere primus inter 
pares among the nobles to an absolute ruler.
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A strong monarch would be able to guarantee the
existence of an autonomous Rusin state and to protect the
rights of his Rusin subject. "We pray to God, that Your
Majesty, Our Gracious Lord, may become an autocrat, as
other kings", he wrote to Jan Kazimierz btfore his election,
"and not just as the late predecessors of Your Majesty, who
2
really were in the bondage [of the nobles]". In February 
1649, during his negotiations with the commissioners at 
Pereiaslav, Khmelnytskyi pursued the same theme: "The king
is a king in order to have the liberty to do whatever he 
pleases; and [even] to punish and to behead the nobles, the 
dukes and the princes. If a prince disobeys [the king], off 
with his head; if a Kozak disobeys, off with his head as
3
well". In these words Khmelnytskyi described a monarch 
who must be obeyed by all his subjects, regardless of rank 
or position, and who must be in a position to effectively 
curb the lawlessness of the magna’tes and of the gentry.
2 . . .
B. Khmelnytskyi!s letter to Jan Kazimierz, Zamostia,
November 15, 1648, in Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc 
(Kiev, 1954), p. 80. Khmelnytskyi addressed Jan Kazimierz 
as "Your Majesty" because he assumed the title of "here­
ditary King of Swedes, Goths and Vandals" after the death 
of his brother, Wladyslaw IV.
3
Journal of W. Miaskowski, Pereiaslav, February 23, 1649, 
in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy etc., 3 vols (Moscow, 1954), II,
109.
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Furthermore, Khmelnytskyi sought to insure that the 
monarch would be able to guarantee the "rights and liberties" 
of his Orthodox Rusin subjects. Khmelnytskyi1s support for 
Jan Kazimierz was only a temporary measure. By casting his 
vote for the candidate of the party of concilliation, 
Khmelnytskyi was certain of gaining certain concessions and 
time to carry out his plans. A non-Catholic king would be 
more sympathetic to the faith of the Orthodox "Schismatics", 
he would be in a better position to resist the pressure of 
the Holy See and the Roman Catholic hierarchy of the Common-
' wealth, and he could be more easily persuaded to abolish the
<
Uniate Church. For these and other reasons Khmelnytskyi 
plotted the dethronment of Jan Kazimierz with Prince Rakoczy 
of Transylvania, to whom he promised the Polish throne. 
Khmelnytskyi1s envoys made this proposition to Rakoczy as 
early as November 1648; then repeated it again in January 
and March 1649; and again in September 1649, one month 
following the signing of the Treaty of Zboriv.
But the transformation of the Commonwealth into a 
trialist state proved to be impossible chiefly because of 
the opposition from the nobles and the Catholic hierarchy. 
Khmelnytskyi was therefore left with one choice; to cut off 
all ties with t^e Commonwealth and to establish a Rusin
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state outside of it. Such a step was a radical departure 
from the past. Prior to 1648 there was no movement for 
national liberation among the Rusin people as a whole. The 
Kozaks, who evolved as national spokesmen for the Rusin 
people, clamoured for autonomy only within the state organ­
ism of the Commonwealth. Even the most rebellious elements 
among the Kozaks, no matter that they acted independently by 
interfering into questions of the neighbouring states or by 
receiving foreign envoys and subsudies from the foreign 
monarchs, still acknowledged the nominal authority of the 
King of Poland and of the government of the Commonwealth.
By pursuing this course of action Khmelnytskyi was therefore 
faced with an extraordinary task and with a mass of problems.
Khmelnytskyi saw clearly that, once separated from 
the Commonwealth, the Rusin state would be encircled by 
rival and unfriendly powers. Under these circumstances it 
could neither wage war nor lead an independent existence 
completely on its own resources for a long time. With this 
in mind, Khmelnytskyi resorted to the usual expedient of 
political manipulations —  playing off the threatening 
powers against one another and forming alliances with those 
which were presumably the least dangerous. 'His first most 
pressing problem was to secure protection against the
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Commonwealth which would strive to.regain its lost terri­
tories . Khmelnytskyi therefore appealed to Muscovy for 
military aid. But Muscovy, using its" eternal peace" with 
the Commonwealth as an excuse, appeared rather reluctant to 
be involved in a matter it considered a domestic problem of 
the Commonwealth. In the years 1648-1649 Muscovy remained 
neutral and adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude.
Khmelnytski then turned to the Muslim world for 
support. He was successful in concluding a military 
alliance with the Tatars. No matter how costly and how 
unpopular this alliance proved to be, its advantages were 
great. Khmelnytskyi was assured that he would not be 
attacked from both sides at once. By accepting the pro­
tection of the Turkish sultan, Khmelnytskyi also checked the 
potential aggressive actions of both Muscovy and the Common­
wealth. Furthermore, by becoming a vassal of the High Porte, 
Khmelnytskyi secured a firm foothold on the Danube. Here he 
planned to establish buffer states out of Moldavia and 
Walachia. By these steps he began to alter the balance of 
power in Eastern Europe.
Bohdan Khmelnytskyi realized that the declaration of 
independence and the establishment of a Rusin state would 
lead his people into a long struggle with the Commonwealth.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
234
But he had no other choice. In 1649 he failed to achieve 
his two basic aims: to "free all the Rusin people from the 
Polish bondage"; and to extend the boundaries of the Rusin 
state "as far as Lviv, Kholm and Halych". Then, on the one 
hand, the Rusin people expressed a firm desire for an inde­
pendent existence; while on the other hand, there was no 
room for an independent Rusin state within the Commonwealth.
These attitudes were clear within the few months 
following the Treaty of Zboriv. The great majority of the 
Commonwealth's nobles would not hear any plans about 
constitutional changes in their state. They already gave 
an indication how they felt in this matter when they 
bitterly fought against "projects of absolutism" during the 
reign of King Wladyslaw IV. Even the smallest changes were 
considered radical by them, and as infringment on their 
"golden liberties". These nobles dismissed compromise or 
concessions as a solution to the problem; on the contrary, 
they were prepared to defend their privileged position to 
the utmost. Every conceivable vile epithet was hurled at 
Jerzy Ossolinski because he dared to warn them not to imi­
tate the example of the King of Spain, who did not want to 
seek compromise with his Dutch "fishermen" and later on was 
forced to entitle them "My Gracious Lords" in his letters.
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Ossolinski1s main supporter, Adam Kysil, was likewise "an 
individual . . . most unpopular in the Commonwealth".
Furthermore, the Roman Catholic hierarchy was not 
in favour of granting too many concessions to the Orthodox 
"Schismatics"; and resisted all pressure which was directed 
against the abolition of the Uniate Church. Both of these 
groups would never consent to the election of a non-Catholic 
king. The Diet of 1649 (November 22, 1649 to January 17, 
1650) echoed these attitudes. Although it ratified the 
Treaty of Zboriv, three major provisions were not carried 
out: the Orthodox Metropolitan Bishop of Kiev was humiliated 
by being refused a seat in the Senate; the Uniate Church was 
not abolished; and the amnesty was granted only to those 
nobles who "unwillingly" took part in the conflict against 
the Commonwealth.
Thus, on the one hand, the majority of the Common­
wealth's nobles remained obstinate and refused to profit 
from the lessons of the two years of bloody struggles. On 
the other hand, the Rusin people had gone too far to be 
satisfied with promises. The serfs were unwilling to accept 
the hated regime of landlords. Moreover, both sides had too 
many grievances against each other, for the,two years of 
conflict made deep wounds. It became clear to all that the
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two walls must collide again to resolve issues.
The Treaty of Zboriv did not bring lasting peace; 
on the contrary, it proved to be only another armistice. In 
the years that followed the times of fire, sword and blood­
shed reappeared in the Commonwealth. Bohdan Khmelnytsky 
again led the Rusin people in their fight for independence. 
But by 1651 he felt himself losing ground. He failed to 
achieve his aims, and in the process saw much of the 
national strength exhausted. He had to secure new allies 
and to obtain their military aid against the Commonwealth.
Because Muscovy remained non-committal, Khmelnytskyi 
was forced to turn to the Muslim world. But his Tatar- 
Turkish orientation brought him fresh disappointments, not 
the desired results. He failed to organize a great coalition 
against the Commonwealth; the Tatars continued to pursue 
their policy of treachery. In 1653 he made a decisive 
change in his policy. He dropped his orientation toward the 
Muslim world as an ally, and instead he re-established close 
contacts with Muscovy. In 1654 these contacts culminated in 
the Treaty of Pereiaslav, by which Khmelnytskyi accepted the 
protection of the tsar and all the territories under the 
control of the Kozak Army became part of the expanding Mus­
covite state.
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TREATY OF ZBORIV 
(Translation with a Commentary)
A Declaration of His Royal Majesty's Grace, given [in res­
ponse to ]• the Articles of the Petition of the Zaprozhian
■''The original text of the Treaty of Zboriv has perished. 
The following translation is based on copies of this treaty 
found in these three sources:
(a). Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., 15 vols (St. Peters­
burg, 1861), III, 415-16 [Hereafter cited as Text 1]. The 
text of this version of the Treaty of Zboriv is written in 
Russin (i.e., old Ukrainian). It was prepared for the Musco­
vite government in 1649. Although this text is the best 
composed version of the three versions of the treaty listed 
below, it is uncertain that it is a true copy of the original 
document.
(b). Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., 15 vols (St. Peters­
burg, 1878), X, 455-58. [Hereafter cited as Text 2 ]. The 
text of this version of the Treaty of Zboriv is written in 
Muscovite (i.e., old Russian). It was made from the penal 
records (Polish: ksiegi grodzkie) in Kiev. On March 8 , 1650 
the keeper of these records copied the charter of King Jan 
Kazimierz, issued at Warsaw on January 12, 1650, which con­
firmed the articles of the Treaty of Zboriv. The king issued 
this charter after the Crown General Diet of 1649 ratified 
the Treaty of Zboriv, and this charter contained the full 
text of the treaty. This entry in the Kievan penal records 
was recopied for the use of the Muscovite government, in 
connection with the Kozak-Muscovite Treaty of Pereiaslav 
(1654).
(c). J. Jerlicz, Latopisiec etc., 2 vols (Warsaw, 1853), 
I, 105-18 [Hereafter cited as Text 3]. The text of this 
version of the Treaty of Zboriv is written in old Polish 
(but modernized somewhat by the editor K. W. Wojcicki). It
237
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2Army.
1. His Royal Majesty has preserved for His Zaporo-
zhian Army all [its ] former liberties in accordance with
former charters [granted to it], and at the same time, for
[ the confirmation of] them, has graciously issued His own 
3
charter.
24 [With regard to] the numbers [of the registered 
Kozaks] in the Army, His Royal Majesty [has given] the fol­
lowing instructions: wishing to fulfill the petition of His 
subjects and to retain them in His service, [His Royal
Majesty] has consented [to increase the strength of] the
4 ■
Zaporozhian Army to forty thousand, and has entrusted the
is uncertain where Jerlicz obtained the copy of this treaty. 
Since this chronicler spent some time in Kiev and made us of 
the Kievan penal records, he most likely copied it from these 
records.
2
See the Articles on the Needs of the Zaporozhian Army 
addressed to Jan Kazimierz, Zboriv, August 17, 1649, in 
Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho etc (Kiev, 1961), pp. 128-30. 
These eighteen articles were the basis of the Treaty of Zboriv.
3
See the Charter of Jan Kazimierz for the Zaporozhian Army, 
Zboriv, August 18, 1650 (sic; it should be 1649), in Akty 
otnosiashchiesia etc., X, 453-55.
^According to the summaries of the royal chancery, there 
were listed 40,447 names of Kozaks in the completed Register. 
See S. Oswiecim, Stanislawa Oswiecima Dyaryusz 1643-1651 
[The Diary of Stanislaw Oswiecim, 1643-1651], ed. W. Czermak 
(Krakow: Akademia Umiejetnosci, 1907), p. 221.
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Hetman with the preparation of th.e Register of His Zaporo­
zhian Army. [The names of] the Kozaks will be entered [into 
the Register] according to rank, and whoever will qualify 
for this, on the estates of the nobles, as well as on the 
estates of His Royal Majesty, [in the territory] designated 
by the following towns, [his name] will be accepted into the
Kozak Register: beginning from this side of the Dnieper 
5
[River] at Dymer, Hornostaipol, Korostyshiv, Pavoloch, 
Pohrebyshche, Pryluky, Vinnitsa, [and] Bratslav, and thence 
from Bratslav to Iampil toward the Dniester [River], also 
included will be [the territory] from the Dniester to the
g
Dnieper and also from the other side of the Dnieper, at 
7
Oster, Chernrhiv, Nxzhyn, Romny [and] as far as the Musco-
8 * 
vite border and the Dnieper. With regard to other towns of
His Royal Majesty and of the nobles, [located] beyond the
delination described in this article: no Kozak will live in
5
i.e., the right bank of the Dnieper, 
i.e., the left bank of the Dnieper.
7
In Text 3 the town of "Ostrog" is listed. This is either 
the mistake of the chronicler or of the editor, for there was 
no town of that name on the left bank of the Dnieper.
g
i.e., roughly the territory comprising the areas of the 
Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv, including 
Zaporozhe.
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them; it will be permitted, however, for any one [living] 
in them, who wants to remain a Kozak and who[se name] will 
be accepted into the Register, to move with all his posses­
sions into Ukraine without any hindrance from his master.
The Register will be drawn up by the Hetman of the Zaporo-
zhian Army. It will be completed, at the latest, by the
9Rusin feast of the New Year [and prepared] in the following
u i i l \  f i s t  R t g i& U n .  ^ 4 -
way: the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army^will be enrolled as 
[ registered] Kozaks, [and upon completion] will subscribe 
[ it] with his own hand and [stamp it] with the seal of the 
Army. This [procedure] will be required [to be carried out] 
in order [to ascertain] that all those who became [regis­
tered] Kozaks might enjoy Kozak liberties, and that all 
others be subject to [the officials of] the castles of His 
Royal Majesty, and those [living] on the estates of the 
nobles, to their own masters.
3. The [Hetman's] mace of the Zaporozhian Army will
9
i.e., the beginning of the Orthodox ecclesiastical 
calendar, or September first, according to the Gregorian 
calendar. The Register was completed on October 27, 1649. 
See W. Lipinski, Stanislaw Michal Krzyczewski etc (Krakow, 
1912), p. 324. Kozak envoys presented it to Jan Kazimierz 
at a private audience on January 7, 1650. See Oswiecim, op. 
cit., p. 212.
Text 3 has the following additional passage: " . . .  New 
Year, if God will grant us life till the coming year 1650".
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always retain, in its present boundaries, the town of 
Chyhyryn, which has been conferred also on the present 
Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army, the noble^ Bohdan Khmel­
nytskyi, by His Royal Majesty,.[who has also] restored him 
as His faithful servant and [as the faithful servant] of the 
Commonwealth.
4, Whatever has taken place by the disposition of 
God during the present disorder will pass into oblivion; and 
the masters will neither punish nor seek revenge on their 
serfs.
5. His Royal Majesty has pardoned and condoned the 
actions of those nobles, both of Greek [Orthodox] and Roman 
[Catholic] faith, who in whatever capacity, have served in 
the Zaporozhian Army. And if any one of them has his estates 
confiscated, whether hereditary or those held by tenure, or 
if anyone has been declared infamous, because all of this 
has occurred during the present disorder, [all such proce­
edings] will be eradicated by a constitution of the Diet.^
•^Khmelnytskyi was entitled a noble of the highest order, 
i.e., "of noble birth" (Latin: generosus; Polish: urodzony) .
•^Although this treaty was ratified by the Diet of 1649, 
the original article 5 was amended by the Diet of 1650. This 
amendment specified that the amnesty, etc.,,would be extended 
only to those nobles who were compelled to serve —  or served 
"unwillingly" —  in the Zaporozhian Army. See Volumina 
Legum, 8 vols (Warsaw, 1737), IV, 332-33.
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6. The Crown Army will not be stationed in the 
towns which were assigned to the Kozaks by the Register.
7. The Jews will not dwell, [and] be neither 
tenants nor leaseholders, in the towns of Ukraine where 
Kozak regiments will be stationed.
12
8. With regard to the abolition of the [Church]
13Union in the Crown [Kingdom] of Poland, as well as in the
Grand Duchy of Lithuania; also with regard to the safety of
the [Orthodox] Church lands, foundations, belonging to them,
and, as well as the rights of the [Orthodox] Church: as [all
these matters] will be discussed and resolved by the Most
14
Reverend Father Metropolitan [Bishop] of Kiev and the
15
[Orthodox] clergy at the forthcoming Diet, His Royal
12In Text 3 the word "zamieszanie" (disorder, disturbance, 
turmoil, confusion) is used instead of ”zniesienie"
(abolition). This is obviously a mistake of the chronicler 
or of the editor, for in the article 3 of the Articles on the 
Needs of the Zaporozhian Army addressed to Jan Kazimierz, 
Zboriv, August 17, 1649, there is -a specific reference made 
to the abolition of the Union. See Dokumenty Bohdana 
Khmelnytskoho etc., p. 128.
13 .i.e., of the Uniate Church.
■^Sylvestr Kosiv, who was elected the Metropolitan 
Bishop of Kiev, following the death of Metropolitan Petro 
Mohyla in 1647.
15Text 1 has the following additional passage: " . . .  
forthcoming Diet, —  all [these.matters] were supposedly 
allowed for [already] upon the request of Father Metropolitan 
and the [Orthodox] clergy .
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Majesty is prepared to honour His promises, so that all [of 
His subjects] will enjoy their rights and liberties. His 
Royal Majesty has [also] consented to grant a seat in the 
Senate to the Metropolitan [Bishop] of Kiev.
9. In accordance with former laws, His Royal 
Majesty has promised to distribute all dignities [and] 
offices of the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav [and] Chernihiv 
among the resident nobility of the Greek [Orthodox] faith.
10. Since there are chartered Rusin schools in the
town of Kiev, as well as in other towns of Ukraine, the
16Jesuit Fathers will not be established there, but be moved
17 'elsewhere. All other schools which were in operation
18
there, m  former times, will be preserved entirely.
11. The Kozaks will not deal in whiskey: [they may
^i.e., will not found schools there.
1 7In Text 3 this passage reads as follows: "All other 
Rusin [my italics] schools" etc; and in Text 2: "All other 
[Roman Catholic] churches and schools" etc. The word Rusin 
in the former version changes the meaning of the text 
completely; while the latter version does not change the 
meaning of the text.
-^Articles 8 and 10 were further expanded by more conces­
sions to the Orthodox Church. See the summary of this 
charter, which was issued at Warsaw on January 12, 1650, in 
M. Hrushevskyi, Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy, 10 vols (New York, 
1956), VIII, 3, 262-63.
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distill it] , but only [in such quantities] as to fill their 
own needs, and which they may sell wholesale. The dealing 
in mead, beer and other fbeverages] , however, will be in 
accordance with the customs.
[Conclusion]. These articles will be ratified by 
19the Diet. All rancor [will pass] into oblivion; and at the 
present time only concord and love will prevail among the 
residents of Ukraine and the Zaporozhian Army of His Royal 
Majesty and of the Commonwealth.
Sigillum 
Maioris Cancellariae
Jan Kazimierz, by the Grace of God, King 
of Poland; Grand Duke of Lithuania, Rus, 
Prussia, Samogitia, Mazovia, Livonia, 
Smalensk, Chernihiv; [and the Hereditary 
King of Swedes, Goths and Vandals].
^ I t  was ratified by the Crown General Diet of 1649 (its 
sessions lasted from November 22, 1649 to January 17, 1650). 
The Diet of 1650 amended article 5 and ratified this treaty 
again. See Volumina Legum, IV, 258, 332-33.
20 *This was the full title of the king. See ibid., IV,
203 et seq.
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21Some historians date the Treaty of Zboriv from the time 
when its text was completed, i.e., Wednesday, August 18; or 
from the event on Thursday, August 19, 1649, when Khmelnyts­
kyi swore an oath of fidelity. The final act, however, took 
place on Friday morning, August 20, 1649, when Khmelnytskyi 
paid homage to Jan Kazimierz and asked for his pardon. See 
the anonymous diary, in Akty otnosiashchiesia etc., Ill, 413; 
and W. Miaskowski's letter to Anonymous, Zboriv, August 22, 
1649, in Jakuba Michalowskiego etc (Krakow, 1864), p. 438.
NOTE: For other sources where copies of the Treaty of
Zboriv are found, see Hrushevskyi, op. cit., VIII, 3, 217, n. 
1; and L. Kubala, Szkice historyczne, 1st ser., 5th ed (Lviv, 
1923), p. 114, n. 131.
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INDEX OF PERSONS
NOTE; Dates in brackets indicate the reigns 
of kings, sultans, tsars, etc. Date in paren­
thesis indicates the year of appointment to, 
or of investment with, an office, a dignity 
or a function. This applies only to the 
officials of the Polish-Lithuanian Common­
wealth .
1. A listing of the names of persons most frequently 
mentioned in this monograph during the years 1648-1649;
Ahmed Pasha: Turkish Grand Vezir.
Aleksei Mikhailovich: Tsar of Muscovy [1646-1676].
Arsenev, Fedor Iurevich: Voevoda of Volnyi Voinov .
Bolkhovskii, Prince Semen Nikitich: Voevoda of Khotmyzhsk.
Czaplinski (Czaplicki), Daniel: Deputy Sheriff of Chyhyryn.
Dolgorukii (Dolgorukov), Prince Iurii Alekseevich: Voevoda 
of Putivl.
Firlej, Andrzej: Castellan of Belz; Regimentary (1649);
Palatine of Sandomierz (1649); died in 1650.
Gembicki (Gebicki), Piotr: Bishop of Krakow (1643) .
Giray, Crim: Crimean Kalga.
Grodzicki, Krzysztof: "Governor" of Kodak (1640).
Gyorgy II Rakoczy: Prince of Transylvania [1648-1660].
Ibrahim I: Sultan of Turkey [1640-1648].
Islam III: Khan of Crimea [1644-1654].
Jan II Kazimierz: King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania
[1648-1668], Abdicated in 1668; died in 1672.
246
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Kalinowski, Marcin: Palatine of Chernihiv; Crown Field
Hetman (1646).
Kazanowski, Adam: Crown Court Marshal (1643); died in 1649.
Khmelnytskyi, Bohdan Zynovii: Hetman of the Zaporozhian
Army (officially in 164 9) .
Klimov, Grigorii: Starodubets.
Kobylskii, Ivan Semenovich: Voevoda of Sevsk.
Koniecpolski, Aleksander: Crown Ensign; Regimentary (1648).
Koniecpolski, Krzysztof: Palatine of Belz.
Kosiv (Kosov), Sylvestr: Orthodox Metropolitan Bishop of
Kiev (1647) .
Krychevskyi, Stanislav Mykhailo: Colonel of Chyhyryn
Regiment (1643); died in 1649.
Kryvonis (Kryvonos), Maksym: Kozak colonel; died in 1649. 
Kunakov, Grigorii: Diak.
Kysil, Adam: Palatine of Bratslav (1648); Palatine of Kiev
(1649) .
Lemckoronski, Stanislaw: Castellan of Kamianets; Regimentary
(1649); Palatine of Bratslav (1650).
Lcisko, Petronii: Orthodox Priest from Hoshcha.
Leontev, Zamiatnia Fedorovich: Voevoda of Sevsk.
Leszczynski, Andrzej: Bishop of Chelmno (1646); Crown Vice
Chancellor (1645).
Leszczynski, Boguslaw: General of Great Poland; Marshal
of the Chamber of Deputies (1648, 1649); Crown Treasurer
(1650).
Lubienski, Maciej: Archbishop of Gniezno and Primate (1641);
Interrex (1648).
Lubomirski, Stanislaw: Palatine of Krakow (1638); died in
1649.
Meshcherskii, Prince Nikifor Fedorovich: Voevoda of Briansk.
Miaskowski, Lukasz: Judge of Podolia.
Miaskowski, Wojciech: Chamberlin of Lviv; Secretary of
Jan Kazimierz.
Muhammed IV: Sultan of Turkey [1648-1687].
Nashchokin, Nikifor Nikitich: Voevoda of Trubchevsk.
Obuchowicz, Teodor Michal: Chamberlin of Mazyr.
Ossolinski, Jerzy: Crown Grand Chancellor (1643); died in
1650.
Ostrorog, Michal: Crown Cup-Bearer; Regimentary (1648).
Pleshcheev, Nikifor Iurevich: Voevoda of Putivl.
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Potocki, Mikolaj: Castellan of Krakow (1646); Crown Grand
Hetman (1646).
Potocki, Stanislaw "Rewera": Palatine of Podolia.
Prozorovskii, Matvei: Voevoda of Viazma.
Radziwill, Janusz: Field Hetman of the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania (1646) .
Sapieha, Kazimierz Leon: Vice Chancellor of the Grand Duchy
of Lithuania (1645) .
Smiarowski, Jakob: Deputy Sheriff of Cherkasy; died in 1649.
Szemberg (Szemberk), Jacek: Kozak Commissioner; died in
1648.
Szoldrski, Andrzej: Bishop of Poznan (1636).
Trubetskoi, Prince Aleksei Nikitich: Boiarin.
Tyszkiewicz, Janusz: Palatine of Kiev; died in 1649.
Unkovskii, Grigorii: Muscovite envoy.
Vasyl IV Lupul (Vasile Lupu): Hospodar of Moldavia
[1634-1653].
Velikoganin, Danila: Voevoda of Velikie Luki.
Waza, Prince Karol Ferdynand: Bishop of Wroclaw and Plock;
brother of Kings Wladyslaw IV and Jan Kazimierz.
Wladyslaw IV: King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania
[1632-1648] .
Wisniowiecki, Prince Jeremi: Palatine of Rus (1646); Regi­
mentary (1648, 1649).
Zagriazhskii, Ivan: Voevoda of Viazma.
Zaslawski-Ostrogski, Prince Wladyslaw Dominik: Palatine of
Sandomierz (1645); Regimentary (1648); Palatine of 
Krakow (1649).
2. Selected authors listed in the bibliography:
Chevalier, Pierre: French noble; army officer; writer.
Golinski, Marczyn (Golinski, Marcin): Councillor of
Kazimierz, a town near Krakow: chronicler; compiler of 
documents.
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Grondski, Samuel (Gradski, Samuel): Polish Protestant who
spent much of his life in Transylvania; writer; historian.
Hannower, Natan (Hannover, Nathan): Jewish chronicler;
kabbalist.
Jemilowski, Mikolaj: Polish noble; diarist.
Jerlicz, Joachim: Rusin noble; a typical "gente Ruthenus,
natione Polonus"; chronicler.
Kochowski, Vespasiano (Kochowski, Wespazjan): "Royal his­
toriographer"; poet.
Le Vasseur, Guillaume , Sieur de Beauplan: French noble;
army officer; engineer-cartographer in the service of 
Polish kings; writer.
Maskiewicz, Boguslaw Kazimierz: A petty noble from the
Grand Duchy of Lithuania; diarist.
Michalowski, Jakub: Castellan of Biecz; compiler of documents.
Obuchowicz, Kazimierz Filip: Marshal of the Chamber of
Deputies (1648); Secretary of Lithuania (1649); Palatine 
of Smalensk (1653); diarist.
Opalinski, Krzysztof: Palatine of Poznan (1637); satirist.
Pastorius, Ioachimus (Pastoriusz, Joachim): Clergyman;
historian; teacher; physician.
Paul of Aleppo: Archdeacon; secretary to Patriarch Macarius
III of Antioch.
Radziwill, Prince Albrecht Stanislaw: Chancellor of the
Grand Duchy of Lithuania (1623); diarist.
Rudawski, Wawrzyniec Jan: Clergyman; doctor of laws;
historian.
Temberski, Stanislaw: Clergyman; professor and official
historiographer of the University of Krakow.
Twardowski, Samuel: Soldier; historian; poet.
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APPENDIX III
GLOSSARY OF NAMES AND TERMS
Abbrevi at ions
Bel. Belorussian
Cze. Czech
Ger. German
Lat. Latin
Lit. Lithuanian
Pol. Polish
Rus. Russian
Tur. Turkish
Ukr. Ukrainian
ARCHMANDRITE: (Rus. Arkhimandrit; tf^ r. Arkhymandryt).
A monk charged with the spiritual supervision of several 
Orthodox monasteries, or the superior of a monastery of 
special importance.
CASTELLAN: (Lat. Castellanus; Pol. Kasztelan). With the
emergence of sheriffs at the end of the thirteenth 
century, castellans lost most of their authority and 
functions. In the Commonwealth of the middle of the 
seventeenth century, castellans retained certain of 
their military functions; other than that, they held 
honorary offices for life, which entitled them to seats 
in the Senate.
CONSTITUTION: (Lat. Constitutum; Pol. Konstytucja). Reso­
lution arising from the legislative activity of the 
Diet of the Commonwealth appeared as a constitution. 
Unlike the conception of a modern constitution, it com­
prised even the smallest and most trifling resolution. 
From the middle of the sixteenth century, constitutions 
originated in the Chamber of Deputies. They were read 
before the king and the Senate, approved, and published 
immediately after the last session of the Diet.
250
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CROWN: (Pol. Korona). One of the two component parts of
the Commonwealth. Poland proper, as opposed to the 
Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
CROWN ARMY: or regular army (Pol. Wojsko Koronne, or
more properly Wojsko Kwarciane) . One-quarter (Pol. 
kwarta) of revenue from royal estates (one-fifth from 
1538) was assigned for the upkeep of this army. It was 
formed in 1562-1563 and 1567. In 1648 its strength was 
3,410 men.
DIAK: (Rus.) Secretary of Central Muscovite government;
immediate superior of clerk. The Secretaries of Council 
(Rus. Dumnye Diaki) had high social status.
DIET: (Pol. Sejm). Central organ legislating for the whole
Commonwealth. Several kinds of Diets may be distingui­
shed:
1. Crown General Diet (Pol. Sejm Walny Koronny). It 
was composed of "three estates": the king; the Senate (arch­
bishops, bishops, palatines, castellans, and other high 
officials of the state or ministersand the Deputies 
(elected representatives from General and Territorial Diet- 
ines). As the Chamber of Deputies contained no representa­
tives of the towns or of the clergy, it was purely an assembly 
of the gentry. Crown General Diets were held in Warsaw.
Apart from legislation, other functions of these Diets 
included: control of finance; levy of taxes; reception of 
foreign envoys; formulation of foreign policy; call of 
general levy to arms; conferment of ennoblement; and grant
of mercy and amnesty. At times, these Diets sat as judical 
bodies. In addition there were: (a) "Ordinary" Crown General
Diets, which were called into session regularly every two 
years and lasted for six weeks; and (b) "Extraordinary"
Crown General Diets, which were summoned in case of sudden 
need and sat for a fortnight.
2. Convocation Diet (Pol. Sejm Konwokacyjny). It was 
summoned into session by the Primate during an interregnum. 
Under his presidency the Diet, in fact a "confederation", 
had the task of safeguarding the Commonwealth against 
internal and external danger, and to prepare for an election 
of a new monarch.
3. Election Diet (Pol. Sejm Elekcyjny) . It was summoned 
by the primate on a date and to a place (usually near Warsaw) 
decided by the Convocation Diet. Its main task was to elect
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a new monarch. This body prepared the text of the pacta 
conventa. It consisted of the Senate/ the Deputies and of 
all the nobles in attendance. Once the primate received 
the consent of all the electors, he then announced the name 
of the new king-elect.
4. Coronation Diet (Pol. Sejm Koronacyjny). It was 
summoned to Krakow, the former capital of Poland. The king- 
elect first swore to abide by the pacta conventa; he was 
then crowned and took the coronation oath. The Coronation 
Diet followed, at which all acts of the interregnum were 
confirmed.
DIETINES: (Pol. Sejmiki). These were assemblies of all the
gentry from a given region. Several kinds of Dietines 
may be distinguished:
1. General Dietines (Pol. Sejmiki Generalne). These 
were assemblies of deputies elected at Territorial Dietines 
and senators from certain regions (e.g., Great Poland, Little 
Poland, Mazovia, Rusin Lands or Lithuania). They held joint 
consultations and deliberations over their positions in the 
Crown General Diets.
2 . Territorial Dietines (Pol. Sejmiki Ziemskie). These 
were assemblies of all the gentry from a certain district or 
region. They were summoned by the king (or by the Primate 
during an interregnum). Their chief role was to elect 
deputies for the Crown General Diets, to draw up instructions 
for them and to deal with all local matters. There were the 
following kinds of Territorial Dietines: (a) Pre-Diet (Pol. 
Przedsejmowe), which elected deputies to the Crown General 
Diets; (b) "Hooded" (Pol. Kapturowe), which exercised tempo­
rary power, determined defense, organized judicature, etc., 
in their districts during an interregnum; (c) Deputation 
(Pol. Deputackie), which selected deputies or judges for the 
tribunals; (d) Election (Pol. Elekcyjne) , which elected local 
officials; and (e) Report (Pol. Relacyjne) , at which the 
deputies gave an account of their activities during the Diets 
they attended.
HETMAN: From the Lat. Capitaneus, and via the Low Ger.
Hoedman, High Ger. Hauptman and the Cze. Hejtman, came 
the Pol. form Hetman, Lit. Atmonas or Etmonas and Ukr. 
Ataman and Hetman. In the Commonwealth * it designated 
the ranks of its highest military commanders. There were 
two in the Crown and two in the Grand Duchy: Crown Grand
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Hetman and Crown Field Hetman;. Lithuanian Grand Hetman 
and Lithuanian Field Hetman. Prior to 1649 the Kozak 
commander was officially called "Elder"; in that year 
he was officially named Hetman. Lesser Kozak officers 
were also called Ataman or Otaman.
HOSPODAR: (Ukr.) Lord; a title often applied to the princes
or rulers of Moldavia and Walachia. The Rus. gospodin 
is close in derivation.
INTERREGNUM: (Lat.) In the Commonwealth it was a period
of time which lasted from the death of a king to the 
coronation of his successor.
INTERREX: (Lat.) In the Commonwealth, this office was
held from 1572 by the Primate. He was therefore the 
representative of a king, and wielded power as the head 
of the state during an interregnum.
KOZAKS: (Pol. and Ukr. Kozak; Rus. Kazak). An occupational
rather than ethnic designation. The West European form, 
Cossack, is the result of Pol. and Ukr. pronunciation of 
the Tur. word Kazak, which means robber, disturber of 
peace and adventurer.
1. Origin and Evolution: The so-called Codex Cumanicus
(1303), a lexicon of the language of Polovtsy (Cumans, 
Kipchaks), defined "Kozak" as a sentry, guard and escort.
To the Mongols (Tatars), from thirteenth to fifteenth cen­
turies, "Kozak" signified a free man, or one who was indepen­
dent, as well as an adventurer, vagabond, robber and waylayer. 
During the same period "Kozaks" were also known in Crimea. In 
the chronicle of the Genoese town of Soldaia (Sudak), refer­
ence was made to a "Kozak", a brig'and, who killed a youth in 
the year 1308. The statutes of the towns of Soldaia and 
Cembalo (Balaklava) also mention "Kozaks". In the middle of 
the fifteenth century they were performing various duties: 
some were armed guards of consuls of Kaffa (Theodosia); 
others were paid as escorts of caravans; still others were 
engaged in brigandage. At the same time, in Muscovy, the 
southern boundaries of the Riazan lands were protected by 
settlements of"Riazan Kozaks".
By the middle of the fifteenth century the south-eastern 
borderlands (i.e., "Ukraine") of Grand Duchy of Lithuania 
began to suffer from the raids of "Tatar Kozaks", who occupied
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Crimea and the northern shores of the Black Sea. The Slavic 
population of the Lithuanian borderlands, being in constant 
struggle with the Tatars, adopted from them their manner of 
warfare, way of life, dress and even their name. The first 
official mention of these "Ukrainian Kozaks" seems to have 
been made in 1492. In that year Khan Mengli Giray of Crimea 
complained to the Grand Duke Aleksander of Lithuania that men 
from Kaniv and Cherkasy wrecked and plundered his vessel and 
siezed ten horses. In response to this complaint the 
Lithuanian ruler promised to call these "Kozaks" into account. 
The Muscovites called the Kozaks of the Commonwealth by 
another name -- Cherkasy —  after a town of that name, which 
is often referred to as the "cradle of Kozakdom". In a broad 
sense they also applied this name to the population of 
Ukraine in general. On the development of Kozaks in the 
Polish-Lithuanian state in the sixteenth and the seventeenth 
centuries, see Chapter I.
2. Registered Kozaks: Starting in 1572 a certain number 
of Kozaks, varying from time to time, was enrolled for the 
service of the Commonwealth. The names of those accepted 
were entered into an official register (i.e., "Registered"), 
and they formed special regiments o f 4the regular army. The 
Registered Kozaks received extensive privileges: apart from 
pay and uniforms, they were exempt from the jurisdiction of 
royal officials and were able to elect their own officers 
(this right was taken away for the period 1638-1648). Since 
they were recognized by the government, such rewards as 
grants of land and even ennoblement for meritorious service 
to the state, were within their reach.
3. Kozak Army: The official Kozak Army, called His
Royal Majesty's Zaporozhian Army, was composed of Registered 
Kozaks. It was divided into regiments which were attached 
to designated towns in Ukraine; these into hundreds; and 
finally into tens. In 1638 the 6,000 Registered Kozaks 
formed six regiments: Cherkasy, Pereiaslav, Kaniv, Korsun,
Bila Tserkva and Chyhyryn. In 1649 over 40,000 Registered 
Kozaks formed sixteen regiments: to the six already listed 
were added, Uman, Bratslav, Kalnyk, Kiev, Kropnyvna,
Myrhorod, Poltava, Pryluky, Nizhyn and Chernihiv. The Kozak 
Army was a closed organization and carried out its own 
affairs. Except for the period 1638-1648, it had its own 
commander, court, chancery and ordinance officers; these, as 
well as all other regimental posts, were elective. The Army 
as a whole, under the guidance of the general staff, acted 
as an assembly. Similar internal organization was found at 
the Sich.
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LEGATUS NATUS: (Lat.) A person who is a legate, or a rep­
resentative of the Holy See, by his very office. This 
position was held in the Commonwealth by the Primate, 
the Archbishop of Gniezno.
MAGDEBURG RIGHTS: Common Law of Magdeburg (Ger. Magdeburger
Weichbild; Lat. Jus municipale Magdeburgense) was intro­
duced into Poland in the thirteenth century by German 
immigrants. It established civil rules, affected urban 
administration and social organization.
MANIFESTO: (Pol. Uniwersal; Rus. and Ukr. Universal). The
announcement of regulations and laws; message or procla­
mation of general information.
METROPOLITAN: (Rus. Metropolit; Ukr. Mytropolyt). The
title of a bishop in the Orthodox Church, who has juris­
diction over bishops of subordinate sees, and who ranks 
above the archbishop, but below the patriarch. In the 
Commonwealth, this title belonged to the bishops of Kiev.
PACTA CONVENTA: (Lat.) A bi-lateral agreement between the
king-elect and his electors, which contained the indivi­
dual obligations of the king-elect. If the king failed 
to fulfill the agreed conditions, then his electors had 
the right to withold obedience. This was covered by the 
articulus de non praestanda oboedientia.. This agreement 
was first formulated in 1573 at the election of King 
Henri de Valois.
PALATINE: (Lat. Palatinus; Pol. Wojewoda) . The title of a
governor of the largest administrative unit of the 
Commonwealth; literally leader of.an army. As its 
highest-ranking official, he presided over the Election 
Dietine, commanded the army (i.e., the mass levy of the 
gentry), supervised the towns (weights and measures) and 
acted as the judge for the Jews. He was appointed by 
the king for life and by the virtue of his office received 
a seat in the Senate.
PALATINATE: (Pol. Wojewodztwo). A territory administered
by the palatine.
«
PRIKAZ: (Rus.) Central government department or office in
Muscovy.
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1. Posolskii Prikaz; Department of External Affairs;
Foreign Office; or literally, Office of Ambassadors.
2. Razriadnyi Prikaz; Department of Defence; it
concerned itself chiefly with matters of military nature.
PRIMATE: (Lat. Primus). In 1417 the Archbishop of Gniezno
became "primas regni Poloniae" , a title by which he was 
able to exercise jurisdiction over all bishops in the 
country. In 1515 he was also a legatus natus; and from 
1572 he exercised the functions of an interrex.
REGIMENTARY: (Pol. Regimentarz). A military post created
for replacement of Hetman; a vice-Hetman. Created for 
the first time in 1648, when both the Crown Grand Hetman 
and Crown Field Hetman became Tatar prisoners.
SHERIFF: (Lat. Capitaneus; Pol. and Ukr. Starosta) . This
official was appointed ty the king; he was a local 
official bestowed with full powers over the district of 
his jurisdiction, with the exception of granting privi­
leges or charters. From the beginning of the fourteenth 
century there evolved the following: General Sheriff, a
viceroy in certain large regions (for example, in Great 
Poland); Castle Sheriff, with authority over a castle 
and surrounding districts; and Non-Castle Sheriff, a 
leaseholder of royal estates. An official ranking below 
the Sheriff was called Deputy Sheriff (Pol. Podstarosta; 
Ukr. Pidstarosta).
SICH: (Ukr.) (Pol Sicz; Rus. Sech) . A fortified Kozak camp
on one of the islands south of the Dnieper's cataracts. 
The first Sich was began ca. 1553 by Prince Dmytro 
Vyshnevetskyi, on the Island of Khortytsia; it served as 
prototype and model for later structures of this nature. 
The Zaporozhian Sich served as a military center for all 
Kozaks, and it was moved from island to island as con­
ditions demanded.
UKRAINE: (Pol., Rus. and Ukr. Ukraina) . The name (literally
borderland) is of considerable age. The oldest known 
example dates from the middle of the eleventh century.
In reference to the Polish-Lithuanian state, the geo­
graphic area of Ukraine underwent frequent changes. From 
the sixteenth century, this name was generally applied 
to the southern Dnieper region, or the south-eastern
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confines of Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In 1569 Ukraine 
became part of the Province of Little Poland and passed 
under the authority of the Crown. This nomenclature 
began to appear in official acts (frequently not capital­
ized, i.e., "borderland"). It was almost restricted to 
geo-topographic use, for the name Ukraine was never used 
to designate a political area in the same sense as, for 
example, Podolia or Volynia had been. In a more restric­
ted use in the middle of the seventeenth century, Ukraine 
encompassed the steppe areas of the Palatinates of Kiev 
and Bratslav; in the broadest use, the area comprising 
the Palatinates of Kiev, Bratslav and Chernihiv.
UNION OF BREST: (Bel. and Rus. Brest; Pol. Brzesc; Ukr.
Berest). As the result of the Union of Brest (1596) the 
Orthodox Church within the boundaries of the Commonwealth 
(i.e., Kievan Metropolitan See) became the Greek Catholic 
or Uniate Church. The Uniates accepted papal supremacy; 
they retained the traditional Eastern liturgy, including 
the use of Slavonic language, communion of two kinds and 
marriage of lower clergy. The Uniate bishops and priests 
were to enjoy the rights and privileges of their Roman 
Catholic counterparts.
UNION OF LUBLIN: In 1569 the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand
Duchy of Lithuania united to form "The Commonwealth of 
both Nations" (Lat. Respublica; Pol. Rzeczpospolita).
The union turned the hitherto purely personal union of 
the two countries into something resembling a confedera­
tion, similar to that of England and Scotland. Both 
Poland and Lithuania had a common king (who retained his 
title of grand duke in Lithuania), Diet, currency and 
foreign policy. Each part of the.Commonwealth had 
separate ministers, armies, treasuries and courts; and 
Lithuania retained its judicial codes and its official 
language. At the time of the union Lithuania ceded to 
Poland the Palatinates of Podlachia, Volynia, Bratslav 
and Kiev.
VOEVODA: (Rus.) Muscovite military governor of urban district
having judicial, financial and police functions.
VOEVODSTVO: (Rus.) A Muscovite territory <pr province
administered by voevoda.
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ZAPOROZHE: (Pol. Zaporoze; Rus. Zaporozhe and Ukr.
Zaporozhzhia or Zaporizhzhia) (Ukr. za = beyond; porohy 
= rapids, cataracts, i.e., literally land beyond the 
Dnieper's rapids or cataracts). In the strict use of 
this term, it was the steppe area south of the Dnieper's 
cataracts, on both banks of the river, to the shores of 
the Black Sea. In a broader use, it comprised the whole 
lower drainage basin of the Dnieper: south of Tiasmyn on 
its right bank and Orel on its left; and the Vast area 
stretching from S, Buh on the west, to the watershed of 
Donets on the east. The Zaporozhian steppe "wilderness" 
was called "Wild Plains" or "Wild Fields".
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Vol. IV.
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Gawronski, Franciszek Rawita, ed. Sprawy i rzeczy ukrain- 
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[Ukrainian Affairs and Events. Materials Pertaining to
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the History of the Kozaks and the Haidamaks]. Lviv: n.p. , 
1914.
Grabowski, Ambrozy, ed. Ojczyste spominki w pismach do
dziejow dawnej Polski. Diaryusze, Relacye, Pamietniki, 
i t .  p., sluzyc mogace do dojasnienia dziejow krajowych 
i tudziez listy historyczne do panowania krolow Jana 
Kazimierza i Michala Korybuta, oraz Listy Jana Sobieskiego 
marszalka i hetmana wielkiego koronnego, z rekopismow 
zebrane [References to the Fatherland in Works Pertaining 
to the History of Old Poland: Diaries, Reports, Memoirs, 
and the Like, which may Serve in the Illustration of the 
Country's Past, and also Historical Letters Pertinent to 
the Reigns of Kings Jan Kazimierz and Michal Korybut, as 
well as Letters of Jan Sobieski, Marshal and Crown Grand 
Hetman, collected from Manuscripts]. 2 vols. Krakow,
1845.
Gudzenko, P. P., et al., eds. Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s
Rossiei. Dokumenty i materialy v trekh tomakh [The 
Reunion of Ukraine with Russia. Documents and Materials 
in Three Volumes]. Moscow; Akadgmiia Nauk S.S.S.R., 
1953-1954. Vol. II.
Helcel, Antoni Zygmunt, ed. Jakuba Michalowskiego wojskiego 
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Biecz, from an Old Manuscript Owned by Count Ludwik 
Morsztyn]. Krakow, 1864.
Ivanishev, N., ed. Pamiatniki, izdannye vremennoiu
kommissieiu dlia razbora drevnikh aktov, . . . [ Memorials,
Published by the Archaeographic Commission for the Study 
of Old Documents]. 4 vols. Kiev, 1845-1859. Vol. I.
Kostomarov, N. I., et al., eds. Akty otnosiashchiesia k
istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rosii [Documents Relating to 
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V I T A  A U C T O R I S
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Department of History Graduate Fellowship; 
and Province of Ontario Graduate 
Fellowship
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